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ABSTRACT
THREE ESSAYS ON CEO CHARACTERISTICS AND CORPORATE DECISIONS
Trung Nguyen
Old Dominion University, 2019
Director: Dr. John A. Doukas

Recent studies have stressed the importance of managerial fixed effects on firm investment
decisions. Following this stream of research, this dissertation empirically investigates the potential
effects of two major Chief Executive Officer (CEO) characteristics, i.e. risk preferences and
potential mobility, on corporate decisions such as merger and acquisition (M&A) and corporate
social responsibility (CSR) investments.
Essay 1 examines whether the variation of M&A stock returns around the 2008 financial
crisis is associated with shareholders’ increased loss aversion as a result of undergoing financial
losses. The results show that acquisitions carried out by CEOs with risk-averse inducing
compensation (inside debt) before and during the financial crisis creates greater shareholder gains
than counterpart M&As by CEOs with risk-seeking (convex) compensation. However, this pattern
is reversed in the post-crisis period, suggesting that equity holders’ risk tolerance is amplified after
the financial crisis, consistent with the prospect theory predicting that economic agents become
more risk-seeking subsequent to suffering a financial loss.
Essay 2 investigates shareholder reactions to CSR investments undertaken by firms under
the helm of CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation contracts. The evidence
shows that CSR announcements carried out by CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing
compensation generate higher (lower) cumulative abnormal returns and post-CSR long-term
performance. This pattern holds under a battery of robustness checks. In addition, firms led by

CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation contracts are less (more) likely to
engage in excessive CSR decisions and associated with greater (lower) CSR information
disclosure and improved financial performance.
Essay 3 explores the impact of CEO mobility on M&As. Using ability and willingness to
switch jobs as a proxy for CEO mobility, the evidence shows that acquiring CEOs’ mobility has a
positive effect on the propensity to engage in value-increasing M&A deals. In addition, acquiring
firms led by more (less) mobile CEOs are associated with higher (lower) short-term shareholder
gains, realize better (worse) post-M&A long-term performance, and tend to use cash (stock) to
finance M&A transactions. The empirical results are robust to potential omitted variable bias and
self-selection bias.
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the finance and business literature by reconciling
some of the gaps left by prior studies based on unexplored thus far key managerial characteristics
that truly matter in corporate decision making. Furthermore, this work empirically validates and
refines recently proposed measures of CEO potential mobility that can potentially be used to
address additional research issues in the future.
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ESSAY 1: SHAREHOLDER REACTIONS TO ACQUISITIONS AROUND THE
REALM OF HIGH UNCERTAINTY
INTRODUCTION
A key focus of research in corporate finance is whether mergers and acquisitions (M&A)
create or destroy value. A considerable body of research concludes that most mergers do not create
value for anyone, except perhaps the investment bankers that negotiate the deals. This study
examines whether chief executive officers’ (CEOs) risk preferences can provide new insights into
the motives and the likelihood of creating value though M&As. This is inspired by the welldocumented fact that CEO heterogeneous traits do matter to firm corporate policies and
performance (e.g., Williamson 1963; Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Aghion and Tirole 1997;
Shivdasani and Yermack 1999; Bertrand and Schoar 2003). Among these characteristics, CEO risk
preferences have drawn extraordinary amounts of research attention in recent years (Coles, Daniel,
and Naveen 2006; Edmans and Liu 2011; Wei and Yermack 2011; Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and
Stuart 2012; Liu, Mauer, and Zhang 2012; Phan 2014; Srivastav, Armitage, and Hagendorff 2014;
Caliskan and Doukas 2015; Graham, Harvey, and Puri 2015). On average, a manager is believed
to be risk-averse because his or her portfolio is generally less diversified than that of stockholders.
From a theoretical standpoint, standard agency theory suggests that CEO risk preferences can be
affected by the nature of CEO compensation packages (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Jensen 1986;
Jensen and Murphy 1990). Specifically, a typical CEO will become more risk-averse (riskseeking) and be less (more) likely to engage in risky projects in accordance with the CEO’s
compensation design. From a practical perspective, a recent survey-based research by Graham,
Harvey, and Puri (2013) finds that CEO risk preferences are indeed tied to the CEO’s own level

2

of compensation. Furthermore, this survey demonstrates that CEO risk preferences are closely
related to corporate financial policies.
Consistent with this evidence, Cassell et al. (2012) investigate the effects of CEO risk
preferences on corporate policies and find that generally CEO inside debt holdings (i.e., risk-averse
encouraging compensation packages) induce them to pursue less risky investment and financial
policies. In addition, Liu, Mauer, and Zhang (2014) find that inside debt helps resolve agency cost
of debt but at the detriment of shareholders’ interests by encouraging CEOs to maintain excess
cash holdings. Major investment decisions made by risk-seeking CEOs are expected to be favored
by equity holders, but disfavored by bondholders. Wei and Yermack (2011) find evidence
consistent with this argument, with the bond (equity) market perceiving inside debt disclosure by
U.S. firms in 2007 positively (negatively). Several other studies also find a negative relation
between CEO risk aversion (i.e., inside debt) and accounting conservatism, the cost of debt, the
issuance of convertible bonds, and the usage of restrictive covenants in debt contracts (Chava,
Kumar, and Warga 2010; Chen, Dou, and Wang 2010; Wang, Xie, and Xin 2010, 2013; Li, Rhee,
and Shen 2018). Furthermore, firms with higher CEO inside debt holdings are likely to have
greater firm liquidation value and narrower credit default swap spreads (Chen et al. 2010; Bolton,
Mehran, and Shapiro 2015). In terms of dividend policies and payouts, Caliskan and Doukas
(2015) document that dividend payouts are positively associated with higher CEO inside debt
while convex CEO compensation decreases dividend payouts. In other words, it seems that riskaverse CEOs are willing to forgo growth (risky) opportunities in favor of more dividend payouts
as their compensation is loaded with greater inside debt. Srivastav et al. (2014), in the regulated
banking industry, instead report that CEOs with higher relative leverage (risk aversion) are more
likely to reduce payouts to shareholders, which supports the view that inside debt aligns CEO
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interests with the interests of bondholders, since the distribution of dividends to shareholders is
against creditors’ interests.
In this study, we add to the current stream of research by examining the impact of CEO
risk preferences on the nature and outcomes of M&As, the most visible and important investment
decisions CEOs can make. The Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and Alliances has documented
that over 44,000 transactions have been announced worldwide with a total market value of more
than 4.5 trillion USD in 2015.1 Highlighting the risks associated with M&A decisions, Furfine and
Rosen (2011) argue that such investments tend to intensify the acquirer’s default risk, on average.
Given the vital importance of this form of corporate investment, research scholars have
investigated its potential antecedents.
Although a larger number of M&A studies over the last three decades has identified several
determinants of acquirer performance, the overall variation in acquisition returns remains largely
unexplained. Specifically, a widely cited study by Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004)
examines over 12,000 M&A deals and, despite employing an extensive list of determinants, is able
to explain just over 5% of the variation in acquirer returns (as judged by the adjusted R2 values of
their main regression models). Similarly, studies with smaller samples such as those of Masulis,
Wang, and Xie (2007) and Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell (2012) report comparably low
explanatory powers. In contrast to the common belief that mergers fail to deliver value, anecdotal
evidence indicates persistent acquisition successes. For example, Cisco Systems, Berkshire
Hathaway, IBM, General Electric, and Diageo are some noteworthy examples of frequent
acquirers that most observers consider as having been consistently successful in their acquisitions.

1

More information is available at https://imaa-institute.org/statistics-mergers-acquisitions/.
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Therefore, we examine whether CEO risk preferences, gauged through the manager’s
unfunded and unsecured inside debt holdings, in addition to the exhaustive list of factors
mentioned above, can potentially explain the variation of M&A stock returns documented in the
previous literature. Moreover, while CEO risk preferences could play an important role, changes
in investors’ risk tolerance in response to a rare event such as the 2008 financial crisis could also
influence market reactions to M&A announcements. Cognizant of and motivated by recent studies
(Wei and Yermack 2011; Phan 2014; Campbell, Galpin, and Johnson 2016) documenting that
shareholders discern and react to disclosure of CEO inside debt compensation, we argue that
shareholder reactions to M&As consummated by high (vs. low) inside debt CEOs could also
change after the financial crisis in response to realizing financial losses during the crisis in accord
with the prediction of prospect theory. The importance of changes in investor risk preferences
around the crisis (financial loss) is suggested by prospect theory which predicts that economic
agents when suffering a financial loss, tend to increase their risk tolerance (Kahneman and Tversky
1979; Kahneman and Tversky 1984). That is, shareholders are expected to be much more riskseeking in the realm of losses where they are much more likely to take risks in order to recoup
previous losses or to recover from a loss in order to revert to a previous position by favoring M&A
decisions carried out by CEOs with risk-seeking (convex) compensations. Hence, the 2008
financial crisis allows us to directly examine whether investor risk tolerance changed by focusing
on equity market reactions to M&A decisions before, during and after the financial crisis.
Our study extends the discussion in the literature in two directions. First, recent studies on
inside debt are subject to the pre-2006 limitation of pension and deferred compensation data. More
important, they rely on post-2006 pension and deferred compensation data rather than the
compensation portion of supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs), a more accurate
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indicator of the unfunded component of inside debt. Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong (2013) show
that total inside debt may not be able to serve its intended purpose - the incentive-alignment effect
- because the three components of inside debt can be starkly different. Specifically, only the
compensation portion of SERPs is considered unfunded and unsecured, whereas rank-and-file
plans and other deferred compensation plans are more secure or can be withdrawn at a more
convenient time. If a significant portion of a manager’s inside debt is based on SERPs, one would
expect this to be a better measure of risk aversion. Otherwise, a CEO might still exhibit riskseeking behavior despite being exposed to a high level of overall inside debt holdings. Consistent
with this view, Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova (2013) document a negative association between
defined benefit pensions and bond yield spread. Similarly, Choy, Lin, and Officer (2014) find that
freezing only defined benefit pension plans is still associated with higher firm equity risk and firm
credit risk in subsequent periods. In addition, there is theoretical and empirical evidence against
the effectiveness of deferred compensation in mitigating risk-taking behavior (Wang et al. 2010;
Lee and Tang 2011; Inderst and Pfeil 2012; Leisen 2015). For instance, with respect to bonus
compensation, according to the conceptual model of Leisen (2015) a deferral could inherently
increase risk-taking.
Second, although a negative relation between CEO risk aversion and shareholder reactions
to M&A announcements has been reported in previous studies (Liu et al. 2012; Phan 2014), how
changes in both managers’ and shareholders’ risk preferences due to an extreme exogenous shock
influence the nature of M&A decisions and shareholder reactions to such corporate events remains
relatively unexplored and warrants further investigation. In this study we address this issue by
focusing on the recent financial crisis, undoubtedly a rare and major exogenous financial event
that forced the global financial market to cave in resulting in huge firm and shareholder financial
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losses. The intuition behind this examination is that economic agents’ risk preferences, according
to the prospect theory, are shaped by their past economic gains or losses. Hence, the recent
financial crisis offers a unique testing ground to examine the validity of this prediction in the
context of M&A decisions. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to argue that an extremely rare and
catastrophic economic event such as the 2008 financial crisis can alter CEO attitudes towards risk,
and subsequently affect their investment and other corporate decisions. Similarly, investors’ risk
perception and risk tolerance are unlikely to remain unchanged after the financial crisis (Campello,
Graham, and Harvey 2010; Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy 2010; Campello, Giambona, Graham, and
Harvey 2011; Bucher-Koenen and Ziegelmeyer 2013; Hoffmann, Post, and Pennings 2013;
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga 2015). Recent empirical evidence documents that people who
experienced a major shock in their life tend to become more risk-averse (e.g., Kuhnen and Knutson
2011; Malmendier and Nagel 2011; Cohn, Fehr, and Maréchal 2012). For instance, according to
Malmendier and Nagel (2011), individuals who went through periods of low stock market returns
during their early years are less likely to take financial risks. They are more likely to be pessimistic
about future stock returns, more reluctant to participate in the stock market, and allocate a smaller
portion of their liquid assets to stocks (if they decide to participate). Similarly, CEOs that grew up
during the Great Depression are averse to debt and excessively in favor of internal finance
(Malmendier, Tate, and Yan 2011). Using German Sparen und AltersVersorgE (SAVE) survey
data, Necker and Ziegelmeyer (2016) find households that experienced financial losses as a result
of the 2008 financial crisis tend to be less risk tolerant. Hence, while our study relates to the
previous literature that examines the impact of agents’ negative past experiences on their current
decisions, we use the recent financial crisis as the focal point of our analysis to investigate whether
the risk-tolerance of corporate managers and investors changed subsequent to the financial crisis
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in line with the conjecture of prospect theory. More specifically, we are interested in examining
the premise of prospect theory which predicts that economic agents who experience major
financial losses tend to increase their risk tolerance (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and
Tversky 1984).
Jointly, the research question whether CEO and investor risk preferences matter in the
context of M&As deserves additional empirical investigation conditional on an exogenous event
such as the 2008 financial crisis. In this paper, to address the two above concerns, we adopt and
employ two SERP-based measures of CEO risk aversion in conjunction with the traditional ones
that depend on both SERP and deferred compensation, and jointly examine whether equity
holders’ reactions to M&A announcements were influenced by their exposure to the 2008 financial
crisis. Our M&A sample is restricted to 2003–20152, mainly due to the time and cost of manually
collecting pension data via the companies’ annual proxy statements. Furthermore, the start of the
sample period is justified by the need to exclude any potential effects caused by the 2001 tech
bubble. Using a comprehensive sample of 1,929 takeover bid announcements by 417 unique public
U.S. firms, we find that CEO risk preferences are significantly associated with acquisition
announcement cumulative abnormal stock returns conditional on the financial crisis. Specifically,
the results of the univariate analysis, show that M&A carried out by risk-seeking and risk-averse
CEOs led to short-term shareholder gains before the financial crisis. However, equity investors
reacted positively (negatively) to M&A announcements associated with risk-averse (risk-seeking)
CEOs during the wake of the financial crisis. In stark contrast with the widely accepted notion that
shareholders are less likely to favor risk-reducing CEO compensation packages (i.e., inside debt),
because they motivate the undertaking of risk averse corporate decisions, our evidence suggests

2

For data merging procedure, the pension data is from 2002 to 2015.
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that CEO inside-debt compensation acts to the benefit of shareholders in devastating financial
times, such as the recent global financial crisis.
After 2009, more importantly, the equity market’s reaction to M&A announcements linked
with risk-averse (risk-seeking) CEOs is less (more) positive. Collectively, the evidence suggests
that the post-2009 behavior of both risk-seeking CEOs and equity investors seems to defy the view
in the literature that individuals who were exposed to exceptionally bad times tend to act cautiously
(conservatively) subsequently. Rather, their behavior is more likely to be consistent with prospect
theory (betting behavior). Specifically, equity investors appear willing to place bets on post-2009
M&A activities pursued by risk-seeking CEOs, since they hope that these investment decisions
will not only restore but also substantially grow bidders’ future value, resulting in positive
announcement excess returns considerably greater than those in the pre-2009 period.
These results also survive a battery of robustness tests such as alternative proxies of M&A
short-term stock performance, CEO risk aversion, and subsample analyses. Additionally, empirical
investigation of acquirers’ buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns post-2009 lends further support
to the betting attitude story, since M&As pursued by risk-seeking CEOs lead to lower long-term
performance than the ones initiated by risk-averse CEOs. Collectively, our results are consistent
with prospect theory predicting that economic agents who experience a financial loss tend to
become more risk tolerant afterwards (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kahneman and Tversky
1984) by betting on the outcomes of riskier investment decisions. Furthermore, we replicate the
analysis of Wei and Yermack (2011) for the 2009–2015 period and find that, after the financial
crisis, equity investors also react negatively to firm annual proxy statement disclosures, indicating
an increase in CEO relative leverage ratios (i.e., when CEOs become more risk-averse) among
firms with at least 1 billion USD in market capitalization.
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In summary, we document that equity market reactions to M&As are not uniform but vary
with CEO risk preferences and changes in shareholder risk preference around the 2008 financial
crisis. More importantly, our evidence demonstrates that equity holders who experienced the
financial calamity of the 2008 financial crisis, exhibited more risk-tolerant (gambling) behavior in
the post-2008 financial crisis than before with equity investors betting on and overestimating the
future gains of M&A deals announced by risk-seeking CEOs after the financial crisis. On the other
hand, unreported results show bondholders consistently placed a premium (discount) on M&A
announcements made by risk-averse (risk-seeking) CEOs before, during and after the 2008
financial crisis.3
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the research
methodology. Section 3 reports the univariate and multivariate results of acquirers’ cumulative
abnormal stock returns as well as additional robustness tests. Section 4 presents supplemental
analyses. Section 5 concludes the paper.
METHODOLOGY
Data collection
We utilize different secondary sources to compile the data of our sample. From the
Thomson One M&A database, we extract M&A deals announced by U.S. public firms with nonnegative common equity between 2003 and 2015. To construct the final sample of successful
M&A announcements, we impose the following restrictions (Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and
Teoh 2006; Liu et al. 2012; Phan 2014): First, the emphasis of our empirical analysis is on M&A
activities conducted by non-financial and non-utility firms in the United States; therefore, we do
not consider announcements made by acquirers with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes

3

These results are available upon request.
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that range from 4900 to 4999 or from 6000 to 6999. Second, an announcement is included in the
final sample only if the transaction value is at least 5 million USD and the transaction value scaled
by acquirers’ total assets is greater than or equal 0.1%. (Cai and Sevilir 2012; Huang and Tung
2016). This restriction ensures that our M&A sample only comprises successful announcements
that are likely to have a tangible impact on acquirers and their shareholders. The final M&A sample
consists of 1,929 successful deal announcements made by 417 unique acquirers (or 586 unique
CEOs).
Variable description
Cumulative abnormal stock returns
For each M&A deal, we follow the standard event study procedure to estimate acquirer
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement (Eckbo 2009; Wei and Yermack
2011). The cumulative abnormal stock return is calculated as the sum of several daily abnormal
returns for a two-day window (i.e., from t = 0 to t = 1) around the announcement date. We estimate
daily abnormal stock returns using the one-factor model (Sharpe 1964).
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
The acquirers’ daily stock returns are obtained from the Center for Research in Securities
Prices (CRSP). We calculate the coefficient estimate (𝛽) of the market risk premium (Rm,t – Rf,t),
using the estimation period from t = -251 to t = -11 relative to the M&A announcement date for
each acquirer. The daily abnormal stock return (ARi,t or 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ) is the difference between the actual
return and the return predicted by the one-factor model.4

4
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CEO risk preferences
Since pension and deferred compensation data became publicly available after the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission’s 2006 disclosure requirement, previous studies (Sundaram
and Yermack 2007; Edmans and Liu 2011; Wei and Yermack 2011) have recommended the use
of such information to better estimate the degree of CEO risk preferences. Because of the unfunded
and unsecured nature of pension and deferred compensation (or so-called inside debt), a CEO
whose compensation structure tilts toward these two debt-based components is exposed to default
risk comparable to that faced by bondholders, and the CEO is expected to display a higher level
of risk aversion. Accordingly, previous studies have used CEO relative leverage and CEO relative
incentive to identify whether a manager is risk averse or risk seeking. A CEO is expected to be
more risk-averse if exposed to a higher level of relative leverage or relative incentive (Edmans and
Liu 2011; Wei and Yermack 2011). Specifically, CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt
divided by CEO inside equity scaled by firm leverage while CEO relative incentive is the ratio of
the change in CEO inside debt to the change of CEO inside equity scaled by the change in firm
leverage.
However, information about CEO pension and deferred compensation was not made
available until 2006, which further limits the estimation of CEO risk preferences prior to 2006
from the Securities and Exchange Commission data source. A possible remedy is the collection of
this information from the listed companies’ annual proxy statements (i.e., form DEF 14A). In an
ideal scenario, we should be able to compute both pension and deferred compensation values for
a CEO, using information from such statements. Because deferred compensation was disclosed
with extremely limited information prior to 2006, we can only construct CEO risk preferences
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measures by relying on the estimation of pension values from 2002 to 2005.5 To estimate the CEO
pension data for 2002–2005, we strictly adopt the methodology proposed by Sundaram and
Yermack (2007). All the necessary inputs are extracted directly from the company’s annual proxy
statements. Given this information, we calculate the annual actuarial present value of each CEO’s
pension for 2002–2005.
Another problem with these two inside debt measures of CEO risk preferences is that they
do not address the opposing effects of the components of inside debt, that is, pension versus
deferred compensation. According to Anantharaman et al. (2013), despite sharing similar
characteristics, deferred compensations differ from SERPs in terms of withdrawal flexibility and
payment form. Essentially, deferred compensations are less likely to align CEO interests with those
of creditors. Following Anantharaman et al. (2013), we use CEO relative leverage (SERP) and
CEO relative incentive (SERP), as alternative measures, to control for this issue. As the terms
indicate, these two alternatives are identical to the proxies above, that is, CEO relative leverage
and CEO relative incentive, except that deferred compensation is excluded from the numerator.
Throughout our empirical analysis, CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive
(SERP) serve as our primary proxies of CEO risk preferences.6
Control variables
In the multivariate analysis, we include several control variables. Specifically, the Precrisis dummy is set equal to one if the M&A announcement occurred before 12/31/2007, and zero
otherwise. The During-crisis dummy takes the value of one if a takeover deal is announced
between 12/31/2007 and 06/30/2009, and zero otherwise. The Post-crisis is a dummy that takes
5

A comprehensive and exhaustive discussion of this issue is provided by Sundaram and Yermack (2007).
Following previous studies, we only consider acquiring CEOs with positive values for these two proxies (Wei and
Yermack 2011; Cassell et al. 2012; Phan 2014).
6
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the value of one if a M&A deal is announced after 06/30/2009, and zero otherwise. 7 In terms of
CEO characteristics, we control for CEO age and CEO compensation after logarithmic
transformation. Following previous studies (Andre, Kooli, and L'her 2004; Coles et al. 2006;
Cassell et al. 2012; Phan 2014), for firm characteristics, we incorporate firm size, the firm’s
market-to-book ratio, and the firm’s financial leverage into the model specifications. The related
items are extracted directly from the Compustat database. Concerning deal characteristics, in
addition, we control for the method of payment, that is, stock deal, friendly deal, private target,
public target, as well as industry and international diversifications. Additionally, we account for
the effect of the relative deal value, which is defined as the deal transaction in U.S. dollars, scaled
by the acquirer’s total assets. A detailed description of these variables is provided in Appendix 1.1.
Descriptive statistics
Table 1.1 reports the annual number and percentage of successful M&A announcements
made by U.S firms in our sample. The number of successful M&A announcements is evenly spread
across the sample period. However, the total number of M&A announcements in our sample
slightly declines from 208 deals in 2006 to 124 deals in 2009. If the financial crisis leaves a bad
impression among managers, we would expect a major decline in the ratio of M&As conducted by
risk-seeking CEOs to the total after the financial collapse of the markets. However, closer
examination reveals that the annual number of M&As conducted by risk-seeking CEOs does not
seem to drop dramatically, even after the financial crisis. Rather, the average percentage of annual
M&A activities of risk-seeking CEOs are maintained at more or less the same level, that is, around
76% pre-2007 as opposed to 71% post-2009.

7

12/31/2007 (06/30/2009) indicates the first (last) date of the 2008 financial crisis according to the business cycles of
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). The related information can be retrieved from:
http://www.nber.org/cycles.html.
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[Insert Table 1.1 about here]
In addition, the table shows the average of several items in terms of the CEO’s
compensation structure. As in previous studies, the majority of CEO compensation portfolios in
our sample consist of stock and option holdings. For instance, in 2008, CEO inside debt constituted
less than approximately 20% of CEO inside equity. Consistent with the number of M&A
announcements, average CEO stock and option holdings also experienced a significant drop in
2007 – 2009 period.
[Insert Table 1.2 about here]
Table 1.2 reports the descriptive statistics of all the right-hand side variables used in our
empirical analysis. Panel A reports acquirer and M&A characteristics while Panel B shows the
statistics for CEO characteristics. According to Panel A, 35.04% of our M&A sample consists of
internationally diversified deals, while around 45.20% of the sample represents industrially
diversified deals. About 39.40% of the deals are made before 12/31/2007 while approximately
50.60% of the M&A announcements occurred after 06/30/2009. The average transaction value is
around 10.08% of the acquirer’s total assets. Consistent with previous studies, more than 30%
(27%) of the announcements involve private (public) targets whereas less than 43% of the sample
involves other form of targets as specified by Thomson One. Of the final sample, there are only
4.15% of the takeover deals whose at least 30% of transaction value is finalized with stock. Similar
to previous studies, the average acquirer in our sample is overvalued and has a market-to-book
ratio of 1.8155 (Liu et al. 2012; Phan 2014). The average of the logarithm of CEO age is 4.0290,
that is, slightly higher than its median (4.0254). The means of our two primary measures of CEO
risk preferences are 0.8152 and 0.6807, respectively. Including CEO deferred compensation into
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the calculation, the means of CEO relative leverage and incentive are 1.1014 and 0.9243,
respectively.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Univariate analyses
Acquirer CARs and CEO risk preferences: Risk-seeking versus risk-averse CEOs
In this section, we first investigate the average reaction of equity holders to M&A
announcements estimated by the one-factor model for the entire sample period. Column (A1) of
Table 1.3 reports the means, standard deviations and number of observations for the full sample.
The acquirers’ CAR[0,+1] is positive and significant at 1% for the entire sample period. In
particular, acquirers earn 0.63% cumulative abnormal stock returns during the two days around
the event. Although the figure is generally consistent with recent papers (Liu et al. 2012; Phan
2014), it differs from previous empirical work (e.g.,Doukas and Travlos 1988; Dong et al. 2006)
reporting that M&As are, on average, value-destroying events. Therefore, we conduct an
additional analysis to address this issue and find that the difference is mainly due to the uneven
distribution of the method of payment in our sample. According to the literature, M&As financed
with stock tend to have lower or even negative cumulative abnormal stock returns than cash
acquisitions. As reported in Table 1.2, however, less than 5% of the deals included in our sample
whose at least 30% of transaction value is paid with stock. Hence, our results and most likely those
of recent work are probably attributed to the lower use of the stock method of payment (Fuller,
Netter, and Stegemoller 2002; Masulis et al. 2007; Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki 2011; Duchin
and Schmidt 2013; John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva 2015; Schmidt 2015).8 To confirm this, we

8

In their comprehensive analysis of U.S. M&As from 1992 to 2009, Netter et al. (2011) intensively discuss how
sample screenings can affect acquirers’ short-term performance.
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examine acquirers’ cumulative abnormal stock returns by method of payment (not tabulated here
for brevity but available upon request) and find the average CAR[0,+1] to be positive for cash
deals, whereas the corresponding average for stock acquisitions is negative, which is consistent
with the earlier acquisition literature. For instance, the average CAR for stock acquisitions is 1.49% (statistically significant at 5%), whereas that of cash deals is 0.72% (statistically significant
at 1%).
[Insert Table 1.3 about here]
Following the previous literature (Liu et al., 2012; Phan 2014), we also examine how the
equity market reacts to M&A announcements conditional on acquirers’ CEO risk preferences for
the entire period. Previous studies suggest that pension value or inside debt compensation would
induce managers to be more risk averse with respect to M&A decisions, since these compensation
packages will not be distributed until several years later or, even worse, until retirement (Sundaram
and Yermack 2007; Edmans and Liu 2011; Wei and Yermack 2011; Cassell et al. 2012). Managers
loaded with inside debt compensation are more likely to engage in risk-reducing M&A activities
that might not be in the best interests of shareholders. Therefore, our a priori expectation is that
equity investors will react more positively to M&A announcements made by risk-seeking CEOs
relative to those pursued by risk-averse CEOs. To test this prediction, we partition the M&A
sample into two groups based on CEO relative leverage (SERP). A CEO-year observation is
classified as a risk-seeking (risk-averse) if its CEO relative leverage (SERP) is lower (higher) than
the sample median. Accordingly, we compute the means and standard deviations of cumulative
abnormal stock returns as well as the number of observations for the two groups, namely, riskseeking CEOs that is, low CEO relative leverage (SERP) and risk-averse CEOs that is, high CEO
relative leverage (SERP). In addition, we perform the difference-in-means test between these two
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CEO groups. As shown in columns (A2) to (A4) of Table 1.3, takeover deals initiated by riskseeking CEOs earn marginally higher, though insignificantly so, cumulative abnormal stock
returns than M&A deals associated with risk-averse CEOs. In line with our prediction, M&A deals
announced by risk-seeking CEOs seem to deliver slightly better equity returns than those pursued
by risk-averse CEOs for the entire period from 2002 to 2015. This evidence is similar to the
findings of recent empirical work (Liu et al. 2012; Phan 2014).
Acquirer CARs around the 2008 financial crisis
Given the nature and consequences of the 2007–2009 financial crisis, many common
beliefs in business and economics have been questioned and challenged. For instance,
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2015) show that conglomerates, in contrast to the general consensus
that they are traded at a discount, outperform single-segmented firms by a considerable margin
during periods of financial distress. In the context of M&As, we also expect that the disastrous
event of the financial crisis would dramatically change the behavior of managers which, in turn,
affects corporate decisions and investors, for two particular reasons (Duchin et al. 2010; Hoffmann
et al. 2013). First, due to limited access to external capital and exogenously driven bottlenecks on
the demand side, firms are faced with additional constraints in selecting and financing potential
growth opportunities, which result in underinvestment (Campello et al. 2010; Campello et al. 2011;
Balakrishnan, Watts, and Zuo 2016; Gunn, Khurana, and Stein 2018). Second, recent behavioral
studies have shown that extreme events, such as the recent financial crisis, can alter investors’ risk
perception and tolerance thanks to their salience, in turn dictating investors’ trading and investing
behavior during and after such events (Malmendier and Nagel 2011; Bucher-Koenen and
Ziegelmeyer 2013; Hoffmann et al. 2013; Gerrans, Faff, and Hartnett 2015; Necker and
Ziegelmeyer 2016). For instance, Kuhnen and Knutson (2011) find that emotional states (positive
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versus negative) can dictate individuals’ subsequent beliefs and behavior. Hence, the
“characteristics of markets, economic policies, or organization design that have an impact on
emotional brain circuits may influence decision making under risk by changing both risk
preferences, and the learning process” (Kuhnen and Knutson 2011, p. 623). Therefore, the
financial crisis presents itself as an ideal setting to investigate whether investors’ exposure to such
a catastrophic event altered their risk tolerance, through their reaction to M&A announcements
conditional on CEO risk preferences (risk averse versus risk seeking).
Accordingly, we examine shareholders’ reactions to M&A announcements before, during,
and after the 2007– 2009 financial crisis. Columns (A5) to (A7) of Table 1.3 report the means and
standard deviations of cumulative abnormal stock returns as well as the number of observations
for each period. Means difference tests among the three periods are also reported in column (A8)
to (A10). Shareholder reactions are positive and statistically significant at 1% for the pre-and postcrisis, yet negative and insignificant during the crisis. More important, although M&A
announcements are associated with positive cumulative abnormal stock returns in the pre- and
post-crisis periods, those occurring after 2009 result in higher short-term economic gains,
suggesting that investor reactions were highly optimistic about the future performance of these
deals. For the two-day window, the short-term performance of post-crisis M&As is 0.38% higher
than that of pre-crisis M&As and statistically significant at 5% as shown in column (A10). This
implies that the equity market reacted to M&A news more positively after the financial crisis,
which seems to indicate that investors favored risky investments in the post-crisis period to recover
financial losses realized during the crisis. An alternative explanation for this result could be that
acquirers may engaged in more positive NPV acquisitions after the crisis, which triggered the
positive shareholder reactions. If this is the case, post-crisis targets should have a higher Tobin’s
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Q value, on average, than pre-crisis targets. Nevertheless, additional inspection of the data show
that there is no statistical difference in the public targets’ Tobin’s Q before (i.e., 1.8238) and after
the crisis (i.e., 1.6719). To put it differently, investors’ greater positive reaction to M&A deals
after the crisis is probably because they endorse risky investments to recover losses realized during
the crisis, not because acquirers engaged in superior deals after the crisis.9 Therefore, the evidence
documented so far is more consistent with prospect theory predicting a decrease in equity
investors’ risk aversion after the crisis as a result of having suffered financial losses due to the
financial crisis.
Acquirer CARs and CEO risk preferences around the 2008 financial crisis
The evidence so far has shown that equity investors do pay attention to CEO risk
preferences when evaluating M&A announcements and the 2008 financial crisis has affected the
market reactions to such corporate events. In this section, we directly compare shareholders’
reactions around M&A announcements for risk-seeking and risk-averse CEOs before (before
12/31/2007), during (12/31/2007 – 06/30/2009), and after (after 06/30/2009) the crisis. The
empirical findings are reported in panel B of Table 1.3. Before 12/31/2007, the M&A
announcements of firms run by both risk-seeking and risk-averse CEOs elicited positive
shareholder reactions and there is no statistical difference between the two groups. However,
during the crisis period (12/31/2007 – 06/30/2009), the average shareholder reaction to M&As
announced deals by risk-seeking CEOs is -0.98% and statistically significant at 1% while M&As
pursued by risk-averse CEOs triggered a positive but insignificant short-term shareholder reaction.
However, the difference between these two groups of CEOs is statistically significant at 5%. Thus,

9

We observe that acquirers in the post-crisis period allocated more capital resources in research and development and
capital expenditures. For brevity, these results are not tabulated here but are available upon request.
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this pattern reveals that equity investors seem to endorse the M&A decisions of risk-averse CEOs
when firms have to operate under tighter financial constraints and higher uncertainty during the
crisis which tends to amplify firms’ underlying risk (Hoffmann et al. 2013; Kuppuswamy and
Villalonga 2015). Furthermore, in contrast to previous studies arguing that IOU (inside debt)
compensation helps align managers’ interests with the interests of bondholders at the expense of
shareholders, the reported evidence suggests that inside debt appears to be beneficial to
shareholders as well, especially in high uncertainty times.
In the post-crisis period (after 06/30/2009), equity investors continue to react positively to
the acquisitions of risk-averse CEOs (i.e., 0.57% and significant at 1%) as in the pre-crisis and
during the crisis periods. However, shareholder reactions are even more positive to M&As made
by risk-seeking CEOs and the difference in terms of short-term shareholder gains is 0.65% and
statistically significant at 1%. In addition, as shown in columns (B2) and (B8), the difference in
acquirer CAR between the post- and pre-crisis periods for risk-averse CEOs is (i.e., 0.58% as
opposed to 0.57%) statistically insignificant. However, as shown in columns (B1) and (B7),
takeover bids pursued by risk-seeking CEOs after 06/30/2009 generated approximately 1.22% 0.45% = 0.77% (significant at 1%) higher abnormal returns than the ones conducted before
12/31/2007. Taken together, although equity investors preferred risk-reducing investments and
stayed away from investments made by risk-seeking CEOs during the crisis, in the post-crisis
period, shareholders on average exhibited a strong preference for M&As carried out by riskseeking CEOs than the ones pursued by risk-averse CEOs. Overall, the positive reaction of
shareholders in the post-2009 period suggests that the financial crisis amplified their risk tolerance.
Jointly, these findings do not appear to be consistent with the literature postulating that past severe
economic experiences (events) tend to reduce investors’ risk tolerance (i.e., increase risk aversion).
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A plausible explanation for the patterns reported thus far is that equity investors’ strong post-crisis
endorsement of risk-seeking CEOs’ heightened merger activity could be driven by shareholders’
betting attitude with the aim to recuperate losses realized during the crisis period. This pattern is
in line with the premise of prospect theory according to which investors’ risk tolerance increases
when previously they have experienced a financial loss. To ensure that the above reported results
are not biased by the interval of estimated CARs, we replicated the analysis using CAR[-1,+1]
window and the CEO relative incentive (SERP) instead of CEO relative leverage (SERP) to
measure CEO risk preferences and find that the new findings remain consistent with the reported
ones. These results provide additional support of shareholders’ increased risk tolerance in the post2009 period as a result of the financial losses they incurred during the crisis period.10
Multivariate analyses
CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to acquisition announcements
Next, we examine the equity market’s reactions to acquisition announcements carried out
by CEOs with different levels of risk preferences controlling for other effects. We employ ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions with robust standard errors to test the effect of CEO risk
preferences on acquirers’ CARs around the announcement dates. The main dependent variable is
the acquirers’ cumulative abnormal stock returns for the two-day event window.11 As mentioned
in Section 2, our research design controls for firm and deal characteristics such as the logarithm of
the CEO’ age, the firm’s financial leverage, the firm’s market-to-book ratio, firm size, methods of
payments, diversification indicators, target status, and relative deal value. In addition, we employ
both CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP) based on pension value,

10

These additional findings are available upon request.
We arrive at the same conclusion regardless of the event windows and factor models used to estimate the cumulative
abnormal stock returns.
11
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as alternative measures, to capture the effect of CEO risk preferences on acquirer CARs. The
baseline regression model of our study is as follows.
𝐶𝐴𝑅 𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑋𝑖 + 𝛽2 (𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠)𝑖 + 𝛽3 (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠)𝑖 + 𝛽4 [𝑋𝑖 ∗ (𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠)𝑖 ] +
𝑘

𝛽5 [𝑋𝑖 ∗ (𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠)𝑖 ] + ∑

𝑗=1

𝛾𝑗 𝑍𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖

(1)

According to equation (1), the emphasis in this study is to examine the effect of CEO risk
preferences Xi (i.e., β1) on acquirer CARs as well as the moderating effects of the 2008 financial
crisis on this relationship (i.e., β4 and especially β5).12 Specifically, if neither CEO risk preferences
nor the financial crisis matters to investors, we expect these coefficients to be statistically
insignificant. Alternatively, if equity holders place a premium on M&A decisions made by riskaverse CEOs relative to those made by risk-seeking CEOs during the crisis, as found in the
univariate results, β1 is expected to be significantly greater than zero. More importantly, if
shareholders’ risk tolerance increases subsequent to the financial crisis, due to losses realized as a
result of the financial crisis, the interaction coefficient β5 is expected to be statistically less than
zero in accordance with the prediction of prospect theory. That is, a negative value implies that
shareholders, after experiencing severe losses due to such a catastrophic event, become more risk
seeking after the crisis, as they gamble on the success of M&As initiated by risk-seeking CEOs
than risk-averse CEOs (Hoffmann et al. 2013). The empirical findings are presented in Table 1.4.
Regressions (1) and (3) show that the coefficients of CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO
relative incentive (SERP, for the entire sample period from 2003 to 2015, are 0.0006 and 0.0008
respectively. However, they are not statistically significant at conventional levels. This result
indicates that M&A decisions made by risk-averse and risk-seeking CEOs triggered roughly the

12

The base category is the during-crisis period.
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same market reaction, suggesting that in the eyes of equity investors, these decisions appeared to
be fairly similar.
[Insert Table 1.4 about here]
However, accounting for the 2008 financial crisis, we find empirical evidence consistent
with the reported pattern in Table 1.3. First, as inferred from regression (2), the marginal effect of
CEO relative leverage (SERP) on acquirer CARs before 12/31/2007 is 0.0057 – 0.0029 = 0.0028
and it is not statistically different from zero, suggesting that shareholders are indifferent between
M&A decisions made by risk-averse CEOs and those consummated by risk-seeking CEOs prior
to the financial crisis. Second, during the 2008 crisis, equity investors responded positively, instead
of negatively as documented in previous studies, to M&A announcements pursued by risk-averse
CEOs. Specifically, the coefficient of CEO relative leverage (SERP) is 0.0057 and statistically
significant at 5% level, as reported in regression (2). Inconsistent with previous studies arguing
that inside debt motivates managers to be risk-averse that creates agency costs for shareholders,
our evidence points out that shareholders during financial distressed periods prefer M&As made
by risk-averse CEOs as they tend to be more prudent and behave conservatively.
Third, as shown in column (2), the coefficient estimate of the interaction term (CEO
relative leverage (SERP) * Post-crisis) is -0.0080 (statistically significant at 1%), and the net effect
of CEO relative leverage (SERP) after the 2008 financial crisis becomes negative and equals 0.0080 + 0.0057 = -0.0023 (statistically significant at 5%), suggesting that M&As announced by
risk-averse CEOs are no longer favored by equity investors after the crisis. That is, while equity
investors favored risk-averse CEOs’ merger decisions during to the crisis (β1 = 0.0057), in the
post-crisis period, they endorsed the M&A decisions carried out by risk-seeking CEOs (β5 = 0.0080). To put it differently, shareholders’ post-crisis behavior seems to be consistent with
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gambling behavior, as they bet on the success of M&As initiated by risk-seeking CEOs. This
evidence is in line with the prediction of prospect theory that investors who experienced major
financial losses tend to exhibit more risk-seeking behavior, i.e., favoring risky investments to
outweigh losses realized during the crisis period. We find consistent results, as shown in column
(4), when we use CEO relative incentive (SERP) as an alternative measure of CEO risk-aversion.
With respect to the effects of other control variables, our multivariate regressions yield
consistent coefficient estimates with those documented in previous studies (Travlos 1987; Doukas
and Travlos 1988; Phan 2014; Cai, Kim, Park, and White 2016). Specifically, we find that
undervalued firms with smaller size are associated with higher short-term stock performance. In
addition, takeover bids announced before and after the crisis earns significantly higher returns than
those made public during the crisis. Regarding other deal characteristics, stock deals incur
additional loss to acquirers’ shareholders. In terms of diversification effects, we document that
both industrial and international diversifications are value-destroying activities and their
coefficient estimates are statistically significant at least at 5% across different specifications.
Alternative measures of acquirer cumulative abnormal stock returns
In this section, we continue to check if our multivariate results are robust to different
measures of acquirer short-term market performance. First, there is a possibility that a portion of
equity investors may know about the announcement before it is made public. To control for this
issue, we recapture shareholder reactions to M&A announcements using CAR[-1,+1] estimated
from the one-factor model and use it in place of the two-day CAR in the regressions. Columns (1)
and (2) of Table 1.5 provide consistent findings with what have been documented in the previous
sections. For brevity, the coefficient estimates of other controls are suppressed.
[Insert Table 1.5 about here]
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Second, a potential concern with the acquirer CARs based on the one-factor model used
thus far is that the CARs estimated for a number of M&A events after 06/30/2009 may be subject
to an upward bias because the chosen estimation period (i.e., from t = -251 to t = -11) can overlap
with the crisis period during which acquirer daily stock returns were abnormally low.
Consequently, we may draw inappropriate inferences from regression results based on these onefactor model CARs. To overcome this methodological problem, instead of using the one-factor
model, we simply compute abnormal returns for acquirer i on date t as follows.
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡
The acquirer CARs estimated from this method are unlikely to suffer from the upward bias
in the post-crisis period. We repeat the multivariate analysis using this simple market-adjusted
CAR[0,+1] and report the findings in column (3) and (4) of Table 1.5. These results are consistent
with the reported evidence in Table 1.4 suggesting that our prior inferences remain robust to the
above concern.
Alternative measures of CEO risk preferences and crisis period classifications
In addition to CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP) estimated
using only pension data, we also examine if our previous reported results hold with the two
commonly used debt-based measures of CEO risk preferences. Therefore, we repeat our empirical
analysis by employing CEO relative leverage and CEO relative incentive measures, which are
computed using both pension and deferred compensation. Since deferred compensation data were
not available until 2006, we restrict our sample to the post-2006 period in this section. Table 1.6
reports the multivariate results of regressing shareholders’ short-term reactions on these alternative
measures of CEO risk preferences. Overall, we consistently find that M&As conducted by risk-
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seeking CEOs earn higher short-term gains than M&As made by risk-averse CEOs in the postcrisis period, confirming the gambling behavior of equity investors.
[Insert Table 1.6 about here]
Beside NBER’s crisis classification, we also follow Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2015)
and divide the sample into four sub-periods: pre-crisis (2002Q1–2007Q2), early-crisis (2007Q3–
2008Q3), late-crisis (2008Q4–2009Q1), and post-crisis (2009Q2–2015Q4), where the pre-crisis
period serves as the baseline period in our regression models. In line with the previous analyses,
we are interested in the interaction terms between CEO risk preferences and these crisis periods,
or whether the effect of CEO risk preferences on equity market’s reaction to M&A announcements
differs across the above four sub-periods around the crisis.
[Insert Table 1.7 about here]
Specifically, in regression (1) of Table 1.7 for instance, the net effect of CEO relative
leverage (SERP) during the late-crisis period is 0.0031 + 0.0133 = 0.0164 and statistically
significant at 5% while such an effect in the post-crisis period is 0.0031 – 0.0052 = -0.0021 and
statistically significant at 10%. Overall, the regression results based on Kuppuswamy and
Villalonga’s (2015) crisis classification, shown in Table 1.7, continue to lend empirical support to
our arguments that CEO debt-based compensation appears to be beneficial to shareholders during
tough times, but they seem to become more risk tolerant after the crisis by engaging in gambling
as exhibited through their robust preference of riskier M&As undertaken by risk-seeking CEOs
with the expectation of recovering financial losses realized during the catastrophic event of the
global financial crisis.
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Effects of better corporate governance after the 2008 financial crisis
One may argue that the different equity reactions to M&A announcements made by riskseeking CEOs vs. risk-averse CEOs after the crisis may simply be due to better exerted corporate
governance in firms with lower inside debt. To address this concern, we repeat our multivariate
analysis with the inclusion of corporate governance measures as well as their interaction with the
post-crisis dummy. Specifically, corporate governance characteristics are captured using the % of
female directors on board and % of independent directors on board that are both retrieved from
the Bloomberg database. These results, as shown in Table 1.8, indicate that our main results do
not change after controlling for corporate governance. In addition, the effects of corporate
governance measures and their interaction terms are not statistically significant. Collectively, these
findings rule out the view that the different equity reactions to M&A announcements made by riskseeking CEOs vs. risk-averse CEOs after the crisis could be attributed to better corporate
governance after the crisis. This evidence lends additional support that investor risk preferences
changed as a result of the shock of the crisis.
[Insert Table 1.8 about here]
Subsample analyses using retained CEO sample and U.S. targets only sample
Although we provide sufficient theoretical as well as empirical evidence in support of the
argument that the exogenous shock of the financial crisis led to the shift in investors’ risk tolerance,
this does not completely rule out the possibility that the financial crisis endogenously affected the
risk preferences of corporate managers (e.g., via CEO turnover or lower compensation) and the
market’s reaction to M&A announcements. To address this concern, we focus only on a subsample
of takeover deals made by the same acquiring firms led by the same CEOs who appeared in at least
two crisis periods. If the empirical evidence remains robust for this subsample, we can safely
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conclude that the different shareholder reaction to merger announcements around the crisis is
attributed to a shift in shareholders’ risk tolerance as a result of this exogenous shock. These
findings are reported in Table 1.9. According to columns (1) and (2), the multivariate results for
the same CEO sample before and after the crisis remain consistent with our previously reported
findings in support of investors’ increased risk tolerance after the financial crisis.
Similarly, there is also a chance that the more positive reactions to M&As made by riskseeking CEOs (relative to risk-averse CEOs) post-2009 may be simply because this sample period
contains more new CEOs with lower inside debt compensation. Therefore, in an unreported
analysis, we exclude M&A deals during 2010-2012 made by CEOs who first appeared in our
original sample only after 2009 and replicate our analysis.13 The findings are still consistent with
our original evidence implying that there was a systematic increase, instead of a decrease, in equity
investors’ risk tolerance after the financial crisis.
[Insert Table 1.9 about here]
Furthermore, we check the sensitivity of our results by excluding foreign targets (35% of
the original sample). Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.9 show the OLS regression results for the
sample of U.S. targets. These findings point out that our original results are not affected by the
M&A sample of international targets.
In summary, in contrast to previous studies suggesting that IOU compensation only help
align managers’ interest with that of bondholders at the expense of shareholders, the reported
evidence implies that inside debt can be beneficial to shareholders as well during the financial
crisis. More importantly, the post-crisis evidence is also in line with the prediction of prospect

13

For brevity, these results are not reported, but are available upon request.
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theory that investors who experienced major financial losses tend to exhibit more risk-seeking
behavior, i.e., favoring risky investments to outweigh losses realized during the crisis period.
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES
CEO risk preferences and post-acquisition returns
While the univariate result has shown that equity investors’ reactions to acquisitions carried
out by risk-averse CEOs around the crisis were essentially uniform, the post-2009 overreactions
of equity investors to acquisitions performed by risk-seeking CEOs relative to their acquisitions
undertaken during-crisis suggest increased investor risk tolerance in favor of risky investments.
To examine whether the more positive and significant reactions of equity investors to the
acquisition announcements of risk-seeking CEOs post-2009 reflect investors’ speculative
overestimation of the future outcomes of these acquisitions, we focus on the post-acquisition
performance of such deals. According to the increased risk tolerance (gambling) hypothesis, we
expect the post-2009 acquisitions consummated by risk-seeking CEOs to be associated with a
negative and significantly lower performance than those by risk-averse CEOs. To address this, we
estimate the acquirers’ buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) as follows:
𝑇

𝑇

𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅[+1, +𝑇]𝑖 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ) − ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡 )
𝑡=1

𝑡=1

where BHAR[+1, +T]i is the buy-and-hold abnormal stock return of acquirer i over the next T
trading days after the announcement date. We examine acquirers’ long-term performance either
18 months (T = 375 trading days) or 24 months (T = 500 trading days) after the announcements.
Furthermore, Ri,t is the actual daily stock return of firm i and Rbenchmark,t is the daily benchmark
return predicted by the one-factor model. Table 1.10 documents the multivariate results for
acquirers’ BHARs.
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[Insert Table 1.10 about here]
Consistent with the gambling story, more risk-seeking behavior is consistently associated
with acquirers’ long-term value losses across most of the model specifications. According to model
(1) and (2), for instance, the coefficient of CEO relative leverage (SERP) (CEO relative incentive
(SERP)) is 0.0341 (0.0395) and statistically significant at 10%. In brief, these results are consistent
with the conjecture that shareholders generally exhibit gambling attitudes in the post-crisis period
and bet on risky M&A investments that eventually result in long-term value loss.
Shareholder reactions to annual changes in CEO risk preferences
The empirical evidence documented so far has confirmed that CEO risk preferences matter
in the context of M&As. More importantly, we have shown that acquisitions carried out by CEOs
with risk-averse inducing compensation during the financial crisis created greater shareholder
gains, compared with the ones performed by CEOs with risk-seeking (convex) compensation.
However, this pattern is reversed in the post-crisis period despite the severe impact of such a risky
event. If this is the case, we should also observe a similar result in the context of shareholder
reactions to a significant increase (decrease) in CEO risk aversion on an annual basis, before,
during and after the crisis. To test our conjecture, we replicate the results of Wei and Yermack
(2011) for all ExecuComp companies (excluding financial and utility firms) during 2007–2015. In
addition, we focus only on observations with a market capitalization of at least 1 billion USD since
these are more visible to general equity investors. Specifically, we investigate investors’ shortterm reactions to a shift in CEO risk preferences around the official filing dates of a company’
proxy statements (i.e., DEF 14A forms). The CEO–year sample comprises 4,684 observations and
is partitioned into two groups, risk-seeking vs. risk-averse CEOs. A CEO-year observation is
classified as a risk-seeking (risk-averse) if its change in CEO relative leverage greater than or equal
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to (less than) zero.14 During 2007–2009, despite being consistent with our expectation, the
difference is not statistically different from zero (not tabulated for brevity). However, for 2010–
2015, the findings reported in Table 1.11 provide evidence consistent with our main prediction
and that of Wei and Yermack (2011), that equity investors experience increased risk tolerance (or,
rather, gambling attitudes) in the post-crisis period and therefore dislike (prefer) firms run by riskaverse (risk-seeking) CEOs.
[Insert Table 1.11 about here]
Specifically, equity investors generally react more negatively (positively) to an increase
(decrease) in CEO risk aversion after the crisis. On one hand, for the risk-seeking CEO group, the
average of cumulative abnormal stock returns is consistently positive and statistically significant
at 5% across different event windows. For the risk-averse CEO groups, on the other hand, the
market reactions are consistently negative across all measures of cumulative abnormal stock
returns, and it is statistically significant at 10% in the case CAR[-1,+1]. For instance, a proxy
statement disclosure indicating a risk-averse CEO is associated with 0.15% deductions in shortterm performance. More importantly, the reported difference-in-means tests show that the average
of cumulative abnormal stock returns for the risk-seeking CEO group is statistically higher than
that of the risk-averse CEO group.
CONCLUSION
This study examines and sheds light on the variation of M&A announcement stock returns
conditional on CEO risk preferences and investors’ risk tolerance changes around the 2008
financial crisis. Previous studies have shown that CEO risk preferences gauged by compensation
14

Using changes in CEO relative incentive, or changes in inside debt in place of changes in CEO relative leverage
does not materialistically alter our empirical findings. In addition, substituting CEO inside debt with only CEO pension
value in the computation of CEO relative leverage and CEO relative incentive does not affect our results either.
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packages play an important role in corporate investment decisions. Motivated by this strand of
research, we examine whether risk aversion-inducing CEO compensation, in addition to an
exhaustive list of factors documented in the literature, can explain M&A outcomes. In addition to
the commonly used measures of CEO risk preferences based on both pension and deferred
compensation values to capture the level of CEO risk aversion, in this study, we use only the
unsecured and unfunded supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) to estimate more
accurate measures of CEO risk aversion. We also investigate whether the variation of M&A
announcement stock returns observed before, during and after the exogenous 2008 financial crisis
is linked to changes in shareholders’ risk preferences, and more importantly, whether such a
relation is in line with prospect theory postulating that investors make decisions based on potential
values of losses and gains rather than expected outcomes, and that their asymmetric (i.e., steeper
for losses than for gains) value functions imply loss aversion.
The empirical findings show that takeover bids announced by firms under the helm of riskaverse (risk-seeking) CEOs are associated with higher (lower) cumulative abnormal stock returns
before, and especially during the financial crisis. These results suggest that CEO inside-debt
compensation appears to be favored by shareholders in states of high economic uncertainty.
Regarding the post-crisis period, however, equity investors switch their preferences to M&A deals
pursued by risk-taking CEOs, indicating increased risk tolerance among equity investors after the
catastrophe. Consistent with the prediction of prospect theory, the observed pattern suggests that
equity investors bet on risky investments to outweigh losses realized during the crisis period. These
results are robust to different model specifications, alternative measures of CEO risk preferences
and M&A performance, as well as subsample tests.
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Additional analyses of acquirer long-term performance, and shareholder reactions to
changes in CEO inside debt in the post-crisis period provide supportive evidence to the
aforementioned conclusion. Specifically, despite being preferred by the equity market in the shortrun, the acquirers led by risk-seeking CEOs consistently underperform their counterparts in the
long run. Furthermore, shareholders also reacted negatively to proxy statement disclosures
associated with an increase in CEO risk aversion as they did to M&A announcements made by
risk-averse CEOs after 2009. Taken together, these results imply that equity investors endorse
increased managerial risk-taking M&A decisions in the post-crisis period. In other words, the
documented empirical evidence supports prospect theory positing that economic agents when
suffering significant financial losses, tend to increase their risk tolerance, and that their decisions
are based on the potential value of losses and gains.
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Table 1.1 M&A announcement distribution by year from 2003 to 2015
This table reports successful M&A announcements made by U.S. firms annually during the 2003 –2015 period. The means of CEO Option Holdings, CEO Stock
Holdings, CEO Inside Equity, CEO Inside Debt, CEO Pension, and CEO Deferred Compensation are shown in columns 2 to 7. More specifically, CEO Inside
Equity is equal to CEO Stock and Option Holdings while CEO Inside Debt equals CEO Pension and Deferred Compensation (reported in thousands). For the post2006 period, CEO Pension and CEO Deferred Compensation are extracted directly from ExecuComp. For the pre-2006 period, CEO Pension is estimated using
Sunderam & Yermack’s (2007) approximation method. The necessary inputs are manually collected from the companies’ DEF 14A proxy statements. The next
two columns show the number of M&As announced by risk-seeking and risk-averse CEOs, respectively. A CEO-year observation is classified as a risk-seeking
(risk-averse) if its CEO relative leverage (SERP) is less than (greater than or equal to) one. The last two columns show the annual number and percentage of M&A
deals.
Acquisition
Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total

CEO
Option
Holdings
25,585.83
25,795.62
32,768.49
36,821.72
31,482.94
25,185.07
43,209.40
13,807.75
16,348.38
18,331.01
15,369.41
20,351.81
40,683.05

CEO
Stock
Holdings
68,983.38
35,843.09
36,911.30
74,652.50
47,050.53
51,624.31
41,377.05
84,788.72
44,005.47
40,411.34
31,262.87
66,440.33
128,548.39

CEO
Inside
Equity
94,569.21
61,483.32
69,508.23
110,589.08
77,639.06
75,922.58
83,192.59
97,897.34
59,826.48
58,305.90
45,222.25
84,470.12
163,419.57

CEO
Inside
Debt
.
.
.
.
21,813.41
14,834.71
15,739.08
14,378.75
15,595.48
14,053.36
18,161.17
15,645.90
19,900.97

CEO
Pension
4,811.41
7,498.74
7,886.75
7,576.29
8,117.49
8,912.14
7,934.59
9,677.08
9,470.86
9,793.39
12,096.20
11,339.21
11,863.91

CEO
Deferred
Compensation
.
.
.
.
13,292.85
5,922.57
7,804.49
4,701.67
6,124.62
4,259.97
6,064.97
4,306.69
8,037.06

Risk-Averse
CEOs

Risk-Seeking
CEOs

M&As

M&As
(%)

5
47
42
37
40
52
25
46
60
55
33
40
34
516

14
119
149
171
136
90
99
112
126
113
76
109
99
1413

19
166
191
208
176
142
124
158
186
168
109
149
133
1929

0.98%
8.61%
9.90%
10.78%
9.12%
7.36%
6.43%
8.19%
9.64%
8.71%
5.65%
7.72%
6.89%
100.00%
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Table 1.2 Descriptive statistics of firm, M&A and CEO characteristics
This table shows the total number of observations, mean, median, standard deviation, and the 25 th and the 75th percentile values of all independent variables for the
final M&A’s sample from 2003 to 2015. Panel A reports the statistics for M&A and firm characteristics while Panel B shows the statistics for CEO variables. For
the post-2006 period, the items used to estimate CEO variables are extracted and estimated directly from ExecuComp. For the pre-2006 period, in addition to other
items available in ExecuComp, CEO Pension is computed using Sunderam & Yermack’s (2007) approximation method. The necessary inputs are manually
collected from the companies’ DEF 14A proxy statements. Appendix 1.1 provides the variable descriptions.
Variable
International Diversification
Industrial Diversification
Relative Deal Value
Stock Deal
Pre-crisis
During-crisis
Post-crisis
Private Target
Public Target
Friendly Deal
Firm Size
Firm Financial Leverage
Firm Market-To-Book Ratio
CEO Pension (in $ thousands)
CEO Deferred Compensation (in $ thousands)
CEO Inside Debt (in $ thousands)
CEO Age
CEO Compensation
CEO Relative Leverage
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)
CEO Relative Incentive
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)

Standard
Deviation
Panel A: M&A & Firm Characteristics
1,929
0.3504
0.4772
1,929
0.4520
0.4978
1,929
0.1008
0.2245
1,929
0.0415
0.1994
1,929
0.3940
0.4888
1,929
0.1001
0.3001
1,929
0.5060
0.5001
1,929
0.3090
0.4622
1,929
0.2794
0.4488
1,929
0.9025
0.2967
1,929
8.8187
1.6589
1,929
0.9395
4.1531
1,929
1.8155
0.8172
Panel B: CEO Characteristics
1,929
9,133.39
12,823.01
1,182
5,880.71
13,438.91
1,182
15,933
22,714.30
1,879
4.0290
0.1102
1,929
8.7541
0.9309
1,182
1.1014
1.0791
1,929
0.8152
0.9509
1,182
0.9243
1.0074
1,929
0.6807
0.8835
Observations

Mean

25%

50%

75%

0.0000
0.0000
0.0086
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
7.5947
0.316
1.2826

0.0000
0.0000
0.0287
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
8.601
0.5113
1.5864

1.0000
1.0000
0.0945
0.0000
1.0000
0.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
10.0086
0.812
2.0838

1,498.42
95.57
2,903.57
3.9512
8.2212
0.4352
0.2187
0.3214
0.1714

4,549.71
1,263.41
8,119.13
4.0254
8.7956
0.8312
0.5622
0.6478
0.4279

11,509.83
4,772.76
18,647.74
4.0943
9.3863
1.4480
1.0427
1.1870
0.8377
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Table 1.3 Acquirer abnormal stock returns: risk-seeking vs. risk-averse CEOs and pre- vs. during- vs. post-crisis periods
This table reports the univariate tests for acquirer CARs for different M&A subsamples over the 2003-2015 period. CARs are estimated using the one-factor model. In panel A,
column (A1) reports the results for the full sample. Column (A2), (A3) and (A4) show the statistics for different groups of CEOs (risk-seeking vs. risk-averse) as well as their
difference-in-means test. A CEO-year observation is classified as a risk-seeking (risk-averse) if its CEO relative leverage (SERP) is lower (higher) than the sample median. CEO
relative leverage (SERP) equals CEO pension divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage. Column (A5) – (A10) report similar statistics for the pre-, during-, and postcrisis subsamples as well as their difference-in-means test. The pre-crisis subsample comprises M&A announcements made prior to 12/30/2007. The during-crisis subsample
comprises M&A announcements made between 12/31/2007 and 06/30/2009 while the post-crisis subsample includes deals announced after 06/30/2009. Panel B provide the statistics
of different groups of CEOs for each crisis period. ***, **, and * are used to indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Panel A
Group
Mean
Standard Deviation
Observations

Group
Mean
Standard Deviation
Observations

Full
Sample
(A1)
0.0063***
0.0345
1,929

RiskSeeking
CEOs (RS)
(A2)
0.0070***
0.0375
964

RiskAverse
CEOs (RA)
(A3)
0.0055***
0.0312
965

RS - RA
(A4)
0.0015
0.0345

Pre-Crisis (Before 12/31/2007)
RiskRiskSeeking
Averse
RS - RA
CEOs (RS)
CEOs (RA)
(B1)
(B2)
(B3)
0.0045***
0.0058***
-0.0012
0.0342
0.0303
0.0323
380
380

PreCrisis

DuringCrisis

PostCrisis

(A5)
(A6)
(A7)
0.0052***
-0.0030
0.0090***
0.0323
0.0399
0.0347
760
193
976
Panel B
During-Crisis (12/31/2007 – 06/30/2009)
RiskRiskSeeking
Averse
RS - RA
CEOs (RS) CEOs (RA)
(B4)
(B5)
(B6)
-0.0098**
0.0037
-0.0136**
0.0440
0.0342
0.0394
96
97

Pre - During

Post - During

Post - Pre

(A8)
0.0082***
0.0339

(A9)
0.0120***
0.0356

(A10)
0.0038**
0.0336

Post-Crisis (After 06/30/2009)
RiskRisk-Averse
Seeking
RS - RA
CEOs (RA)
CEOs (RS)
(B7)
(B8)
(B9)
0.0122***
0.0057***
0.0065***
0.0375
0.0313
0.0345
488
488
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Table 1.4 CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to acquisition announcements
This table reports the results of regressing acquirer CAR[0,+1] on CEO risk preferences, CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative
incentive (SERP). CAR[0,+1] is estimated from the one-factor model. The two key independent variables are CEO relative leverage
(SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP). CEO relative leverage (SERP) equals CEO pension divided by CEO inside equity scaled
by the firm leverage while CEO relative incentive (SERP) is the ratio of the change in CEO pension to the change of CEO inside equity
scaled by the change in the firm leverage. The pre-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made before 12/31/ 2007,
and zero otherwise. The post-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made after 06/30/2009, and zero otherwise. Other
independent variables are defined in Appendix 1.1. Models (2) and (4) include the crisis dummies and their interaction terms with CEO
risk preferences. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate
significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Variable
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)

(1)
0.0006
(0.6001)

CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Pre-crisis
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Post-crisis

(2)
0.0057**
(2.2207)
-0.0029
(-0.9401)
-0.0080***
(-2.8379)

CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)

(3)

(4)

0.0008
(0.6782)

0.0061**
(2.1904)
-0.0030
(-0.8660)
-0.0084***
(-2.7363)
0.0102**
(2.4418)
0.0187***
(4.5774)
-0.0061
(-0.8012)
-0.0003
(-0.2215)
-0.0023***
(-4.0362)
0.0001
(0.7210)
-0.0015*
(-1.6882)
-0.0239***
(-3.5932)
-0.0030**
(-2.0005)
-0.0032**
(-2.1832)
-0.0010
(-0.5544)
-0.0003
(-0.1270)
-0.0054*
(-1.7507)
0.0040
(0.4533)
0.0501
(1.5513)
5.98%
1,879

CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Pre-crisis
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Post-crisis
Pre-crisis
Post-crisis
CEO Age
CEO Compensation
Firm Size
Firm Financial Leverage
Firm Market to Book Ratio
Stock Deal
Industrial Diversification
International Diversification
Private Target
Public Target
Friendly Deal
Relative Deal Value
Intercept
R2 (%)
Observations

-0.0033
(-0.4398)
0.0002
(0.1325)
-0.0023***
(-3.8819)
0.0001
(0.9369)
-0.0021**
(-2.2916)
-0.0245***
(-3.6357)
-0.0035**
(-2.2420)
-0.0036**
(-2.4209)
-0.0005
(-0.2837)
0.0002
(0.0994)
-0.0045
(-1.4584)
0.0050
(0.5606)
0.0488
(1.5387)
4.09%
1,879

0.0106**
(2.4496)
0.0196***
(4.5733)
-0.0058
(-0.7669)
-0.0003
(-0.2224)
-0.0023***
(-4.0284)
0.0001
(0.7268)
-0.0015
(-1.6321)
-0.0239***
(-3.5925)
-0.0030**
(-1.9885)
-0.0032**
(-2.1666)
-0.0009
(-0.5505)
-0.0003
(-0.1462)
-0.0055*
(-1.7649)
0.0041
(0.4594)
0.0485
(1.4993)
5.99%
1,879

-0.0035
(-0.4601)
0.0002
(0.1462)
-0.0022***
(-3.8613)
0.0001
(0.9399)
-0.0021**
(-2.3100)
-0.0245***
(-3.6341)
-0.0035**
(-2.2446)
-0.0036**
(-2.4266)
-0.0005
(-0.2903)
0.0002
(0.0952)
-0.0045
(-1.4487)
0.0050
(0.5605)
0.0491
(1.5504)
4.10%
1,879
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Table 1.5 CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to M&A announcements with different CAR measures
This table reports the results of regressing acquirer CARs on CEO risk preferences, CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO
relative incentive (SERP). The dependent variables are CAR[-1,+1] estimated from the one-factor model and CAR[0,+1]
estimated from the market model. The two key independent variables are CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative
incentive (SERP). CEO relative leverage (SERP) equals CEO pension divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage
while CEO relative incentive (SERP) is the ratio of the change in CEO pension to the change of CEO inside equity scaled by
the change in the firm leverage. In addition, the pre-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made before
12/31/ 2007, and zero otherwise. The post-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made after 06/30/2009, and
zero otherwise. Other independent variables are defined in Appendix 1.1. The standard errors are adjusted for
heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively.
Variable
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Pre-crisis
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Post-crisis
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Pre-crisis
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Post-crisis
Pre-crisis
Post-crisis
Other Control Variables
R2 (%)
Observations

One-factor CAR[-1,+1]
(1)
(2)
0.0074**
(2.1537)
-0.0045
(-1.1871)
-0.0094***
(-2.6174)
0.0082**
(2.1640)
-0.0049
(-1.1567)
-0.0101**
(-2.5621)
0.0130***
0.0126***
(2.9915)
(3.0142)
0.0217***
0.0208***
(5.0644)
(5.1112)
Yes
Yes
6.67%
6.69%
1,879
1,879

Market-adjusted CAR[0,+1]
(3)
(4)
0.0050*
(1.6601)
-0.0024
(-0.6830)
-0.0069**
(-2.1341)
0.0055*
(1.7148)
-0.0027
(-0.6916)
-0.0074**
(-2.1096)
0.0117**
0.0115**
(2.3325)
(2.4167)
0.0205***
0.0198***
(4.0955)
(4.2029)
Yes
Yes
5.56%
5.55%
1,879
1,879
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Table 1.6 Alternative measures of CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to acquisition
announcements
This table reports the multivariate results for different model specifications. In all specifications, the main dependent
variable is acquirer CAR[0,+1] estimated from the one-factor model. The two key independent variables are (1) CEO
relative leverage, and (2) CEO relative incentive for the post-2006 period. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside
debt divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage while CEO relative incentive is the ratio of the change
in CEO inside debt to the change of CEO inside equity scaled by the change in the firm leverage. In addition, the precrisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made before 12/31/ 2007, and zero otherwise. The post-crisis
dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made after 06/30/2009, and zero otherwise. Other independent
variables are defined in Appendix 1.1. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Variable
CEO Relative Leverage
CEO Relative Leverage*Pre-crisis
CEO Relative Leverage*Post-crisis

(1)
0.0062**
(2.4102)
-0.0064**
(-2.0699)
-0.0083***
(-3.0436)

CEO Relative Incentive
CEO Relative Incentive*Pre-crisis
CEO Relative Incentive*Post-crisis
Pre-crisis
Post-crisis
Other Control Variables
R2 (%)
Observations

0.0123
(1.4819)
0.0217***
(4.5632)
Yes
8.13%
1,172

(2)

0.0066**
(2.3694)
-0.0068**
(-2.0448)
-0.0088***
(-2.9458)
0.0113
(1.3781)
0.0206***
(4.5409)
Yes
8.07%
1,172
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Table 1.7 CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to acquisition announcements with alternative
crisis periods
This table reports the multivariate results for different model specifications. In all specifications, the main dependent
variable is acquirer CAR[0,+1] estimated from the one-factor model. The two key independent variables are CEO
relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP). CEO relative leverage (SERP) equals CEO pension
divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage while CEO relative incentive (SERP) is the ratio of the
change in CEO pension to the change of CEO inside equity scaled by the change in the firm leverage. The early-crisis
dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made during 06/30/2007 and 09/30/2008, and zero otherwise. The
late-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made during 09/30/2008 and 03/31/2009, and zero
otherwise. The post-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made after 03/31/2009. Other independent
variables are defined in Appendix 1.1. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Variable
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Early-crisis
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Late-crisis
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Post-crisis

(1)
0.0031
(1.4332)
-0.0013
(-0.5116)
0.0133*
(1.7088)
-0.0052**
(-2.1273)

CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Early-crisis
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Late-crisis
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Post-crisis
Early-crisis
Late-crisis
Post-crisis
Other Control Variables
R2 (%)
Observations

-0.0032
(-0.8370)
-0.0233**
(-2.4607)
0.0085***
(3.4118)
Yes
6.08%
1,879

(2)

0.0036
(1.4502)
-0.0015
(-0.5174)
0.0138
(1.5321)
-0.0056**
(-2.0471)
-0.0032
(-0.8868)
-0.0211**
(-2.3122)
0.0081***
(3.3981)
Yes
6.02%
1,879
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Table 1.8 CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to acquisition announcements with corporate
governance
This table reports the results of regressing acquirer CAR[0,+1] on CEO risk preferences, CEO relative leverage (SERP)
and CEO relative incentive (SERP). CAR[0,+1] is estimated from the one-factor model. The two key independent
variables are CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP). CEO relative leverage (SERP) equals
CEO pension divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage while CEO relative incentive (SERP) is the
ratio of the change in CEO pension to the change of CEO inside equity scaled by the change in the firm leverage. The
pre-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made before 12/31/ 2007, and zero otherwise. The postcrisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made after 06/30/2009, and zero otherwise. In addition, % of
independent directors on board and % of female directors are used to capture acquirer’s corporate governance. Other
independent variables are defined in Appendix 1.1. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and tstatistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Variable
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Pre-crisis
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Post-crisis

(1)
0.0107***
(3.4109)
-0.0104**
(-2.3737)
-0.0130***
(-3.9500)

CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Pre-crisis
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Post-crisis
% of Independent Directors
% of Independent Directors*Post-Crisis

0.0005
(0.9033)
-0.0005
(-0.9060)

(2)

0.0122***
(3.7140)
-0.0119**
(-2.4946)
-0.0144***
(-4.2218)
0.0005
(0.9121)
-0.0005
(-0.9287)

% of Female Directors
% of Female Directors*Post-Crisis
Pre-crisis
Post-crisis
Other Control Variables
R2 (%)
Observations

0.0256***
(3.8067)
0.0641
(1.3856)
Yes
9.72%
1,029

(3)
0.0099***
(3.5217)
-0.0096**
(-2.2731)
-0.0124***
(-4.1840)

0.0246***
(3.8210)
0.0636
(1.3820)
Yes
9.71%
1,029

(4)

0.0111***
(3.7333)
-0.0109**
(-2.3627)
-0.0136***
(-4.3518)

-0.0001
(-0.3058)
0.0001
(0.2981)
0.0240***
(3.9301)
0.0215***
(2.7939)
Yes
9.77%
1028

0.0000
(-0.0190)
0.0000
(0.0223)
0.0230***
(3.9307)
0.0214***
(2.7945)
Yes
9.74%
1028

Table 1.9 CEO risk preferences and shareholder reactions to acquisition announcements using the retained CEO sample and the U.S. targets sample
This table reports the results of regressing acquirer CAR[0,+1] on CEO risk preferences, CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP) only
for the sample of M&A deals made by CEOs who retained in the position for at least two crisis periods, and the U.S. M&As sample. CAR[0,+1] is estimated from
the one-factor model. The two key independent variables are CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive (SERP). CEO relative leverage (SERP)
equals CEO pension divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage while CEO relative incentive (SERP) is the ratio of the change in CEO pension to
the change of CEO inside equity scaled by the change in the firm leverage. The pre-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made before 12/31/
2007, and zero otherwise. The post-crisis dummy takes a value of one if the M&A deal was made after 06/30/2009, and zero otherwise. Other independent variables
are defined in Appendix 1.1. The standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant
levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Variable
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Pre-crisis
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)*Post-crisis
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Pre-crisis
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)*Post-crisis
Pre-crisis
Post-crisis
Other Control Variables
R2 (%)
Observations

Retained CEO Sample
(1)
(2)
0.0069**
(2.2881)
-0.0062*
(-1.9207)
-0.0085**
(-2.5315)
0.0073**
(2.1843)
-0.0066*
(-1.8347)
-0.0090**
(-2.4070)
0.0133***
0.0126***
(2.9027)
(2.8720)
0.0174***
0.0164***
(3.7348)
(3.7241)
Yes
Yes
7.63%
7.59%
1,077
1,077

U.S. M&As Sample
(3)
(4)
0.0042
(1.3348)
-0.0013
(-0.3364)
-0.0079**
(-2.2167)
0.0048
(1.3827)
-0.0015
(-0.3472)
-0.0084**
(-2.1834)
0.0078
0.0076
(1.2756)
(1.2928)
0.0180***
0.0172***
(2.9620)
(2.9692)
Yes
Yes
6.42%
6.41%
1,230
1,230
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Table 1.10 CEO risk preferences and acquirer post-merger performance after the 2008 financial crisis
This table reports the multivariate results for acquirers’ buy-and-hold abnormal stock returns after the financial crisis.
Acquirers’ BHAR[+1, +375] and BHAR[+1, +500] are estimated from the one-factor model. Consecutive M&A
announcements within 30 days by the same firm are excluded to mitigate the impacts of firms with multiple
acquisitions. The two main independent variables are CEO relative leverage (SERP) and CEO relative incentive
(SERP). CEO relative leverage (SERP) equals CEO pension divided by CEO inside equity scaled by the firm leverage
while CEO relative incentive (SERP) is the ratio of the change in CEO pension to the change of CEO inside equity
scaled by the change in the firm leverage. Other independent variables are defined in Appendix 1.1. The standard
errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significant
levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Variable
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)
CEO Age
CEO Compensation
Firm Size
Firm Financial Leverage
Firm Market to Book Ratio
Stock Deal
Industrial Diversification
International Diversification
Private Target
Public Target
Friendly Deal
Relative Deal Value
Intercept
R2 (%)
Observations

BHAR[+1,+375]
(1)
(2)
0.0341*
(1.7376)
0.0395*
(1.8565)
0.0705
0.0658
(0.3659)
(0.3416)
0.0710
0.0728
(1.1038)
(1.1293)
-0.0077
-0.0069
(-0.3606)
(-0.3258)
-0.0143
-0.0143
(-1.0204)
(-1.0203)
0.0505*
0.0512*
(1.9097)
(1.9482)
0.0211
0.0208
(0.2326)
(0.2286)
0.0573
0.0572
(1.3724)
(1.3701)
0.0077
0.0071
(0.1957)
(0.1795)
0.1468***
0.1465***
(3.0130)
(3.0081)
0.1374***
0.1369***
(2.9064)
(2.9003)
-0.0513
-0.0498
(-0.7565)
(-0.7354)
-0.0710
-0.0706
(-0.9854)
(-0.9796)
-1.1290
-1.1337
(-1.0498)
(-1.0539)
5.36%
5.41%
907
907

BHAR[+1,+500]
(3)
(4)
0.0409
(1.6200)
0.0466*
(1.6984)
0.2073
0.2027
(0.7035)
(0.6884)
0.1408
0.1428
(1.2955)
(1.3111)
-0.0232
-0.0223
(-0.6819)
(-0.6578)
-0.0245
-0.0245
(-0.9505)
(-0.9504)
0.0722*
0.0733*
(1.8486)
(1.8858)
0.0755
0.0751
(0.6504)
(0.6454)
0.0633
0.0633
(0.9848)
(0.9841)
0.0628
0.0622
(1.0657)
(1.0547)
0.1866**
0.1862**
(2.5488)
(2.5455)
0.1596**
0.1591**
(2.3334)
(2.3276)
-0.0709
-0.0693
(-0.7599)
(-0.7425)
-0.1887*
-0.1882*
(-1.6928)
(-1.6819)
-2.2953
-2.3037
(-1.3163)
(-1.3199)
5.56%
5.58%
907
907
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Table 1.11 Shareholder reactions to changes in CEO risk preferences reported in DEF 14A filings
This table shows the univariate tests for the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) two days, and three days around the
DEF 14A’s annual filing dates across different groups of CEOs for the 2010 –2015 fiscal period. The sample includes
only non-financial and non-utility firms whose market capitalization are at least one billion dollars. The final sample
comprises of 3,078 CEO-year observations. A CEO-year observation is classified as a risk-averse (risk-seeking) if its
change in CEO relative leverage greater than or equal to (less than) zero. The change in CEO relative leverage equals
the current period’s value minus the previous period’s. The cumulative abnormal returns are estimated using the onefactor model. The number of observations, mean and standard deviation are reported for each group of CEOs. In
addition, the table also reports the statistical significance for the difference-in-means test. ***, **, and * are used to
indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.

Group
Mean
Standard Deviation
Observations
Group
Mean
Standard Deviation
Observations

Full Sample
(A1)
0.0005
0.0226
3,078
Full Sample
(B1)
0.0001
0.0301
3,078

Panel A: CAR[0,+1]
Risk-Seeking
CEOs (RS)
(A2)
0.0012**
0.0222
1,859
Panel B: CAR[-1,+1]
Risk-Seeking
CEOs (RS)
(B2)
0.0012**
0.0299
1,859

Risk-Averse
CEOs (RA)
(A3)
-0.0006
0.0231
1,219
Risk-Averse
CEOs (RA)
(B3)
-0.0015*
0.0303
1,219

RS – RA
(A4)
0.0017**
0.0226
N/A
RS – RA
(B4)
0.0028**
0.0301
N/A
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ESSAY 2: WHEN DOES CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY PAY OFF?
INTRODUCTION
Investments in corporate social responsibility (CSR) have become more prevalent in recent
years. According to the U.S. Social Investment Forum Foundation’s 2018 report, around $12
trillion were invested in sustainable, responsible, and impact investing (SRI) funds, an
approximately

38%

increase

from

$8.7

trillion

in

2016.

In

addition,

a

recent

PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) global CEO survey indicated that more than 60% of chief
executive officers (CEOs) consider CSR a core business, rather than just stand-alone activity
(Horoszowski 2016). The recent surge in CSR investments is due to the common belief shared
among giant corporations (e.g., Google, Walt Disney, Lego) that views CSR as a means to help
create a competitive advantage over their competitors (Kramer and Porter 2011; Flammer 2015).
Given its growing importance to businesses in practice, CSR has become a major topic of interest
in academic research.15 For example, prior studies (e.g., Jiao 2010; Deng, Kang, and Low 2013;
Becchetti, Ciciretti, and Hasan 2015; Flammer 2015; Ferrell, Liang, and Renneboog 2016) have
investigated whether CSR truly enhances firm value by examining the underlying drivers at the
firm and industry levels. Nevertheless, empirical evidence on the effect of CSR on firm financial
performance is still equivocal at best (Renneboog, Ter Horst, and Zhang 2008).
Some studies argue that CSR investments boost firm financial performance (Jiao 2010;
Edmans 2011; Deng et al. 2013; Cheng, Ioannou, and Serafeim 2014; Flammer 2015; Ferrell et al.
2016) whereas others find CSR investments have the opposite effect on firm value (Mahoney and
Thorne 2005; Frye, Nelling, and Webb 2006; Fabrizi, Mallin, and Michelon 2014; Becchetti et al.

15

For a detailed discussion of this topic, see https://hbr.org/2018/02/more-and-more-ceos-are-taking-their-socialresponsibility-seriously.

53

2015). On one hand, proponents of CSR contend that moderate levels of CSR investment should
enhance corporate financial performance and/or shareholder value through improved relationships
with other key stakeholders or by CSR’s underlying hedging feature in the form of goodwill
(Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria 2004; Heal 2005; Goss and Roberts 2011; Humphrey, Lee, and Shen
2012). However, if excessive amounts of scarce resources are allocated to CSR activities, they
could produce the opposite effect due to potential agency problems between managers and other
parties whose interests are aligned with the company’s long-term performance. Specifically, CEOs
could have an incentive to overinvest in irrelevant CSR activities for their own private benefits
(e.g., raise their reputation as global citizens) or personal agenda (Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson,
Svaleryd, and Vlachos 2009; Borghesi, Houston, and Naranjo 2014; Kang and Han Kim 2017;
Liu, McConnell, and Xu 2017). Consequently, CSR activities can potentially harm shareholder
value in the long run. For example, Cronqvist et al. (2009) find that entrenched CEOs pay higher
wages to workers than what would be optimal instead of distributing residual corporate cash flows
back to shareholders. Therefore, whether CSR investments pay off remains a largely unresolved
question that warrants investigation.
Motivated by the studies of Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003)
that stress the importance of managerial fixed effects regarding firm investment decisions, a recent
stream of research has emerged proposing that the success of CSR and its effects on corporate
financial performance chiefly depend on CEO traits and behaviors. Employing the fixed effects
model of Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), Davidson, Dey, and Smith (2018) show that
CEO fixed effects can explain approximately 63% of the variation in CSR performance, whereas
firm and other unobserved fixed effects only account for less than 30%. In particular, this branch
of literature has examined a variety of CEO fixed effects, including demographics, hubris, political
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viewpoint, and managerial ability, on CSR (e.g., Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014; Tang, Qian,
Chen, and Shen 2015; Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, and Hill 2016; Yuan, Tian, Lu, and Yu 2017). For
instance, McCarthy, Oliver, and Song (2017) show that CEO overconfidence is negatively
associated with the degree of CSR investment as measured by the ratings of Kinder, Lydenberg
and Domini (KLD) because overconfident managers tend to underestimate firm risks and are less
likely to use CSR as a goodwill hedging strategy. Nevertheless, the impact of CEO risk
preferences, induced by the structure of compensation packages, on the nature of CSR decisions
and the valuation effects of CSR remain largely unexplored, although recent empirical studies
emphasize the importance of different CEO compensation packages on several corporate decisions
(e.g., Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart 2012; Phan 2014; Caliskan and Doukas 2015). In this
study, we therefore empirically investigate the valuation effects of CSR decisions by focusing on
CEOs’ compensation contracts designed to influence their risk preferences. The balance of our
study focuses on understanding whether the nature and valuation effects of CSR investment
decisions are related to CEO risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation.
Consistent with the previous literature arguing that risk-averse inducing compensation (i.e.,
high inside debt) motivates the undertaking of risk-averse decisions that increase the firm longterm performance, we also expect CEOs with higher inside debt holdings to engage in socially
responsible management practices that will ultimately add value to the firm. Because of the
unfunded and unsecured nature of pensions and deferred compensation, a CEO whose
compensation structure tilts toward such instruments is exposed to default risk akin to that faced
by creditors. Therefore, a CEO with debt-like compensation is expected to display a higher level
of risk aversion and pursue corporate decisions that enhance the long-term performance of the
firm. For example, Cassell et al. (2012) find that debt-like compensation discourages CEOs from
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investing in research and development (R&D) and leveraging firm capital structure while
motivating them to focus on operational hedging. Following this logic, we argue that CEOs with
risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation—that is, CEOs with high (low) inside debt—are
more (less) likely to be prudent in CSR spending. Specifically, CEOs with risk-averse (riskseeking) inducing compensation are more (less) likely to allocate funds to CSR investments that
are beneficial to firm long-term performance in accord with shareholder expectations. Therefore,
we predict that CSR investments decisions made by CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing
compensation are expected to be more (less) beneficial to firm value.
We examine the valuation effect of CSR investments conditional on CEO risk-averse (riskseeking) inducing compensation on a sample of 843 CSR events announced by 155 U.S. listed
companies (and/or 188 unique CEOs) from 2007 to 2015. Following previous studies, we gauge
CEO risk aversion using the variables CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO
relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. The results show that
cumulative abnormal stock returns around CSR announcement dates are positively associated with
the degree of CEO risk aversion inferred from CEO compensation contracts.16 Moreover, firms
led by CEOs with risk-averse inducing compensation generate higher buy-and-hold abnormal
stock returns after CSR announcements than their counterparts with risk-inducing compensation
contracts. Consistent with the view that risk-averse (risk-seeking) CEOs are more cautious with
CSR spending, we find that CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation are less
(more) likely to engage in CSR activities. In the additional analyses, using Bloomberg’s
Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) disclosure score, which measures a firm’s CSR
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In a separate untabulated analysis, we also find similar results with respect to bondholder reactions. Specifically,
CSR investments announced by CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation yield higher (lower)
cumulative abnormal returns in the bond market. The evidence is available upon request.
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disclosure quality, we find that CEOs with high (low) inside debt holdings are also more (less)
transparent in terms of non-financial information disclosure.17 Furthermore, we document a
positive relation between financial performance and ESG scores only for firms led by CEOs with
risk-averse inducing compensation. Finally, our main results hold for a battery of robustness tests,
such as omitted variable bias (i.e., CEO power and CSR categories), self-selection bias, and
endogeneity concerns.
Overall, our evidence demonstrates that CEO risk preferences, gauged through risk-averse
(risk-seeking) inducing compensation, influence the nature of CSR activities and the impact CSR
exerts on firm outcomes as documented through shareholder reactions to CSR announcements and
firm long-term performance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and
presents the main hypothesis. Section 3 describes the research methodology. Sections 4 and 5
report the main findings, additional tests, and robustness checks. Section 6 concludes the paper.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND MAIN HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
CSR and corporate financial performance
Over the past 50 years, CSR has become widely accepted as “a multidimensional construct
that encompasses the economic, legal, ethical and discretionary expectations that society has of
organizations at a given point in time” (Carroll 1979, p. 500). It covers activities such as corporate
philanthropy, cause-related marketing, minority support programs, and socially responsible
employment, to name a few (Sen and Bhattacharya 2001). Given its growing importance in
practice to businesses, CSR has become an increasingly important research topic among
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According to Bloomberg, this aggregate measure captures how well a company is evaluated in the three categories
(ESG) in terms of disclosure. Throughout the paper, we consider Bloomberg’s ESG score a measure of firm CSR
disclosure quality.
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academics. Specifically, prior studies have investigated whether CSR truly enhances firm value by
examining the underlying drivers at the firm and industry levels.
According to stakeholder theory, a firm’s financial performance depends on not only
explicit contracts, such those involving shareholder dividends or bondholder payments, but also
implicit contracts, such as those concerning product quality and protection of the environment
(Cornell and Shapiro 1987; Freeman 2010). When firms breach implicit contracts, stakeholders
will convert those contracts into explicit claims (e.g., stricter regulations from government
agencies). These explicit claims are generally costlier for firms to satisfy than their implicit
counterparts. Since CSR activities are designed to fulfill implicit contracts, such as improving the
community or society, firms with a stronger CSR reputation are believed to incur lower costs in
conducting their operations and, accordingly, are expected to enjoy better financial performance
(Cornell and Shapiro 1987). Consistent with this viewpoint, prior research has shown that CSR
investments result in positive stock returns through enhanced productivity and analyst
recommendations (Antunovich, Laster, and Mitnick 2000; Filbeck and Preece 2003). Using the
KLD database, Jiao (2010) finds that stakeholders’ welfare score is positively associated with
firms' Tobin’s Q. Other studies also show that firms engaging in CSR have easy access to external
capital markets and face lower costs of equity, as well as lower costs of debt (El Ghoul, Guedhami,
Kwok, and Mishra 2011; Goss and Roberts 2011). According to Edmans (2011), a value-weighted
portfolio comprising firms with high employee satisfaction outperforms industry benchmarks by
approximately 3.5% based on the annual four-factor alpha. In the context of mergers and
acquisitions, Deng et al. (2013) document that high CSR acquirers, relative to low CSR acquirers,
earn higher merger and acquisition announcement returns as well as positive long-term stock
returns, collectively suggesting that CSR is an important antecedent of merger and acquisition
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equity performance and in support of stakeholder theory. Thanks to increased transparency and
enhanced stakeholder engagement, Cheng et al. (2014) also show that socially responsible firms
face fewer capital constraints. Employing a regression discontinuity approach, Flammer (2015)
reports a positive association between the adoption of "close call" CSR proposals and their
announcement returns as well as firms' subsequent accounting performance (e.g., return on assets).
A recent study by Ferrell et al. (2016) suggests a similar pattern at an international scale.
Meanwhile, opponents of stakeholder theory believe that CSR investments are a source of
expenses instead of value creation. Thus, investing in CSR is believed to divert a firm’s ability
from conducting its core business activities that yield much better earnings for shareholders
(Friedman 1970; Jensen and Meckling 1976; McWilliams and Siegel 2001). In line with this view,
previous studies (Brammer, Brooks, and Pavelin 2006; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014; Becchetti
et al. 2015 among others) find that CSR investments are not associated with positive abnormal
stock returns, implying that they fail to elicit positive market reactions. In particular, a metaanalysis of 167 studies during the 1972–2007 period conducted by Margolis, Elfenbein, and Walsh
(2009) concludes that, although CSR is positively correlated with firm financial performance, the
effect is rather small in terms of economic significance. Consistently, earlier work by Alexander
and Buchholz (1978) finds that firms with higher CSR rankings as perceived by the respondents
in their surveys did not outperform other firms in terms of stock returns. Even worse, Brammer et
al. (2006) show that CSR investments, especially those related to employment, were negatively
correlated with abnormal stock returns. Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) report similar effects of
CSR on future stock performance and return on assets. According to Becchetti et al. (2015), the
underpricing anomaly of high idiosyncratic volatility portfolios can also be explained by CSR.
Specifically, they document that idiosyncratic volatility is positively correlated with aggregate
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CSR scores, which is consistent with their argument that CSR reduces firm flexibility in addressing
the negative productivity shocks associated with a decrease in stakeholder well-being.
Collectively, the effect of CSR on firm financial performance documented in the literature
is still considered ambiguous at best (Renneboog et al. 2008). Therefore, it is reasonable to assume
that the effect of CSR on corporate financial performance might be non-monotonic and that not all
CSR activities are detrimental to firm value (Barnea and Rubin 2010). On one hand, when the
investment is at a moderate level, CSR should enhance corporate financial performance and/or
shareholder value through improved relationships with other key stakeholders or through its
hedging feature in the form of goodwill (Boutin-Dufresne and Savaria 2004; Heal 2005; Lee and
Faff 2009; Humphrey et al. 2012). Consistent with this view, Smith and Stulz (1985) and Smith
(2003) suggest that risk-hedging activities should benefit shareholders through violations of
perfect market assumptions. If investors are generally unable to diversify the underlying risks
associated with socially irresponsible firms, CSR investments should be beneficial to shareholders.
On the other hand, if excessive amounts of scarce resources are allocated to CSR activities, they
can produce the opposite valuation effect due to potential agency problems between managers' and
shareholders’ interests. In particular, CEOs can have an incentive to overinvest in irrelevant CSR
activities for their own private benefits (e.g., raising their reputation as global citizens) or personal
agenda (Cronqvist et al. 2009; Borghesi et al. 2014; Kang and Han Kim 2017; Liu et al. 2017) at
the expense of shareholder interests. Consequently, these activities can harm a firm’s social as well
as financial performance in the long run. Hence, shareholder reactions to such CSR announcements
are expected to elicit negative shareholder reaction. Despite the insights of the previous literature,
whether shareholders assess the credibility of a certain CSR activity based on CEO risk preferences
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deduced through risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation contracts remains largely
unresolved and warrants investigation.
CSR and managerial fixed effects
Since Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Bertrand and Schoar (2003) stress the importance
of managerial fixed effects regarding firm investment decisions, a recent stream of research has
emerged proposing that the success of CSR and its effect on corporate financial performance
chiefly depend on CEO traits and behaviors. Employing the fixed effect model of Abowd et al.
(1999), Davidson et al. (2018) show that CEO fixed effects can explain approximately 63% of the
variation in CSR performance, whereas firm and other unobserved fixed effects only account for
less than 30% of such variation. In addition, their study shows that CEO materialism (significant
ownership of luxury goods) is negatively associated with firm social performance in terms of KLD
scores. More importantly, empirical findings of their research show that higher KLD scores are
significantly associated with higher accounting profits only in firms run by frugal CEOs, whereas
such an effect is nonsignificant in firms run by materialistic CEOs.
This branch of literature has also examined the potential influences of other CEO
characteristics on CSR. For instance, CEOs with a rich career experience or a bachelor’s degree in
the humanities and female CEOs tend to improve firm social performance (Manner 2010).
Furthermore, Tang et al. (2015) argue that hubristic CEOs are likely to overestimate their problemsolving skills while underestimating the essential role of stakeholders in providing resources and
support to the firm’s operation. Consequently, these managers are less likely to engage in socially
responsible activities and more likely to engage in socially irresponsible ones. These authors find
empirical support for their theoretical predictions in a longitudinal dataset of Standard & Poor’s
1500 index firms during 2001–2010. Using a sample of Fortune 500 CEOs and a video-based
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measure of CEO narcissism, Petrenko et al. (2016) document that firms run by narcissistic CEOs
tend to have higher profiles in corporate philanthropy, a major form of CSR, than their
counterparts. In addition, the positive relation between CSR and firm performance is negatively
moderated by CEO narcissism. Using a newly proposed measure of managerial ability estimated
by data envelopment analysis (Demerjian, Lev, and McVay 2012), Yuan et al. (2017) demonstrate
that firms with more capable CEOs are likely to engage in socially responsible activities that
ultimately enhance firm social performance.
CSR and CEO risk preferences
Nevertheless, the impact on CSR of CEO risk aversion resulting from risk-averse inducing
compensation contracts remains largely unexplored, although recent empirical studies emphasize
the importance of CEO inside debt compensation in other corporate decisions (Cassell et al. 2012;
Phan 2014; Caliskan and Doukas 2015). Previous literature suggests that inside debt holdings
(compensation) motivate CEOs to be risk averse and to hold a long-term view of the firm’s
financial performance (Sundaram and Yermack 2007; Edmans and Liu 2011; Wei and Yermack
2011). Accordingly, risk-averse inducing compensation contracts are expected to motivate CEOs
to engage in more socially responsible management practices to increase firm social performance
and ultimately add value to the firm than compensation contracts designed to motivate the
undertaking of riskier decisions. Specifically, because of the unfunded and unsecured nature of
pension and deferred compensation, CEOs with high inside debt compensation contracts are
exposed to default risk analogous to that faced by creditors. Hence, a CEO with high inside debt
compensation is expected to display a higher level of risk aversion and to be motivated to focus
on upholding the company’s long-term performance. Supporting this view, White (2012, p.2)
argues that inside debt CEOs “seek to reinvest firm income to preserve the long-term viability of
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the firm and their future pension benefits.” In addition, according to Cassell et al. (2012), debt-like
compensation discourages CEOs from investing in R&D and leveraging firm capital structure
while motivating them to focus on operational hedging.
Following this logic, we argue that managers with risk-averse inducing compensation are
expected to be more selective in their CSR investments. They are particularly less likely to engage
in CSR activities for their own personal agenda that could hurt the firm’s social performance and
eventually dampen its future value. Rather, risk-averse CEOs are expected to invest in CSR
initiatives that act as goodwill hedging instruments to enhance both the social and financial
performance of the firms they manage. Thus, CEOs with high inside debt compensation are more
likely to be perceived as hybrid stakeholders who strive for a compromise/balance in terms of CSR
investments that benefit both equity investors and other stakeholder groups (Caliskan and Doukas
2015). Therefore, we conjecture that shareholders react more positively to CSR investments
initiated by high inside debt CEOs than to those initiated by low inside debt CEOs. In short,
investors will consider inside debt holdings to distinguish between a CSR initiative that is
trustworthy and beneficial to the firm’s long-term performance and its counterpart that does not.
In short, the foregoing discussion leads to our main prediction that shareholders are expected to
react more positively to CSR announcements made by CEOs with high (low) risk-averse inducing
compensation.
METHODOLOGY
Data collection
We utilize different secondary sources to derive the data for our sample. We collect CSR
announcements from news releases from CSRwire (CSRwire.com), a leader in publishing CSR
news (Griffin and Sun 2013). CSR wire has been providing huge samples of CSR investment
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disclosures for a wide range of industries since 1999. In particular, its syndicated distribution has
more than 87 million monthly views and reaches more than 200 countries and territories.
Furthermore, we rely on CSRwire announcements instead of KLD ratings because the markets
immediately utilize new information and, thus, investor reactions to CSR investment disclosures
through CSRwire are more relevant than overall year-based KLD ratings. In addition, as mentioned
by Krüger (2015), KLD newsletters can suffer from selective reporting bias, since KLD could
intentionally focus on certain news that draws the public’s attention.
When screening news releases, unlike previous research, we include only news related to
firm CSR initiatives, that is, commitments to expend a certain amount of money or effort on CSR.
Potential increases in money outflows or decreases in profitability caused by such CSR
investments are expected to induce investors to re-evaluate firm prospects and thus elicit market
reactions. For example, in 2013, 1,200 employees of Newell Rubbermaid Inc. spent hours building
homes for low-income families. Even though their effort was not explicitly monetized, these
employees could have increased production and thus profits for Newell Rubbermaid Inc. had these
hours been used for production rather than CSR activities. Therefore, such news is included in our
sample. On the other hand, we exclude from our analysis news about such events as awards and
certifications that involve a firm’s achievements and not its future money outflows or expenses on
CSR activities. To emphasize the magnitude of the dollar amount, we also include in our analysis
a dummy variable for CSR financial commitment that takes the value of one if the disclosed value
is greater than or equal to $200,000. Different thresholds, such as $500,000 and $1,000,000, still
provide consistent results (not tabulated).
Further, we classify CSR initiatives into three categories, as mentioned in the previous
section: environmental concerns, corporate philanthropy, and socially responsible investing
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(CSRwire 2016). Environmental concerns refer to activities that aim to protect an organism or an
ecological community. This category also includes activities that help to satisfy a firm’s current
needs without compromising resources for its future needs. An example of this is Walmart’s
announced investments in renewable wind power in 2008. Corporate philanthropy activities refer
to donations to charities, communities, and nonprofit organizations, such as Holland American
Line’s donation of $25,000 to Seattle Children’s Hospital in 2015. Socially responsible investing
initiatives are those that integrate personal values and societal concerns with investment decisions.
For example, in 2011, Entergy Corporation committed $1 million to help the elderly and disabled
cope with high utility bills.
It should be noted that there are some other CSR categories identified in KLD ratings that
have been used in prior research. Examples are corporate governance, diversity, and human rights
(Krüger 2015). However, these relate to policy adjustments and generally do not involve efforts or
monetary investments that could incur additional expenses to the firm. Hence, we do not consider
such initiatives in our empirical analysis. Our CSR taxonomy is in line with the main categories
identified as CSR drivers of market returns in the literature. Each of these three types is distinctly
different from the other and they have therefore been investigated independently in prior research.
Griffin and Sun (2013) focus exclusively on green investments when investigating stockholder
reactions to CSR news. Similarly, Godfrey (2005) examines the relation between corporate
philanthropy and shareholder wealth. To capture the potential effects of CSR characteristics, we
include these three categories with separate dummy variables in the robustness tests.
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Variable description
Cumulative abnormal returns
We use the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the five days around the
announcement date (CAR[-2,+2]) to capture shareholder reactions to CSR investment
announcements. We estimate the daily abnormal stock return using the three-factor model (Fama
and French 1996).18 The corresponding inputs are the market risk premium, SMB, and HML,
respectively:
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) + 𝛾(𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 ) + 𝛿(𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
Daily stock prices are extracted directly from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) database. We calculate the coefficient estimates of each factor, using the estimation period
from t = -315 to t = -15 relative to the CSR announcement date of each firm in the sample.
Changing the estimation period (e.g., t = -220 to t = -20) does not affect the overall results of our
study. The daily abnormal return is simply the difference between the actual return and the return
predicted by the three-factor model.
CEO risk preferences and other control variables
Regarding CEO risk preferences, we use several proxies that have been used in previous
studies. A manager is identified as more risk averse if he or she experiences a higher level of
relative leverage or relative incentive (Edmans and Liu 2011; Wei and Yermack 2011).
Specifically, CEO relative leverage equals the natural logarithm of CEO inside debt divided by
CEO inside equity scaled by firm leverage, while CEO relative incentive is the natural logarithm
of the ratio of the change in CEO inside debt to the change of CEO inside equity scaled by the
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Estimation of the cumulative abnormal returns based on the four-factor model yields similar results. The findings
are available upon request.
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change in firm leverage. In addition, we include the two dummies CEO relative leverage ≥ 1 and
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, respectively. Alternatively, the literature also suggests the use of
managers’ stock and option portfolios to infer their risk aversion (e.g., Coles, Daniel, and Naveen
2006). Therefore, we use the natural log of CEO vega-to-delta ratio multiplied by CEO inside debt
to inside equity in the multivariate analysis as another proxy for CEO risk preferences (Cassell et
al. 2012). A higher (lower) value for CEO vega-to-delta ratio indicates a CEO is more (less) risk
seeking.
We also account for CEO, firm, and CSR characteristics in the multivariate analyses. CEO
characteristics include the logarithmic transformations of the variables CEO age, CEO tenure, and
CEO cash compensation. In one of our robustness tests, we investigate if our results are affected
by CEO power or not. To examine the effect of CEO power, we use the following four proxies of
CEO power used in the literature: CEO pay slice, CEO relative ownership, CEO relative tenure,
and CEO duality (Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer 2011; Han, Nanda, and Silveri 2016). Regarding
firm characteristics, we include the variables firm size, firm sales growth, firm market-to-book
ratio, firm financial leverage, firm R&D expenses, and firm free cash flows in our regression
specifications. To control for the potential effect of a firm making more than one announcement
per year, we also use the dummy multiple announcements. In the robustness section, we also add
the following binary variables for CSR characteristics: CSR financial commitment, CSR
environmental concern, CSR corporate philanthropy, and CSR socially responsible investment.
Continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to control for potential outliers
(Cassell et al. 2012). All required items to compute these variables are drawn from the
ExecuComp, Compustat, and CRSP databases. Appendix 2.1 provides detailed descriptions of the
variables.
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Descriptive statistics
Because data on executive pensions and deferred compensations have been explicitly
available since 2006, we first start with an initial sample of CSR events collected from CSRwire
for the period June 30, 2007, to December 31, 2015. We retrieve 1,841 CSR news releases that
match our definition of CSR initiatives. Of these events, 1,456 CSR investments were announced
by U.S.-based companies with an available GVKEY identifier. We then merge this sample with
the other data sources to extract firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and security price
information. Companies with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes in the ranges 6000–
6999 and 4900–4999 are excluded due to their unique capital structure and different regulatory
standards. Our final sample comprises 843 CSR events announced by 155 unique U.S. companies
(or 188 unique CEOs) from 2007 to 2015. Table 2.1 reports the distribution of our CSR sample by
year and by the 10 Fama–French industries
[Insert Table 2.1 about here]
According to Panel A of Table 2.1, most CSR events occurred between 2009 and 2013.
Specifically, more than 23% and 18% of CSR announcements were made in 2010 and 2011,
respectively. Regarding firm financial commitments, only 291 CSR events disclosed a monetary
amount greater than $200,000. In addition, a significant number of CSR observations (568 CSR
events) are corporate philanthropy related, whereas only 84 announcements are identified as firm
socially responsible investments. The rest are investments related to environmental concerns. As
reported in Panel B, the distribution of CSR initiatives illustrates that CSR is mostly related to the
manufacturing, shops, and other Fama–French industries. For instance, almost 30% of the
announcements are from the shops industry, with only 0.36% from the energy industry.
[Insert Table 2.2 about here]
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Descriptive statistics are reported in Panel A of Table 2.2. The mean and standard deviation
of CEO relative leverage are 0.7903 and 0.7159, respectively, while the mean and standard
deviation of CEO relative incentive are 0.7448 and 0.6781, respectively. Furthermore, more than
45% of the CSR-CEO sample is identified as risk averse based on the dummies CEO relative
leverage ≥ 1 and CEO relative incentive ≥ 1. The average of CEO age and CEO tenure (in
logarithmic form) are approximately 4.0245 and 1.5842, respectively. In addition, the average
value of CEO cash compensation (i.e., salary plus bonus) after logarithmic transformation is
around 7.1972. With respect to firm characteristics, the average value of firm size, that is, the
natural logarithm of firm market capitalization, is 10.2562. Similar to Krüger’s (2015), our sample
is skewed toward large firms. In addition, the mean of firm market-to-book ratio is 1.8357,
indicating that the average firm in the sample is overvalued by the market. On average, the ratio
of R&D spending to firm total assets after logarithmic transformation is 0.2956. The table also
shows that average firm sales grow by more than 6% per year. The average firm in our sample can
convert around 5.77% of its total assets into free cash flows.
Although our sample size is smaller than that of Krüger (2015) due to the elimination of
missing CEO compensation data, the two samples share comparable statistics for various firm
variables. Around 77% of the events belong to firms making more than one announcement per
year. In terms of CSR initiative events, the mean of financial commitment is 0.3452, which shows
that almost 65.48% of the news releases do not publicize investment amounts greater than or equal
to $200,000. Among the three CSR categories, CSR corporate philanthropy is more popular than
the other two (i.e., CSR environmental concerns and CSR socially responsible investment) as
shown by their respective shares, 67.38% versus 22.66% and 9.96%.
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
CSR announcement cumulative abnormal returns and CEO risk preferences
Univariate results of the cumulative abnormal stock returns of CSR investments for the
five-day period around the announcement day (CAR[-2,+2]) are reported in Panel B of Table 2.2.
The second column of Panel B shows the mean and standard deviation of CAR[-2,+2] for the full
sample. The next four columns report the means and standard deviations of CAR[-2,+2] for the
CEO relative leverage quartiles.19 For ease of interpretation, we define the first quartile (Q1) as
the risk-seeking CEO group and the fourth quartile (Q4) as the risk-averse CEO group. The last
column shows the results of the difference-in-means tests of CAR[-2,+2] between risk-averse
CEOs (Q4) and risk-seeking CEOs (Q1). For the full sample, according to Panel B, short-term
equity market reactions to CSR announcements are not statistically different from zero, which
seems to indicate that CSR investment announcements do not generally have a significant effect
on firm value.
However, we find that CSR announcements associated with firms run by CEOs
compensated with less inside debt (i.e., risk-seeking CEOs, in the bottom quartile) elicit negative
stock market reactions (CAR[-2,+2] < 0). On the other hand, equity market reactions to the CSR
announcements of firms managed by CEOs with high inside debt compensation (i.e., risk-averse
CEOs, in the top quartile) are positive and statistically significant at 5%. Specifically, CSR
investments for firms run by high inside debt CEOs are associated with a 0.35% shareholder gain,
suggesting that CSR announcements by more risk-averse CEOs are viewed favorably by equity
investors. In addition, the far-right column in Panel B of Table 2.2 shows that the cumulative
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Using CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio
to classify risk-averse versus risk-seeking CEOs does not qualitatively change our overall findings. The results are
available upon request.
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abnormal stock returns of the top quartile (i.e., risk-averse CEOs) are significantly larger than
those of the bottom quartile (i.e., risk-seeking CEOs) at the 5% level. Thus, the difference-inmeans tests show that equity market reactions support our hypothesis that posits that CSR activities
carried out by CEOs compensated with inside debt are viewed by investors as more appropriate
and more favorable in terms of improving the firm’s long-term prospects than the CSR investments
of these CEOs’ risk-seeking counterparts (i.e., CEOs with low inside debt compensation).
We continue to examine the impact of CEO risk preferences on market reactions to CSR
announcements through multivariate regression analysis by controlling for other variables. The
following table presents the results of empirical tests of the effect of CEO risk preferences on CSR
cumulative abnormal returns using the following five proxies of CEO risk preferences: CEO
relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1,
and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. Specifically, we employ the following cross-sectional ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression model with clustered standard errors at the firm level:
k

CAR i = β0 + β1 Xi + ∑

j=1

γj Zi,j + εi

(1)

The dependent variable is the short-term cumulative abnormal return (CAR[-2,+2]) in
response to market reactions based on the five-day window around the announcement. All
independent variables are lagged by one fiscal period relative to the CSR event dates. As shown
in equation (1), the emphasis of our study is to assess the effect of CEO risk preferences on CSR
cumulative abnormal returns. A significant positive value of β1 for the first four proxies (and a
significant negative value for CEO vega-to-delta ratio) will indicate that investors generally react
more (less) positively to CSR announcements made by CEOs with risk-averse (risk-seeking)
inducing compensation. This result would validate the view that CEO packages designed to
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motivate more risk-averse (risk-tolerant) management practices work as expected. Meanwhile, if
the coefficient β1 is insignificant, it would imply that investors do not rely on CEO risk preferences
to draw inferences about the credibility of CSR investments on the social and financial
performance of the announcing firm. Alternatively, it would mean that CEO compensation
contracts intended to encourage more risk-averse (risk-tolerant) management practices do not
work. For brevity, we do not report the intercepts in the subsequent analysis.
Table 2.3 reports regressions of CAR[-2,+2] estimated from the three-factor model on the
five proxies of CEO risk preferences, respectively. Consistent with the univariate results, the
multivariate findings provide additional support to our main prediction that equity investors react
more positively to CSR investments pursued by CEOs with high inside debt compensation (more
risk-averse CEOs) than those announced by low inside debt CEOs (more risk-tolerant CEOs). The
coefficient estimates of the first four proxies are positive and statistically significant at either 5%
or 1%. For instance, a one standard deviation surge in CEO relative leverage (i.e., CEOs with more
risk aversion) is associated with an increase of 30 basis points in the shareholders’ short-term
reaction to CSR announcements.20 Similarly, CSR announcements made by CEOs with a low value
for vega-to-delta ratio (risk-averse CEOs) are associated with stronger shareholder reactions as
measured by CAR[-2,+2] than those initiated by CEOs with a high value of vega-to-delta ratio
(risk-seeking CEOs. The corresponding coefficient is also statistically significant at 10%.
[Insert Table 2.3 about here]
With respect to the control variables, we observe a significant negative relation between
R&D spending and cumulative abnormal stock returns. This piece of evidence suggests that

20

An increase of 30 basis points in CAR[-2,+2] is estimated by multiplying the coefficient estimate of CEO relative
leverage (0.0042) by its standard deviation (0.7159).
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shareholders dislike CSR initiatives by firms with high R&D spending commitments because they
view CSR investment decisions a misallocation of capital resources.
Post-CSR long-term performance and CEO risk preferences
If CEOs with risk-averse inducing compensation engage in CSR activities with the aim of
improving firm long-term performance, we should also expect a positive relationship between
CEO risk aversion and the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) of the CSR announcing firm.
Therefore, we re-estimate the baseline equation (1) by replacing the dependent variable with firm
BHARs, estimated as follows:
125

125

𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖,1−125 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ) − ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡 )
𝑡=1

𝑡=1

We compute the BHARs over the period of 125 trading days (approximately six months)
after the announcement date.21 Table 2.4 reports the multivariate results of regressing six-month
BHARs on the five proxies of CEO risk preferences. For brevity, we suppress the coefficients of
the other control variables and report only the coefficients of the main independent variables.
[Insert Table 2.4 about here]
Consistent with our conjecture, we find that CSR investments announced by high inside
debt CEOs (more risk-averse CEOs) that triggered positive and significant announcement market
reactions are also associated with higher long-term firm performance, suggesting that shareholders
did not overestimate the valuation effects of CSR announcements. Most importantly, this result
demonstrates that CSR investment decisions under the helm of risk-averse CEOs improve firm’s
long-term performance. All the coefficients of the first four proxies of CEO risk preferences are

21

We find similar results when we extend the holding period to 180 trading days (i.e., nine months). These results are
available upon request.
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consistently positive and significant (at 5%), indicating that the relation between risk aversion–
inducing CEO compensation contracts and value-increasing CSR investment decisions is robust.
For instance, a one standard deviation increase in CEO relative leverage is associated with a 2.88%
increase in the long-term market performance of the CSR announcing firm. Despite being negative,
as expected, the coefficient of CEO vega-to-delta ratio is not statistically different from zero.
Additionally, we find that CSR announcing firms with higher CEO cash compensation, smaller
firm size, and higher firm sales growth seem to improve firm post-CSR announcement
performance.
As a robustness check, for each firm in the sample, we exclude consecutive CSR
announcements within the 50-day period after the first announcement to mitigate the influence of
firms with frequent CSR activities. This restriction ultimately reduces the sample size from 843 to
528 observations. However, we still find similar results with respect to the effect of CEO riskaverse inducing compensation on post-CSR long-term performance.22 In brief, the six-month
BHAR analysis shows that shareholders are better off with CSR activities carried out by riskaverse CEOs in the long run. These results suggest that the post-announcement improved BHARs
of CSR announcing firms are also in line with shareholders’ short-term market reactions. Overall,
the reported evidence so far demonstrates that CSR announcements by firms managed by CEOs
with risk-averse inducing compensation contracts (i.e., high inside debt) are beneficial to
shareholders not only in the short run but also in the long run.
Propensity to engage in CSR and CEO risk preferences
On one hand, due to the unsecured and unfunded nature of pension and deferred
compensation, high (low) inside debt CEOs are more (less) concerned with the firm’s long-term

22

For brevity, these results are not tabulated here but are available upon request.
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survival and, thus, are willing to lower its overall risk. Thanks to the goodwill hedging feature of
CSR discussed in the literature (e.g., Goss and Roberts 2011), CEOs with risk-averse (riskseeking) inducing compensation are expected to have more (fewer) incentives to engage in CSR
investments. If this conjecture holds, we expect a positive relation between CEO risk-averse
inducing compensation and firms’ propensity to invest in CSR. On the other hand, other studies
(e.g., Servaes and Tamayo 2013; Di Giuli and Kostovetsky 2014) suggest that CEOs with riskaverse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation contracts will be more (less) prudent in allocating
resources to CSR activities, since they have greater (less) incentive to maintain the long-term
performance of the companies they manage. In this case, CEOs with risk-averse inducing
compensations, as opposed to CEOs with risk-inducing compensations, are not anticipated to
exhibit higher CSR propensity unless these investments are truly beneficial to firm value. Based
on these opposing views, the potential relation between CEO risk aversion and the propensity to
engage in CSR is an empirical issue that warrants investigation. Therefore, we further investigate
the probability of engaging in CSR investments for firms led by CEOs with different levels of riskaverse inducing compensation contracts.
For this empirical test, the sample of interest consists of firm–year observations with CEO
information available from the ExecuComp database for the period from 2007 to 2015. By merging
this sample with our CSR sample, we are able to determine whether a CEO with a given level of
risk-averse inducing compensation will decide to engage in CSR investments in a particular year.
The merged sample comprises 11,640 firm–year observations and the dependent variable is a
dummy that takes a value of one if the company in a given year makes at least one CSR investment
and zero otherwise. In particular, there are 404 firm–year observations that have at least one CSR
event per year, which constitutes 3.47% of the whole sample. The main independent variables are
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CEO risk preferences, measured by CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO
relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. In addition to the
previous set of controls, we also account for industry and year fixed effects.
[Insert Table 2.5 about here]
Table 2.5 reports the logistic regressions of the propensity to engage in CSR on CEO risk
preferences while controlling for other CEO and firm characteristics. Across the five model
specifications, we find empirical evidence that CEOs with higher inside debt (risk-averse CEOs)
exhibit a lower, instead of higher, propensity to engage in CSR activities. Although the coefficient
of CEO risk preferences in the second model is not statistically significant, it is still negative.
Consistently, the positive and statistically significant coefficient of CEO vega-to-delta ratio also
suggests that risk-seeking CEOs have a higher propensity to engage in CSR activities. Therefore,
because risk-averse CEOs’ welfare is more aligned with their firms’ future fortunes, the empirical
evidence shows that they do not have a strong incentive to excessively engage in CSR investments;
they appear to be interested only in CSR investments that truly matter to their firms’ long-term
performance. Jointly, the evidence in this section advocates that risk-reducing CEO compensation
packages (e.g., high inside debt) tend to curb excessive CSR spending and/or the misallocation of
corporate resources, whereas the opposite pattern is observed for CEOs with risk-inducing
compensation contracts.
CSR information disclosure and CEO risk preferences
The findings reported so far support our central argument that investors rely on the nature
of CEO compensation contracts and, in particular, on CEO inside debt type that is designed to
motivate risk-averse decision making to draw inferences about the credibility of CSR investments
on the financial performance of the announcing firm. Another interesting implication of our
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findings is that CEOs with risk-averse inducing compensation are likely to be more transparent
than their counterparts with risk-seeking inducing compensation with respect to the degree to
which CSR-related information is conveyed to the general public. Undoubtedly, greater disclosure
can reduce the degree of information asymmetry between investors and corporate executives,
which, in turn, should help investors to better assess the credibility of firms’ CSR decisions.
Additionally, several empirical studies in the business literature show a significant relation
between CSR disclosure and managerial characteristics. For instance, Jizi, Salama, Dixon, and
Stratling (2014) find that powerful CEOs are associated with greater CSR disclosure. Therefore,
in this section, we extend our empirical analysis by examining the potential connection between
firm CSR disclosure and CEO risk preferences. From a theoretical standpoint, we expect CEOs
with risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation to disclose more (less) CSR-related
information to the markets.
To address this issue, we measure CSR disclosure using firms’ ESG scores as covered and
reported by Bloomberg. Specifically, this aggregate measure captures how well a company is
evaluated in these three categories in terms of disclosure. In accordance with Bloomberg’s
definition, ESG disclosure score is the firm’s weighted average of the environmental, social and
governance scores. The ESG values range from 0.1 to 100, depending on the firm’s public
disclosure in terms of CSR. The higher the ESG score, the better a company’s CSR disclosure
transparency. For this empirical test, we first extract our ESG sample by merging the ExecuComp
database with the Bloomberg database for the period from 2007 to 2015. The final sample size
comprises 6,412 firm–year observations with complete information on all variables except CEO
vega-to-delta ratio. In this analysis, we use two alternative proxies for CSR disclosure: the threeyear average of the firm ESG disclosure score and a dummy that takes a value of one if a firm–
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year observation exhibits an increase in ESG score in the next period and zero otherwise. We also
include the same set of control variables as in the previous tests and account for industry and year
fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the firm level. For brevity, the coefficient estimates of
the controls are omitted here.
[Insert Table 2.6 about here]
Table 2.6 shows the multivariate regression results of CSR information disclosure, based
on the ESG disclosure score, on CEO risk preferences for the five proxies used in the previous
tests. As shown in Panel A, the coefficient estimate of CEO relative leverage is 0.0736 and
statistically significant at 1%. A similar pattern is observed with respect to the other proxies of
CEO risk preferences. As expected, the coefficient estimate of CEO vega-to-delta ratio is negative
and significant at conventional levels. This pattern, as reported in Panel B, holds even when the
three-year average of the ESG score is used as the dependent variable. Hence, the positive
(negative) and significant shareholder reaction to CSR announcements carried out by CEOs with
risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation contracts, documented in Panel B of Table 2.2,
is consistent with the higher (lower) credibility of the CSR information disclosure reported in
Table 2.6. Overall, the evidence reported in Table 2.6 is consistent with our conjecture that CEO
risk-averse inducing compensation is significantly and positively (negatively) related to the firm
ESG disclosure measure, implying that risk-averse (risk-seeking) CEOs are more (less) likely to
disclosure CSR-related information to the public to reduce information asymmetry and improve
the credibility of their CSR investment decisions in the eyes of investors.
CSR information disclosure, financial performance, and CEO risk preferences
Empirical evidence has produced mixed results with respect to the relation between CSR
information disclosure and firm financial performance (Richardson and Welker 2001; Al-Tuwaijri,
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Christensen, and Hughes 2004; Clarkson, Li, Richardson, and Vasvari 2008; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang,
and Yang 2011; Clarkson, Fang, Li, and Richardson 2013; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang, and Yang 2014;
Plumlee, Brown, Hayes, and Marshall 2015). For example, Dhaliwal et al. (2014) report a negative
relation between CSR information disclosure and the cost of equity capital based on an empirical
analysis of 31 countries. Plumlee et al. (2015) find that voluntary environmental disclosure
indicating a firm has done something good for the environment is not only negatively associated
with the cost of equity capital, but also positively related to expected future cash flows. On the
contrary, according to Richardson and Welker (2001), greater CSR disclosure is significantly
associated with higher, instead of lower, costs of equity capital. In addition, other studies even
document a nonsignificant relation (e.g., Clarkson et al. 2013) between CSR information
disclosure and firm financial performance. Therefore, the lack of empirical consensus on the
relation between CSR information disclosure and firm financial performance motivates this
section. The documented inconsistency can be potentially explained through managerial risk
preferences influenced by the design of CEO risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation
contracts.
Having documented thus far that firms led by CEOs with risk-averse inducing
compensation are associated with CSR information disclosure, make better CSR investments in
terms of market-based performance, and do not engage in excessive CSR investments, it can be
reasonably argued that the mixed empirical evidence on the relation between CSR information
disclosure and firm financial performance could be attributed to unexplored CEO risk preferences.
To empirically address this conjecture, we regress firm financial performance on the firm ESG
disclosure score for the CEO groups with high (risk aversion) and low (risk tolerance) inside debt
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based on CEO relative leverage ≥ 1 and CEO relative incentive ≥ 1.23 In other words, we examine
whether the relation between firm performance and CSR information disclosure varies with CEO
compensation contracts intended to motivate risk-averse (risk-seeking) behavior. To capture firm
performance, we use the three-year-average of the measures market-to-book ratio and return on
equity.24 The main independent variable of interest is the firm ESG score reported by Bloomberg.
We also include the same set of control variables used in previous tests and account for industry
and year fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the firm level. For brevity, the coefficient
estimates of the controls are omitted.
[Insert Table 2.7 about here]
Across all regression specifications, as shown in Table 2.7, we find a positive relation
between a firm’s financial performance and its ESG disclosure score. Consistent with our
prediction, the positive association between firm financial performance and a firm’s ESG
disclosure score is statistically significant (at least at 10%) only for the risk-averse CEO subsample
(i.e., CEO relative leverage (incentive) ≥ 1), but not for the risk-seeking CEO subsample. That is,
risk-averse inducing compensation contracts help strengthen the effect of CSR information
disclosure on firm financial performance, while risk-seeking inducing compensation contracts do
not appear to have any influence on firm financial performance. Jointly, these results show that
the CEO’s degree of risk preference, based on risk-averse (risking) inducing compensation
contracts, appears to influence the relation between firm performance and CSR information
disclosure. Regarding the other controls, smaller firms with higher growth opportunities, higher

23

Using median splits based on CEO relative leverage and CEO relative incentive yields similar results. The analysis
is not tabulated but available upon request.
24
We also use the three-year average return on assets as another dependent variable. However, the results are
inconclusive.
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sales growth, higher R&D expenses, and more free cash flows are associated with better future
financial performance.
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
CSR announcement returns conditional on different CSR type
To ensure the robustness of our results, we examine whether market reactions to CSR
investment announcements are sensitive to CSR characteristics.25 Specifically, we re-estimate the
baseline OLS regressions, controlling for the three CSR categories, environmental concerns,
corporate philanthropy, and socially responsible investing, respectively. For brevity, we suppress
the coefficients of the other control variables and report the results in Table 2.8. Consistent with
our previous evidence, these empirical results show that the firm CAR[-2,+2] conditional on CEO
risk preferences remains intact, even after controlling for the three different types of CSR
investments; that is, shareholder reactions to CSR investments per se are insensitive to all three
CSR categories. The rest of the control variables remain consistent with the previous findings.
Additional test results (not tabulated) also suggest that our results remain robust to whether firms
explicitly disclose the monetary amounts they commit to CSR activities.
[Insert Table 2.8 about here]
CSR announcement returns conditional on CEO power
In addition to the different categories of CSR investments, we also check the robustness of
our main empirical findings controlling for CEO power. The rationale behind this test is that one
could argue that the market reactions to CSR investments are driven by CEO power rather than
CEO risk preferences. From a theoretical point of view, CEOs with more power are more likely to
make decisions subject to greater conflicts of interest with shareholders. Therefore, they are
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In untabulated test results, we also find that the post-CSR long-term performance of announcing firms is unaffected
by the three different CSR categories. The findings are available upon request.
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expected to react more negatively to CSR investments made by more powerful CEOs with
discretionary influence.
To test this conjecture, we regress the cumulative abnormal returns obtained from the threefactor model (CAR[-2,+2]) on CEO risk preferences, CEO power, and the other control variables.
The effect of CEO risk preferences is captured by using CEO relative leverage.26 We employ the
following proxies of CEO power in our baseline OLS regressions previously used in the literature:
CEO pay slice, CEO relative ownership, CEO relative tenure, and CEO duality. Specifically, CEO
pay slice equals one if the ratio of CEO total compensation to that of the top five executives is
greater than the industry median and zero otherwise, CEO relative ownership equals one if CEO
stock ownership is above the industry median and zero otherwise CEO, relative tenure equals one
if CEO tenure is above the industry median and zero otherwise, and CEO duality equals one if the
CEO is also the chair of the company’s board of directors and zero otherwise. The results are
reported in Table 2.9.
[Insert Table 2.9 about here]
Across all regression specifications, we find that the coefficients of CEO relative leverage
are positive and strongly significant, whereas the influence of CEO power on CSR announcement
returns is statistically nonsignificant. These findings indicate that our main empirical results on the
relation between CEO risk preferences and CSR investments are not sensitive to CEO power.
Self-selection bias test
Next we use Heckman’s (1976, 1979) two-step approach to address the potential selfselection bias in our CSR sample. Specifically, we first run a probit regression of a firm’s
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We find similar results when the other four proxies (CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO relative
incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio) are used. These results are available upon request.
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propensity to engage in CSR in a given year, similar to the model specification reported in Table
2.5, and calculate the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). In the second step, we augment the OLS
regressions of market short-term reactions (CAR[-2,+2]) and post-CSR long-term performance
(six-month BHARs) on CEO risk preferences with the IMR. We expect the main empirical findings
to hold with the inclusion of the IMR in the second step. Specifically, if the IMR’s coefficient is
statistically insignificant, this would imply that our results are not sensitive to self-selection bias.
In line with the main analysis, we perform this test using the five following proxies to gauge CEO
risk preferences as before: CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative
incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. The dependent variables are
the cumulative abnormal returns for the five-day window around the CSR announcement (CAR[2,+2]) and firm post-CSR long-term performance (six-month BHARs). For brevity, the coefficient
estimates of the controls are not reported. The results of Heckman’s test are reported in Table 2.10.
Overall, the IMR’s coefficients in all the regression specifications are not statistically
significant, suggesting that our sample is not sensitive to self-selection bias. More important, our
main results remain robust, even after including the IMR in the regressions, since all the
coefficients of CEO risk preferences remain statistically significant at either 10%, 5%, or 1%.
[Insert Table 2.10 about here]
Reverse causality test
An issue that could raise concerns about the validity of our empirical results is reverse
causality. Specifically, self-interested managers, who anticipate that the CSR activities they plan
to choose will certainly benefit their firms in the long run, could demand greater risk-averse
inducing compensation. This possibility could lead to endogeneity problems. To ensure that our
main findings of shareholder reactions to CSR events and firm post-CSR long-term performance
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are robust to possible reverse causality concerns, we follow previous studies and employ two-stage
least squares models (Cassell et al. 2012; Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong 2013; Phan 2014). In
the first stage, we run OLS regressions of CEO relative leverage, CEO relative incentive, and CEO
vega-to-delta ratio on a group of potential instruments that are considered important determinants
of CEO risk-averse (risk-seeking) inducing compensation. Specifically, we include CEO age, new
CEO dummy, firm size, firm leverage, firm market-to-book ratio, firm cash flows from operation
scaled by total assets, firm tax loss carry-forward scaled by total assets, maximum state tax rate
on individual income, and the industry–year median CEO relative leverage (incentive) value (or
CEO vega-to-delta ratio).27
[Insert Table 2.11 about here]
Consistent with previous studies, we document that the first-stage F-statistic is greater than
22 in all three models, suggesting rejection of the null hypothesis of weak instruments (Stock and
Yogo 2005). According to Table 2.11, we also find that around 36.51%, 26.87%, and 36.09% of
the variation in CEO relative leverage, CEO relative incentive, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio,
respectively, in our sample can be explained by the above list of instrumental variables. 28 For
instance, the industry–year median and maximum state tax rates are positively (negatively)
associated with CEO relative leverage and CEO relative incentive (CEO vega-to-delta ratio) and
the effects are statistically significant at either 1% or 5%.
In the second stage, we re-estimate our baseline equation (1) using the predicted values of
CEO relative leverage, CEO relative incentive, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio, estimated from the

27

The maximum state tax rate on individual income is retrieved from http://www.nber.org/~taxsim/state-rates/. These
tax rates are calculated using the TAXSIM model (Feenberg and Coutts 1993).
28
Our sample size in this test is smaller because of missing values in the tax loss carryforward variable. Excluding
this instrument does not change the overall results of our analyses.
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first-stage regressions, as the independent variables. These results are reported in Table 2.12.
[Insert Table 2.12 about here]
Having addressed potential endogeneity concerns due to reverse causality, consistent with
our previously documented results, we continue to find that equity holders endorse CSR
announcements initiated by CEOs with risk-averse inducing compensation contracts. In the first
three columns of Table 2.12, the coefficient estimates of the instrumented values (i.e., predicted
values from the first-stage regressions) of CEO relative leverage and CEO relative incentive (and
CEO vega-to-delta ratio) are positive (negative) and statistically significant at least at 5%.
Similarly, as reported in the last three columns, our previously reported findings of post-CSR longterm performance are not sensitive to potential reverse causality problems either.
CONCLUSION
The CSR literature remains inconclusive about the valuation effects of CSR investments.
Motivated by previous studies that stress the importance of managerial fixed effects in corporate
investment decisions, we posit that the impact of CSR investments on firm value could be related
to CEO compensation contracts designed to induce risk averse (risk-seeking) behavior (decision
making). Our evidence shows that CSR announcements made by firms run by CEOs with riskaverse inducing compensation (i.e., high inside debt) contracts elicit strongly positive market
reactions. That is, the strong and favorable reaction to announced CSR investments indicates that
investors view CSR corporate decisions as value increasing when initiated by CEOs with riskaverse inducing compensation contracts, whereas the opposite reaction is documented for CEOs
with risk-seeking inducing (convex) compensation contracts. In addition, our evidence suggests
that risk-averse inducing compensation motivates CEOs to allocate capital resources to CSR
decisions more efficiently that significantly improves firm performance not only in the short-run
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but also in the long-run. To put it differently, our results point out that CSR decisions made by
high inside debt (or low vega-to-delta ratio) CEOs help increase and preserve firm value rather
than enhance CEOs’ myopic self-interests at the expenses of shareholder value. Low inside debt
(or high vega-to-delta ratio) CEOs, however, engage in more CSR investments that are consistently
associated with negative announcement abnormal returns and lower post-CSR firm performance.
Jointly, equity investors appear to strongly endorse CSR investments initiated by CEOs with riskaverse inducing compensation contracts as value-increasing decisions, whereas they tend to reject
CSR investments pursued by CEOs with risk-seeking inducing compensation.
Our findings remain consistent in a battery of robustness checks, including additional CSR
and CEO characteristics, self-selection bias, and endogeneity concerns. Additional analysis with
respect to CSR information disclosure and firm performance shows that CEO risk-averse inducing
compensation (i.e., high inside debt) ensures that CSR investment decisions are trustworthy and
beneficial to firm value. In sum, our evidence highlights the role of different CEO compensation
contracts in explaining the divergent valuation effects of CSR investment decisions reported in the
literature.
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Table 2.1 CSR announcement distribution by year during the 2007 – 2015 period
This table reports the annual distribution of 843 CSR announcements made by 155 U.S. public firms (financial and utility firms are excluded) during the 2007 –
2015 period. In panel A, the second and third columns show the annual number of and percentage of CSR announcements for the full sample. The next five columns
show the number of events for each the five subcategories. Panel B reports the number of CSR announcements and the corresponding percentages across the 10
Fama & French industries. Information about these announcements is manually collected from https://www.CSRwire.com.

Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
Total
Code
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10

Panel A: CSR announcement distribution by year
Financial
Financial
Environmental
Corporate
CSR events
Percentage
commitment
commitment
concern
philanthropy
≤ $200,000
≥ $200,000
40
4.74%
21
19
8
31
80
9.49%
36
44
15
64
87
10.32%
54
33
20
66
196
23.25%
116
80
43
143
159
18.86%
117
42
41
98
99
11.74%
76
23
21
55
92
10.91%
64
28
21
60
38
4.51%
29
9
10
21
52
6.17%
39
13
12
30
843
100.00%
552
291
191
568
Panel B: CSR announcement distribution by Fama & French 10 industries
Industry description
CSR events
Consumer Non-Durables
81
Consumer Durables
12
Manufacturing
118
Energy
3
Business Equipment
95
Telecommunication
73
Shops
247
Health
58
Other
156

Socially
responsible
investment
1
1
1
10
20
23
11
7
10
84
Percentage
9.61%
1.42%
14.00%
0.36%
11.27%
8.66%
29.30%
6.88%
18.51%
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Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics and univariate analysis
The table presents the descriptive statistics of the independent variables and the univariate analysis of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[-2,+2]) around the CSR
announcements. The sample comprises 843 CSR events announced by U.S public firms from 2007 to 2015. Utilities and financial firms are excluded. Panel A
shows the number of observations, means, standard deviations, the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles. Panel B reports average shareholder reactions (as measured by
CAR[-2,+2]) to CSR events for the full sample and the four quartiles based on CEO relative leverage. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside
equity scaled by firm market leverage. The last column of panel B shows the difference-in-means test of CAR[-2,+2] between risk-averse and risk-seeking CEO
groups. All related information to derive or estimate the variables are from the following databases: ExecuComp, CSRwire, CRSP, and Compustat. Continuous
variables are winsorized at 1% extreme. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.

Variable
CEO relative leverage
CEO relative leverage ≥ 1
CEO relative incentive
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1
CEO vega-to-delta ratio
CEO age
CEO tenure
CEO cash compensation
Firm size
Firm leverage
Firm market-to-book ratio
Firm sales growth
Firm R&D
Firm free cash flows
Multiple announcements
CSR financial commitment
CSR environmental concern
CSR corporate philanthropy
CSR socially responsible investment

Variable
Mean
Standard deviation

Panel A: Descriptive statistics
CSR
Standard
Mean
25%
events
deviation
843
0.7903
0.7159
0.1565
843
0.4911
0.5002
0.0000
843
0.7448
0.6781
0.1460
843
0.4508
0.4979
0.0000
707
1.0010
1.0329
0.3908
843
4.0245
0.0979
3.9512
843
1.5842
0.8244
1.0986
843
7.1972
0.4317
6.9745
843
10.2562
1.4469
9.3530
843
0.7734
1.1960
0.2613
843
1.8357
0.7148
1.2977
843
0.0632
0.1505
0.0007
843
0.2956
0.3235
0.0000
843
0.0577
0.1135
0.0062
843
0.7722
0.4196
1.0000
843
0.3452
0.4757
0.0000
843
0.2266
0.4189
0.0000
843
0.6738
0.4691
0.0000
843
0.0996
0.2997
0.0000
Panel B: Univariate analysis of cumulative abnormal returns
Q1
Q2
Q3
Full
Risk-seeking
sample
CEOs
-0.0001
-0.0026
-0.0015
0.0001
0.0273
0.0320
0.0279
0.0250

50%

75%

0.6535
0.0000
0.5772
0.0000
0.6805
4.0431
1.6094
7.1685
10.4247
0.4970
1.6530
0.0451
0.0000
0.0652
1.0000
0.0000
0.0000
1.0000
0.0000

1.3081
1.0000
1.3282
1.0000
1.3218
4.0943
2.1972
7.3406
11.3356
0.9066
2.2144
0.1048
0.6397
0.1192
1.0000
1.0000
0.0000
1.0000
0.0000

Q4
Risk-averse
CEOs
0.0035**
0.0233

Q4 - Q1
0.0061**
0.0280

95

96

Table 2.3 CSR announcement cumulative abnormal returns and CEO risk preferences
This table reports the regression analysis of firm CAR[-2,+2] on different proxies of CEO risk preferences including
CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vegato-delta ratio. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm market leverage
after logarithmic transformation. CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled
by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithmic transformation. CEO vega-to-delta ratio is CEO
vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-to-equity ratio after logarithmic transformation. All models include the
constant term as well as other controls with firm clustered standard errors shown in parentheses. Continuous variables
are winsorized at 1% extreme. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Variable
CEO relative leverage

(1)
0.0042***
(0.0015)

CEO relative leverage ≥ 1

(2)

CAR[-2,+2]
(3)

(4)

0.0061**
(0.0025)

CEO relative incentive

0.0041***
(0.0015)

CEO relative incentive ≥ 1

0.0052**
(0.0023)

CEO vega-to-delta ratio
CEO age
CEO tenure
CEO cash compensation
Firm size
Firm leverage
Firm market-to-book ratio
Firm sales growth
Firm R&D
Firm free cash flows
Multiple announcements
R2 (%)
Observations

(5)

-0.0108
(0.0145)
0.0007
(0.0012)
0.0054
(0.0034)
-0.0015
(0.0010)
0.0000
(0.0008)
0.0001
(0.0019)
-0.0054
(0.0060)
-0.0108***
(0.0037)
-0.0009
(0.0109)
0.0032
(0.0026)
2.60%
843

-0.0105
(0.0146)
0.0004
(0.0012)
0.0060*
(0.0034)
-0.0017
(0.0011)
-0.0001
(0.0008)
0.0000
(0.0019)
-0.0039
(0.0061)
-0.0099***
(0.0038)
-0.0017
(0.0111)
0.0029
(0.0026)
2.58%
843

-0.0105
(0.0146)
0.0007
(0.0012)
0.0053
(0.0034)
-0.0013
(0.0010)
-0.0001
(0.0008)
0.0002
(0.0019)
-0.0050
(0.0060)
-0.0105***
(0.0037)
-0.0007
(0.0109)
0.0031
(0.0026)
2.51%
843

-0.0099
(0.0146)
0.0006
(0.0012)
0.0058*
(0.0034)
-0.0015
(0.0011)
-0.0001
(0.0008)
0.0002
(0.0019)
-0.0033
(0.0061)
-0.0097**
(0.0038)
-0.0016
(0.0112)
0.0030
(0.0026)
2.37%
843

-0.0019*
(0.0011)
-0.0207
(0.0145)
0.0014
(0.0015)
0.0054
(0.0036)
-0.0017
(0.0011)
0.0002
(0.0009)
0.0016
(0.0022)
-0.0027
(0.0059)
-0.0090**
(0.0038)
0.0095
(0.0138)
0.0041
(0.0026)
2.20%
707
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Table 2.4 Post-CSR long-term performance and CEO risk preferences
This table reports the regression analysis of six-month BHARs on CEO risk preferences. CEO risk preferences are
captured using CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥
1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm
market leverage after logarithmic transformation. CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside debt to change in CEO
inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithmic transformation. CEO vega-todelta ratio is CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-to-equity ratio after logarithmic transformation. All models
include the constant term as well as other controls with firm clustered standard errors shown in parentheses.
Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% extreme. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and
* are used to denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Variable
CEO relative leverage

(1)
0.0290**
(0.0116)

CEO relative leverage ≥ 1

(2)

Six-month BHARs
(3)

(4)

0.0415**
(0.0180)

CEO relative incentive

0.0277**
(0.0118)

CEO relative incentive ≥ 1

0.0350**
(0.0177)

CEO vega-to-delta ratio
CEO age
CEO tenure
CEO cash compensation
Firm size
Firm leverage
Firm market-to-book ratio
Firm sales growth
Firm R&D
Firm free cash flows
Multiple announcements
R2 (%)
Observations

(5)

-0.0019
(0.1057)
0.0015
(0.0129)
0.0459**
(0.0226)
-0.0185**
(0.0093)
0.0050
(0.0062)
0.0019
(0.0125)
0.0894*
(0.0521)
-0.0471
(0.0292)
0.1364
(0.0884)
-0.0126
(0.0203)
3.19%
843

-0.0004
(0.1041)
-0.0005
(0.0129)
0.0497**
(0.0229)
-0.0200**
(0.0095)
0.0048
(0.0062)
0.0010
(0.0126)
0.0998*
(0.0516)
-0.0410
(0.0303)
0.1312
(0.0897)
-0.0143
(0.0201)
3.16%
843

0.0002
(0.1067)
0.0011
(0.0129)
0.0454**
(0.0226)
-0.0172*
(0.0091)
0.0049
(0.0062)
0.0028
(0.0125)
0.0920*
(0.0522)
-0.0455
(0.0293)
0.1376
(0.0878)
-0.0133
(0.0203)
3.07%
843

0.0039
(0.1049)
0.0003
(0.0130)
0.0483**
(0.0224)
-0.0184**
(0.0091)
0.0043
(0.0062)
0.0021
(0.0126)
0.1036**
(0.0511)
-0.0396
(0.0302)
0.1316
(0.0886)
-0.0140
(0.0201)
2.92%
843

-0.0080
(0.0111)
-0.1406
(0.1138)
0.0040
(0.0167)
0.0644***
(0.0241)
-0.0140
(0.0119)
0.0032
(0.0085)
0.0252*
(0.0140)
0.1015*
(0.0561)
-0.0589*
(0.0318)
0.1152
(0.0978)
-0.0057
(0.0222)
4.19%
707
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Table 2.5 Propensity to engage in CSR and CEO risk preferences
This table reports the regression analysis of propensity to engage in CSR on CEO risk preferences. CEO risk
preferences are captured using CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO
relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside
equity scaled by firm market leverage after logarithmic transformation. CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside
debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithmic
transformation. CEO vega-to-delta ratio is CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-to-equity ratio after
logarithmic transformation. All models include a constant term as well as other CEO and firm characteristics with
standard errors shown in parentheses. The models also control for year and industry fixed effects; the latter is defined
using two-digit SIC codes. All independent variables are lagged by one period. Continuous variables are winsorized
at 1% extreme. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote significance at
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Variable
CEO relative leverage

(1)
-0.1637**
(0.0776)

CEO relative leverage ≥ 1

Propensity to engage in CSR
(2)
(3)
(4)
-0.1352
(0.1270)

CEO relative incentive

-0.1616**
(0.0786)

CEO relative incentive ≥ 1

-0.2571**
(0.1269)

CEO vega-to-delta ratio
CEO age
CEO tenure
CEO cash compensation
Firm size
Firm leverage
Firm market-to-book ratio
Firm sales growth
Firm R&D
Firm free cash flows
Pseudo R-Squared (%)
Observations

(5)

-0.6753
(0.5696)
-0.1136
(0.0755)
0.1814*
(0.1070)
1.0243***
(0.0527)
-0.0425
(0.0338)
-0.3491***
(0.0863)
-1.1980***
(0.4054)
0.3574
(0.3227)
-0.4522
(0.5326)
9.60%
11,640

-0.7660
(0.5698)
-0.1046
(0.0756)
0.1759
(0.1076)
1.0139***
(0.0525)
-0.0408
(0.0339)
-0.3665***
(0.0862)
-1.1783***
(0.4052)
0.3447
(0.3228)
-0.4179
(0.5326)
9.58%
11,640

-0.6737
(0.5699)
-0.1120
(0.0755)
0.1791*
(0.1070)
1.0195***
(0.0523)
-0.0426
(0.0338)
-0.3537***
(0.0863)
-1.1939***
(0.4054)
0.3580
(0.3227)
-0.4458
(0.5327)
9.60%
11,640

-0.6748
(0.5704)
-0.1107
(0.0755)
0.1835*
(0.1073)
1.0182***
(0.0522)
-0.0424
(0.0338)
-0.3628***
(0.0861)
-1.1974***
(0.4048)
0.3702
(0.3231)
-0.4140
(0.5322)
9.60%
11,640

0.1542**
(0.0720)
-0.6467
(0.7526)
0.0692
(0.0988)
0.1693
(0.1717)
1.0915***
(0.0718)
-0.0209
(0.0490)
-0.2753***
(0.1061)
-1.0589**
(0.5159)
-0.1221
(0.4210)
-1.7444**
(0.6958)
12.52%
6,111
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Table 2.6 CSR information disclosure and CEO risk preferences
This table reports the regression analysis of CSR information disclosure on CEO risk preferences. CEO risk
preferences are estimated using CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO
relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside
equity scaled by firm market leverage after logarithmic transformation. CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside
debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithmic
transformation. CEO vega-to-delta ratio is CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-to-equity ratio after
logarithmic transformation. In panel A, CSR information disclosure is captured using a dummy indicating the annual
change in environmental, social, governance (ESG) score greater than zero. In panel B, CSR information disclosure
is captured using the three-year average ESG performance in the next period. All models include a constant term as
well as other CEO and firm characteristics. The models also control for year and industry fixed effects; the latter is
defined using two-digit SIC codes. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% extreme. Clustered standard errors at
the firm level are shown in parentheses. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used
to denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Variable
CEO relative leverage
CEO relative leverage ≥ 1
CEO relative incentive
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1
CEO vega-to-delta ratio
Other controls
Pseudo R-Squared (%)
Observations
Variable
CEO relative leverage
CEO relative leverage ≥ 1
CEO relative incentive
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1
CEO vega-to-delta ratio
Other controls
R2 (%)
Observations

(6)
0.0736**
(0.0347)

(7)

Panel A: ΔESG > 0
(8)

(9)

(10)

0.1998***
(0.0689)
0.0631*
(0.0342)
0.1684**
(0.0704)
-0.0786*
(0.0407)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
13.45%
13.52%
13.44%
13.48%
12.70%
6,412
6,412
6,412
6,412
3,657
Panel B: Three -year average ESG score of CSR disclosure
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
0.0156
(0.0098)
0.0574***
(0.0195)
0.0126
(0.0095)
0.0414**
(0.0192)
-0.0244**
(0.0114)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
56.35%
56.51%
56.33%
56.41%
57.34%
6,412
6,412
6,412
6,412
3,657

Table 2.7 CSR information disclosure and firm financial performance for CEOs with different risk preferences
This table reports the regression analysis of firm financial performance on CSR information disclosure (ESG score) for CEOs with different risk preferences based on the CEO relative
leverage ≥ 1, and CEO relative incentive ≥ 1. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm market leverage after logarithmic transformation.
CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithmic transformation. In the first
four models, the dependent variable is the three-year average market-to-book ratio. In the last four models, the dependent variable is the three-year average return on equity. All
models include a constant term as well as other CEO and firm characteristics. The models also control for year and industry fixed effects; the latter is defined using two- digit SIC
codes. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% extreme. Clustered standard errors at the firm level are shown in parentheses. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1.
***, **, and * are used to denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.

Variable
ESG score
CEO age
CEO tenure
CEO cash compensation
Firm size
Firm leverage
Firm market-to-book ratio
Firm sales growth
Firm R&D
Firm free cash flows
R2 (%)
Observations

Three-year average of market-to-book ratio
CEO relative CEO relative
CEO relative CEO relative
leverage ≥ 1
incentive ≥ 1 incentive < 1
leverage < 1
1
2
3
4
0.1033**
0.0447
0.0836*
0.0528*
(0.0457)
(0.0305)
(0.0446)
(0.0318)
-0.2545
-0.0137
-0.2146
-0.0225
(0.1884)
(0.1075)
(0.1823)
(0.1078)
0.0401*
0.0261**
0.0404*
0.0253*
(0.0221)
(0.0133)
(0.0224)
(0.0133)
-0.0332
-0.0409*
-0.0398
-0.0390
(0.0413)
(0.0248)
(0.0399)
(0.0247)
-0.0424**
-0.0363***
-0.0379*
-0.0369***
(0.0203)
(0.0109)
(0.0193)
(0.0109)
0.0042
-0.0029
0.0052
-0.0031
(0.0084)
(0.0037)
(0.0084)
(0.0037)
0.8027***
0.7670***
0.8051***
0.7684***
(0.0302)
(0.0216)
(0.0301)
(0.0215)
-0.3800***
-0.1591***
-0.3716***
-0.1589***
(0.1056)
(0.0553)
(0.1049)
(0.0555)
0.2143*
0.4062***
0.2125*
0.4027***
(0.1120)
(0.0719)
(0.1116)
(0.0720)
0.4677***
0.2009*
0.4832***
0.1987*
(0.1516)
(0.1078)
(0.1507)
(0.1079)
79.25%
72.61%
79.10%
72.73%
1,772
4,250
1,783
4,239

Three-year average of return on equity
CEO relative CEO relative
CEO relative CEO relative
leverage ≥ 1
incentive ≥ 1 incentive < 1
leverage < 1
5
6
7
8
0.0901**
0.0225
0.0829*
0.0276
(0.0455)
(0.0334)
(0.0458)
(0.0333)
0.0581
0.0551
0.0887
0.0537
(0.1293)
(0.0983)
(0.1273)
(0.0993)
0.0005
0.0214
0.0037
0.0212
(0.0175)
(0.0132)
(0.0173)
(0.0133)
0.0532
0.0337*
0.0364
0.0347*
(0.0396)
(0.0195)
(0.0361)
(0.0196)
-0.0187
0.0111
-0.0105
0.0108
(0.0211)
(0.0114)
(0.0207)
(0.0114)
0.0173
0.0226***
0.0326*
0.0203***
(0.0204)
(0.0068)
(0.0170)
(0.0067)
0.0631***
0.0560***
0.0618***
0.0566***
(0.0196)
(0.0155)
(0.0195)
(0.0154)
-0.1126**
-0.0452
-0.1213**
-0.0448
(0.0566)
(0.0412)
(0.0552)
(0.0411)
0.1885**
-0.0910
0.1634**
-0.0835
(0.0816)
(0.0609)
(0.0792)
(0.0615)
0.2147
0.1982**
0.2142*
0.1955**
(0.1344)
(0.0986)
(0.1207)
(0.0995)
13.23%
7.28%
14.70%
7.19%
1,772
4,250
1,783
4,250
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Table 2.8 CSR announcement cumulative abnormal returns conditional on different CSR types
This table reports the regression analysis of firm CAR[-2,+2] on CEO risk preferences and CSR categories. CSR
categories comprise CSR socially responsible investment, CSR corporate philanthropy, and CSR environmental
concern (base category). CEO risk preferences are captured using CEO relative leverage, CEO relative leverage ≥ 1,
CEO relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. CEO relative leverage equals CEO
inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm market leverage after logarithmic transformation. CEO relative
incentive equals CEO inside debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm
equity after logarithmic transformation. CEO vega-to-delta ratio is CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-toequity ratio after logarithmic transformation. All models also include a constant term (environmental concern) as well
as other controls with firm clustered standard errors shown in parentheses. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1%
extreme. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote significance at 1%,
5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Variable
CEO relative leverage

(1)
0.0042***
(0.0015)

CEO relative leverage ≥ 1

(2)

CAR[-2,+2]
(3)

(4)

0.0061**
(0.0025)

CEO relative incentive

0.0041***
(0.0015)

CEO relative incentive ≥ 1

0.0053**
(0.0023)

CEO vega-to-delta ratio
CSR socially responsible investment
CSR corporate philanthropy
CSR environmental concern (base)
Other controls
R2 (%)
Observations

(5)

0.0025
(0.0036)
0.0001
(0.0022)
0.0146
(0.0563)
Yes
2.67%
843

0.0028
(0.0036)
0.0003
(0.0022)
0.0127
(0.0566)
Yes
2.66%
843

0.0026
(0.0036)
0.0001
(0.0022)
0.0121
(0.0566)
Yes
2.58%
843

0.0029
(0.0036)
0.0001
(0.0022)
0.0092
(0.0567)
Yes
2.46%
843

-0.0020*
(0.0012)
0.0021
(0.0040)
0.0000
(0.0024)
0.0578
(0.0583)
Yes
2.25%
707
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Table 2.9 CSR announcement cumulative abnormal returns conditional on CEO power
This table reports the regression analysis of firm CAR[-2,+2] on CEO risk preferences and CEO power. CEO relative
leverage is used to capture CEO risk preferences, which equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm
market leverage after logarithmic transformation. The four proxies used to capture CEO power are CEO duality, CEO
relative ownership, CEO pay slice, and CEO relative tenure. Specifically, CEO duality equals one if a CEO is also
the chair of the company's board of directors, and zero otherwise. CEO relative ownership equals one if CEO stock
ownership is above the industry median, and zero otherwise. CEO pay slice equals one if the ratio of CEO total
compensation to the top five executives’ is greater than the industry median, and zero otherwise. CEO relative tenure
equals one if CEO tenure is above the industry median, and zero otherwise. All models also include a constant term
as well as other controls with standard errors clustered at the firm level shown in parentheses. Continuous variables
are winsorized at 1% extreme. Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Variable
CEO relative leverage
CEO duality

(1)
0.0042***
(0.0015)
0.0038
(0.0025)

CEO relative ownership

CAR[-2,+2]
(2)
(3)
0.0041***
0.0042***
(0.0015)
(0.0016)
-0.0015
(0.0023)

CEO pay slice

0.0002
(0.0023)

CEO relative tenure
Other controls
R2 (%)
Observations

(4)
0.0043***
(0.0015)

Yes
2.91%
843

Yes
2.59%
841

Yes
2.60%
843

-0.0009
(0.0031)
Yes
2.61%
843
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Table 2.10 Heckman tests for self-selection bias
This table reports the regression analysis of firm CAR[-2,+2] and six-month BHARs on CEO risk preferences
controlling for Heckman self-selection bias. In panel A, the dependent variable is firm CAR[-2,+2]. In panel B, the
dependent variable is firm six-month BHARs. CEO risk preferences are captured using CEO relative leverage, CEO
relative leverage ≥ 1, CEO relative incentive, CEO relative incentive ≥ 1, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio. CEO relative
leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm market leverage after logarithmic transformation.
CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to
change in firm equity after logarithmic transformation. CEO vega-to-delta ratio is CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by
CEO debt-to-equity ratio after logarithmic transformation. All models include the constant term as well as other
controls with firm clustered standard errors shown in parentheses. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% extreme.
Variable descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
Variable
CEO relative leverage

(1)
0.0043***
(0.0015)

CEO relative leverage ≥ 1

(2)

Panel A: CAR[-2,+2]
(3)

(4)

0.0063**
(0.0025)

CEO relative incentive

0.0042***
(0.0015)

CEO relative incentive ≥ 1

0.0053**
(0.0023)

CEO vega-to-delta ratio
Inverse Mills Ratio
Other controls
R2 (%)
Observations
Variable
CEO relative leverage

0.0190
(0.0165)
Yes
2.78%
843
(6)
0.0297**
(0.0118)

CEO relative leverage ≥ 1

0.0180
0.0188
0.0180
(0.0167)
(0.0166)
(0.0169)
Yes
Yes
Yes
2.75%
2.69%
2.53%
843
843
843
Panel B: Six-month BHARs
(7)
(8)
(9)

(10)

0.0286**
(0.0119)

CEO relative incentive ≥ 1

0.0356**
(0.0179)

CEO vega-to-delta ratio

Other controls
R2 (%)
Observations

-0.0021*
(0.0011)
0.0202
(0.0152)
Yes
2.50%
707

0.0430**
(0.0182)

CEO relative incentive

Inverse Mills Ratio

(5)

0.1429
(0.1307)
Yes
3.42%
843

0.1332
(0.1241)
Yes
3.35%
843

0.1420
(0.1288)
Yes
3.29%
843

0.1251
(0.1244)
Yes
3.09%
843

-0.0089
(0.0109)
0.1002
(0.1123)
Yes
4.36%
707

104

Table 2.11 Instrumental variable analysis: first-stage regressions
This table reports the first-stage OLS regressions of CEO risk preferences on the following instruments including the
industry medians and maximum tax rates on wages. The dependent variables are CEO relative leverage, CEO relative
incentive, and CEO vega-to-delta ratio respectively. CEO relative leverage equals CEO inside debt to CEO inside
equity scaled by firm market leverage after logarithmic transformation. CEO relative incentive equals CEO inside
debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithmic
transformation. CEO vega-to-delta ratio is CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-to-equity ratio after
logarithmic transformation. In addition to their industry medians and maximum tax rates on wages, we control for
CEO age, new CEO dummy, firm size, firm leverage, firm market-to-book ratio, firm cash flows from operations
scaled by firm total assets, and firm tax loss carry forward scaled by firm total assets. All models include a constant
term with standard errors shown in parentheses. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% extreme. Variable
descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
Variable
Industry median of CEO relative leverage

CEO relative
leverage
(1)
0.6896***
(0.0530)

Industry median of CEO relative incentive

CEO relative
incentive
(2)
0.6241***
(0.0600)

Industry median of CEO vega-to-delta ratio
Maximum state tax rate on income
CEO age
New CEO
Firm size
Firm leverage
Firm market-to-book ratio
Firm cash flows from operation
Firm tax loss carry forward
F-statistics
R2 (%)
Observations

CEO vega-todelta ratio
(3)

0.0134**
(0.0063)
0.3148
(0.2130)
-0.1692***
(0.0633)
0.0599***
(0.0160)
-0.0439**
(0.0183)
0.0723*
(0.0383)
1.7133***
(0.4813)
-0.0240
(0.2335)
37.54
37.51%
573

0.0150**
(0.0065)
0.2787
(0.2222)
-0.1577**
(0.0660)
0.0324*
(0.0166)
-0.0418**
(0.0191)
0.0532
(0.0397)
1.6009***
(0.5014)
-0.0026
(0.2433)
22.98
26.87%
573

0.8469***
(0.0663)
-0.0250**
(0.0111)
-1.0125**
(0.3990)
0.4551***
(0.1103)
-0.1634***
(0.0271)
-0.1005***
(0.0288)
-0.0513
(0.0643)
-0.2595
(0.8282)
-1.8771***
(0.5139)
30.50
36.09%
496

Table 2.12 Instrumental variable analysis: second-stage regressions
This table reports the second-stage OLS regressions of firm CAR[-2,+2] and six-month BHARs on the predicted values of CEO risk preferences generated from the
first-stage OLS regressions including instrumented CEO relative leverage, instrumented CEO relative incentive, and instrumented CEO vega-to-delta ratio. All
models include the constant term as well as other controls with standard errors shown in parentheses. Continuous variables are winsorized at 1% extreme. Variable
descriptions are provided in Appendix 2.1. ***, **, and * are used to denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Variable
Instrumented CEO relative leverage

(1)
0.0156***
(0.0044)

Instrumented CEO relative incentive

CAR[-2,+2]
(2)

CEO tenure
CEO cash compensation
Firm size
Firm leverage
Firm market-to-book ratio
Firm sales growth
Firm R&D
Firm free cash flows
Multiple announcements
R2 (%)
Observations

(4)
0.0636**
(0.0303)

0.0172***
(0.0051)

Instrumented CEO vega-to-delta ratio
CEO age

(3)

-0.0111
(0.0138)
0.0007
(0.0016)
0.0047
(0.0032)
-0.0020*
(0.0011)
0.0007
(0.0012)
-0.0045*
(0.0024)
0.0028
(0.0120)
-0.0113***
(0.0041)
0.0000
(0.0127)
0.0006
(0.0030)
3.88%
573

-0.0105
(0.0140)
0.0008
(0.0016)
0.0051
(0.0032)
-0.0017
(0.0011)
0.0008
(0.0012)
-0.0041*
(0.0024)
0.0039
(0.0121)
-0.0106**
(0.0041)
0.0009
(0.0129)
0.0006
(0.0030)
3.63%
573

Six-month BHARs
(5)

(6)

0.0656*
(0.0350)
-0.0056**
(0.0028)
-0.0234
(0.0175)
0.0006
(0.0019)
0.0046
(0.0035)
-0.0019
(0.0013)
-0.0004
(0.0012)
0.0004
(0.0023)
-0.0006
(0.0128)
-0.0098**
(0.0044)
0.0079
(0.0141)
0.0016
(0.0032)
2.09%
496

-0.0659
(0.0954)
-0.0060
(0.0110)
0.0671***
(0.0219)
-0.0319***
(0.0078)
0.0087
(0.0083)
0.0064
(0.0164)
0.1032
(0.0826)
-0.0484*
(0.0283)
0.1320
(0.0877)
0.0090
(0.0204)
4.29%
573

-0.0620
(0.0954)
-0.0057
(0.0110)
0.0685***
(0.0219)
-0.0304***
(0.0077)
0.0089
(0.0084)
0.0092
(0.0161)
0.1070
(0.0829)
-0.0454
(0.0283)
0.1352
(0.0879)
0.0088
(0.0205)
4.14%
573

-0.0077
(0.0179)
-0.0827
(0.1118)
0.0009
(0.0120)
0.0827***
(0.0223)
-0.0292***
(0.0086)
0.0002
(0.0078)
0.0502***
(0.0150)
0.0940
(0.0822)
-0.0563**
(0.0279)
0.0059
(0.0902)
0.0128
(0.0206)
5.09%
496
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ESSAY 3: CEO MOBILITY AND ACQUISITIONS
INTRODUCTION
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) have been and will likely remain the most visible and
crucial form of corporate investments. Indeed, the Institute for Mergers, Acquisitions and
Alliances has documented that over 44,000 transactions have been initiated at the global scale,
with a total market value of more than $4.5 trillion in 2015. Given the vital importance of corporate
takeover activities, research scholars have investigated their potential antecedents. Although a
significant number of large-sample M&A studies over the last three decades have identified a
robust set of acquirer performance determinants, the overall variation in the returns to acquisition
activity remains largely unexplained (e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004; Masulis,
Wang, and Xie 2007; Harford, Humphery-Jenner, and Powell 2012). For instance, despite
employing an extensive list of determinants, a widely cited comprehensive study by Moeller et al.
(2004) is able to explain just over 5% of the variation in acquirer returns (as judged by the adjusted
R2 values of their main regression models). Similarly, other studies with smaller sample sizes have
been able to explain only a small fraction of the variation in acquisition returns (Masulis et al.
2007; Harford et al. 2012). More importantly, in contrast to the common belief that mergers fail to
create value, anecdotal evidence from acquisitions carried out by firms such as Berkshire
Hathaway, Cisco Systems, Diageo, General Electric, and IBM suggest persistent acquisition
success.
Motivated by the pioneering work of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) , a growing number of
research studies aim to resolve the puzzle of M&A return variation by focusing on CEO fixed
effects (Malmendier and Tate 2008; Goel and Thakor 2009; Yim 2013; Phan 2014; Croci and
Petmezas 2015; Jenter and Lewellen 2015). For example, Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that
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overconfident CEOs tend to undertake M&A activities that are detrimental to acquirer value and
overpay the targets. Croci and Petmezas (2015) report a positive association between CEO riskinducing compensation (i.e., vega) and bidder announcement returns as well as the propensity to
engage in acquisitions. Furthermore, Elnahas and Kim (2017) document a significant negative
relation between conservative CEOs—captured by political ideology—and firm propensity to
pursue M&As. Recently, Andreou, Doukas, Koursaros, and Louca (2019) show that valuedestroying corporate diversification decisions are associated with CEO overconfidence.
Following this emerging stream of research, in this study we examine whether CEO
mobility—the manager’s ability and willingness to change jobs in the presence of outside career
options (Gao, Luo, and Tang 2015; Colak and Korkeamaki 2017) – can explain the return variation
of M&A activities documented in the literature. Specifically, from a theoretical standpoint, CEO
mobility can affect the outcomes of M&As in two ways. First, due to the nature of job hopping,
more mobile CEOs are likely to possess diverse skills as well as experiences from different
industries after each transition, which could be beneficial to the current acquiring firm (Song 1982;
Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hambrick 2007). Indeed, CEOs with higher mobility are likely to
obtain valuable experience in strategy formulation and execution as they switch firms over time.
Therefore, more mobile CEOs are deemed better at making corporate decisions than less mobile
CEOs. Consistent with this argument, for firms undergoing poor performance, Ryan and Wang
(2012) show that more mobile CEOs increase shareholder value and improve operating
performance after their appointment. In terms of M&As, Custódio and Metzger (2013) also find
that CEOs with accumulated experience in the target industry are able to deliver better returns than
those who are relatively new to the target industry. Colak and Korkeamaki (2017) report that
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higher-mobility CEOs are associated with riskier corporate policies that tend to increase firm
equity value.
Second, the potential costs in terms of human capital caused by job loss, in addition to
limited external job opportunities, induce immobile or less mobile CEOs to behave more
conservatively than what would be optimal for the shareholders of acquiring firms (Jensen and
Meckling 1976; Gervais, Heaton, and Odean 2011). In other words, immobile or less mobile CEOs
are more likely to be risk averse than mobile CEOs. This point of view is also consistent with
organizational behavior and labor economics studies (Pissarides 1974; Harris and Weiss 1984;
Nicholson and West 1988; Pfeifer 2008). Essentially, shareholders’ interests are more aligned with
the interests of mobile CEOs because they are more willing to take risks and implement alternative
strategies with uncertain outcomes (Ryan and Wang 2012; Colak and Korkeamaki 2017). In line
with the second argument, several studies have also shown that shareholders do not prefer
corporate decisions made by CEOs exhibiting risk-averse behavior. For example, Wei and
Yermack (2011) find that the stock market generally reacts negatively to a higher level of inside
debt (i.e., more risk-averse CEOs) disclosed in a company’s proxy statements. Phan (2014) records
that M&A announcements made by CEOs with higher (lower) levels of inside debt (i.e., debt like
compensation) elicit negative (positive) shareholder reactions.
Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize that acquisitions by CEOs with higher
(lower) mobility are more likely to be associated with higher (lower) shareholder gains and we
then test this conjecture. We also investigate other important aspects of corporate takeover
decisions by more (less) mobile CEOs, including acquirer post-M&A long-term performance,
M&A decisions, payment considerations, and diversification strategies. To address these issues,
we construct two alternative measures of CEO mobility relying on a comprehensive list of 14
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possible mobility determinants suggested in the literature (Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Balsam and
Miharjo 2007; Benson and Davidson III 2009; Garmaise 2011; Cremers and Grinstein 2013; Deng
and Gao 2013; Eisfeldt and Kuhnen 2013; Serfling 2014; Dittmar and Duchin 2015; Gao et al.
2015; Francis, Hasan, John, and Waisman 2016; Colak and Korkeamaki 2017). The higher the
value of our mobility measures, the more likely a CEO is expected to switch jobs in a given year.
Using a sample of 2,906 M&A announcements initiated by 1,085 unique U.S. public
companies (or 1,444 unique CEOs) between 1994 and 2016, we find that acquisitions announced
by highly mobile CEOs are associated with significant positive shareholder reactions. Acquirers
managed by CEOs with higher mobility also tend to outperform those run by CEOs with lower
mobility in the long run. In addition, we document a positive relation between CEO mobility and
the propensity to engage in M&A activities. Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Furfine and
Rosen 2011), we find more mobile CEOs (i.e., exhibiting higher risk tolerance) use a higher
percentage of cash in financing M&A transactions than immobile or less mobile CEOs. We do not
find significant evidence with respect to the effect of CEO potential mobility on acquirers’ industry
and/or international diversification strategies. Additional tests demonstrate that our overall
findings are not sensitive to the inclusion of managerial ability or CEO risk-seeking inducing
compensation. Finally, the results remain statistically significant after we correct for self-selection
bias.
The contribution of this study to the literature is threefold. First, we add to the literature by
showing that CEO mobility, as a distinct managerial attribute (fixed effect), can help explain the
puzzle of M&A return variation documented in previous M&A studies. Specifically, we find
corporate takeover decisions made by CEOs with higher mobility increase shareholder value
relative to M&As carried out by CEOs with lower mobility. In terms of dollar value, more mobile
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CEOs are capable of capitalizing roughly $18.05 million more than less mobile CEOs when
engaging in M&As.
Second, this study offers an alternative angle to the criticism of hiring and appointing jobhopping executives. Some researchers argue that CEO potential mobility (e.g., with more outside
career options) can be detrimental to the current firm because more mobile CEOs can be myopic,
focus on their own interests, and ignore the firm’s long-term performance (Liu, Nanda, Onal, and
Silveri 2018). However, consistent with other recent studies (Ryan and Wang 2012; Colak and
Korkeamaki 2017), our findings suggest the opposite. Specifically, they imply that improving a
manager’s potential mobility in the current firm (e.g., through lowering restrictions in severance
packages) can also alleviate managerial conservatism and increase firm value. In addition, as
suggested by recent anecdotal evidence, hiring a new CEO with a history of job hopping can be
beneficial as well.29
Third, this paper empirically polishes and validates recently proposed measures of CEO
mobility that can potentially be used to address various research issues in the future. To name a
few, researchers can investigate the potential effect of CEO mobility on corporate innovation. On
one hand, given more available outside career options as well as greater willingness to switch jobs,
more mobile CEOs might not see any need for innovation in the current firm. On the other hand,
at the same time, CEOs with higher mobility, thanks to their higher risk tolerance, could be induced
to innovate, because innovation is also considered risky and intangible yet can raise considerably
a firm’s upside potential. Similarly, future studies can also examine the effects of CEO mobility
on other important areas of corporate finance, including but not limited to dividend policies, capital
structure, and cash holdings.

29

For more information on this discussion, see https://www.wsj.com/articles/job-hopping-executives-no-longer-paypenalty-1469545287 and https://www.bluesteps.com/blog/ceo-mobility-on-the-rise.aspx.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the research
methodology. Section 3 reports the empirical results of shareholder reactions to M&A decisions,
acquirer post-M&A long-term performance, M&A decisions, payment considerations, and
diversification strategies conditional on different levels of CEO mobility. Section 4 presents
additional robustness checks for potential omitted variables bias and self-selection bias. Section 5
concludes the paper.
METHODOLOGY
Variable description
Cumulative abnormal returns
For each M&A deal, we follow the standard event study procedure to estimate acquirer
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcement date. Following previous studies
(e.g., Officer 2003; Acharya, Amihud, and Litov 2011), we compute acquirer CARs as the sum of
daily abnormal returns estimated from the one-factor model (Sharpe 1964) for the seven-day
window (i.e., from t = -3 to t = +3) around the announcement date:30
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 ) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡
The acquirers’ daily stock returns are obtained from the Center for Research in Securities
Prices (CRSP). We calculate the coefficient estimate for the market risk premium using the
estimation period from t = -211 to t = -11 relative to the M&A announcement date for each
acquirer. The daily abnormal stock return (ARi,t or 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ) is the difference between the actual return
and the return predicted by the one-factor model.

30

The results are similar when we employ a four-factor model or different event windows (i.e., CAR[0,+1] or
CAR[-1,+1]) and are available upon request.
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CEO mobility measures
We label CEO potential mobility as a CEO’s unobservable outside job options, as well as
the CEO’s willingness and ability to exercise these options. Inspired by recent empirical work
(Fracassi and Tate 2012; Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos 2013; Colak and Korkeamaki 2017), we
employ principal component analysis (PCA) to estimate the first mobility measure. Specifically,
CEO PCA mobility is the weighted average of the top five orthogonal principal components whose
eigenvalues are greater than one, constructed from a comprehensive list of 14 possible mobility
determinants. The literature, as discussed below, suggests that these variables relate to a CEO’s
job hopping.31 The variable CEO age is an important factor, because older CEOs are less likely to
change jobs voluntarily due to higher fixed costs to adapt to a new corporate environment (Serfling
2014). The term CEO tenure—the number of years a CEO has been in the position—captures the
possible effect that the longer an executive stays with a company, the less likely that executive is
to switch jobs (Gibbons and Murphy 1992; Balsam and Miharjo 2007; Benson and Davidson III
2009; Gao et al. 2015). The variable CEO duality could also be influential, since holding the CEO
and chair titles at the same time could discourage an executive from changing firms (Serfling
2014). If a manager is currently offered already high compensation relative to other options in the
market, the manager might be less likely to switch (or would find it hard to switch) to another firm
(Gao et al. 2015). Hence, it is reasonable to include CEO relative pay decile—the decile ranking
assigned to a CEO based on the CEO’s total compensation relative to other CEOs—in the analysis.
Similarly, we also control for CEO cash pay, the natural logarithm of the CEO’s salary plus bonus,
and CEO equity pay, the ratio of the CEO’s equity compensation to total compensation (Balsam
and Miharjo 2007). High relative performance (High RPE) indicates whether a firm already

31

See Colak and Korkeamaki (2017) for a detailed discussion of CEO mobility estimations.
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outperforms others (based on either cash flows or returns on assets) in the same industry in a given
year (Eisfeldt and Kuhnen 2013). The rationale for the inclusion of this factor is that, if a CEO
already works for a better company relative to others in the industry, the CEO is less likely to
switch jobs. Besides, Garmaise (2011) suggests that states with high non-competition
enforceability (NCE index) could discourage a manager from moving to another firm.
On the other hand, the more connections a CEO has with other firms, generally, the higher
the probability and ease in switching jobs. We augment this potential effect using a dummy
indicating if an executive has an interlocking membership (CEO interlocking) on the board of
another firm. A greater number of firms in the same industry (or geographical region) also provide
more opportunities for a CEO to switch jobs. These effects are captured using firms in industry
and firms in same MSA (Deng and Gao 2013; Francis et al. 2016). Furthermore, the extent to which
a manager wants to change jobs could be affected by the oligopolistic structure of a certain
industry, which is estimated by the Herfindahl index based on sales (Cremers and Grinstein 2013;
Deng and Gao 2013). As suggested by Cremers and Grinstein (2013), it should also be easier for
an executive to switch to another company in the same industry if it has been the norm in the
industry. We thus include the percent insider CEOs variable to account for the percentage of CEOs
hired from within the same industry, which is extracted from Table 3 of Cremers and Grinstein
(2013). Motivated by Ryan and Wang (2012) and Dittmar and Duchin (2015), we also add the
variable past job moves—the number of times an executive has switched jobs prior to the current
CEO position—because managers who have changed jobs in the past could be more likely to move
again.
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The second measure, CEO predicted mobility, is estimated as the predicted value of the
following logistic regression:
𝑃(𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ 𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑖,𝑡 = 1|𝑋) = ∅(𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑋1,𝑖,𝑡−1 + ⋯ + 𝛽6 𝑋6,𝑖,𝑡−1 )
where the dependent variable Switch jobsi,t takes a value of one if CEO i in year t is associated
with a different firm than in year t – 1, and zero otherwise. The independent variables X1 to X6 are
CEO specific and include CEO age, CEO tenure, relative pay decile, interlocking, percent insider
CEOs, and past job moves. We also include industry and year fixed effects in estimating CEO
predicted mobility. We standardize the values of CEO predicted mobility and CEO PCA mobility
to make them comparable across different model specifications. In terms of interpretation, a higher
value for CEO predicted mobility (or CEO PCA mobility) indicates that a CEO has more
unobservable outside options, as well as greater willingness plus ability to switch to a better
executive position.
Thus far, in line with previous literature, we argue that highly mobile CEOs are assumed
to gain more diverse skills and accumulate more experience from different industries after each
transition in comparison to immobile or less mobile CEOs. In addition, more (less) mobile
managers are expected to exhibit risk-taking (risk-averse) behavior. To justify these assumptions,
we calculate a set of Pearson correlations between our proxies of CEO potential mobility and
Demerjian, Lev, and McVay’s (2012) managerial ability index; Custódio, Ferreira, and Matos’s
(2013) general ability index; and CEO risk attitudes (captured by a CEO’s vega-to-delta ratio). If
our assumptions are reliable, CEO predicted mobility and CEO PCA mobility are expected to be
significantly and positively correlated with the two ability indexes and the CEO vega-to-delta ratio.
The evidence (significant at 1%) shows that the correlation coefficients are, respectively, 0.0197
and 0.0239 (with respect to the managerial ability index), 0.0602, and 0.2192 (with respect to the
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general ability index), and 0.1312 and 0.0579 (with respect to the CEO vega-to-delta ratio).
Therefore, these correlation results suggest that our two CEO mobility measures gauge a
considerable quantity of managers’ unobservable diverse skills, accumulated experience, and risk
preferences.
Control variables
In addition to the two proxies of CEO mobility, in line with previous studies (e.g., Doukas
and Travlos 1988; Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson, and Teoh 2006; Yim
2013), we also include the following set of control variables in the subsequent multivariate
analyses. In terms of CEO characteristics, we control for CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO cash
compensation scaled by total assets, and CEO duality, which indicates if the CEO is also the chair
of the board. For firm characteristics, we use firm size, firm market-to-book, firm leverage, and
firm return on assets. Specifically, firm size is the natural logarithm of the market value of assets,
firm market-to-book is the ratio of the market value of equity to the book value of equity, firm
leverage is the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, and firm return on assets is the ratio of income
before extraordinary items to total assets. Concerning deal characteristics, we control for the
method of payment (i.e., 100% cash vs. 100% stock vs. mixed), public target, industry, and
international diversifications. The variable 100% cash (100% stock) is a dummy equal to one if
the whole transaction was paid with cash (stock), and zero otherwise. The variable public target
equals one if a public target was acquired, and zero otherwise. The variable for industry
(international) diversification takes a value of one if the target is not in the same two-digit SIC
(country) as the acquirer, and zero otherwise. Additionally, we account for the effect of relative
deal value (relative deal value), which is defined as the deal transaction in U.S. dollars scaled by
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the acquirer’s market value of assets. A detailed description of these variables is provided in
Appendix 3.1.
Data collection and descriptive statistics
Initially, we retrieve successful M&A deals of private and public targets announced by
U.S. publicly listed firms with non-negative common equity between 1994 and 2016 from the
Thomson One M&A database. To construct the final sample, following previous studies (Dong et
al. 2006; Goel and Thakor 2009; Hasan, Kallberg, Liu, and Sun 2014; John, Knyazeva, and
Knyazeva 2015), we impose the following restrictions. First, we exclude announcements made by
acquirers with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes that range from 4900 to 4999 or from
6000 to 6999. Second, an announcement is included in the final sample only if the transaction
value exceeds $2 million and the transaction value scaled by the acquirer’s market value of assets
is greater than or equal to 1%. This restriction ensures that our M&A sample only comprises
successful announcements that are likely to have a tangible impact on the acquirers and their
shareholders.
We merge the M&A sample with the Compustat and CRSP databases to retrieve all the
required items to estimate acquirer CARs, CEO mobility measures, and related control variables.
The final sample consists of 2,906 M&A announcements by 1,085 unique companies (or 1,444
unique CEOs). Panel A of Table 3.1 displays the M&A annual distribution of the sample.
According to column (1), the number of M&As is spread out quite evenly across the sample period,
except for the first year of the sample (1994). In addition, M&A activities reduced from 149 to 98
completed deals during the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2009 but increased afterward. The
next three columns report the numbers of M&As based on the method of payment, namely, 100%
stock, 100% cash, and mixed, respectively. Generally, most M&A transactions are financed using
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100% cash or a mixed form of payment, whereas only 205 acquisitions were paid with 100% stock.
A good number of 100% stock-financed acquisitions occurred before 2001, but this method of
payment became less popular after the tech bubble (Eckbo, Makaew, and Thorburn 2018). On the
other hand, the use of 100% cash or other payment methods turns out to be more prevalent with
time during our sample period.
[Insert Table 3.1 about here]
Regarding M&A characteristics, reported in Panel B of Table 3.1, around 45% of the
acquisitions involve public targets. In addition, more than 32% of our M&A sample consists of
industrially diversified deals, while roughly 20% represent foreign deals. Of the final sample,
approximately 46% of the takeover deals are financed completely with cash, whereas only 7.05%
are paid with stock. The average transaction value is around 9.74% of the acquirer’s market value
of total assets. Comparable to previous M&A studies, the mean of the acquirer market value of
assets after logarithmic transformation is 7.9375. The average acquirer in our sample has a marketto-book ratio of 3.5811, a financial leverage of 0.1511, and typically yields 6.27% profitability in
terms of return on assets. The means of the two proxies of CEO mobility are 0.0333, and -0.0089,
respectively. In terms of the other CEO characteristics, roughly 55% of the acquisitions were
consummated by CEOs who were also the chair of the board. The average CEO age in the sample
is 54.65 years, that is, slightly lower than the median of 55 years, and has a tenure of more than
seven years. Finally, average CEO cash compensation scaled by total assets is around 1.1241.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns and CEO mobility
In this section, we first examine the average acquirer’s short-term performance (i.e.,
CAR[-3,+3]) with respect to CEO mobility in the full sample and in subsamples based on the
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method of payment. According to Panel A of Table 3.2, during the sample period, from 1994 to
2016, successful M&A announcements are typically associated with positive announcement
abnormal returns (around 0.41%). In addition, 100% cash M&A deals, on average, deliver
significant short-term shareholder gains (around 0.87%), whereas 100% stock-financed
acquisitions result in significant shareholder short-term losses (roughly -1.63%). With respect to
M&As involving a mixture of payments, the average shareholder reactions are not statistically
different from zero. Generally, the reported results are consistent with previous studies (Fuller,
Netter, and Stegemoller 2002; Masulis et al. 2007; Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki 2011; Duchin
and Schmidt 2013; Schmidt 2015).
[Insert Table 3.2 about here]
Panel B of Table 3.2 shows the average acquirer short-term performance for different
groups of CEOs based on their predicted mobility, CEO predicted mobility. Although equity
investor reactions are positive for all three categories, they are not statistically significant for the
bottom tercile (less mobile CEOs) or the middle tercile, suggesting that acquisitions by less mobile
CEOs are not viewed by shareholders as value-increasing investments. On the other hand, takeover
deals pursued by more mobile CEOs (top tercile) are associated with significantly positive
shareholder gains (approximately 1.13%). More importantly, according to the difference-in-means
test results, reported in the last column of Panel B, acquisitions consummated by more mobile
CEOs yield considerably higher CARs (statistically significant at 1%) than those initiated by less
mobile CEOs. Given that the median acquirer market capitalization is around $1.687 billion in our
sample, during the seven-day window around the announcement, more mobile CEOs are able to
capitalize roughly $18.05 million more than less mobile CEOs when engaging in M&As
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activities.32 We also find consistent evidence, as reported in Panel C, when using CEO PCA
mobility instead of CEO predicted mobility to partition the M&A sample. In summary, in line with
our expectations, M&A decisions by high-mobility CEOs (with higher ability and more options to
change jobs) are associated with significant and positive announcement returns.
Next, we examine the equity market’s reactions to acquisition announcements carried out
by CEOs with different levels of mobility, controlling for other effects. We employ ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors to test the effect of CEO
mobility on acquirer CARs around the announcement date. The main dependent variable is the
acquirers’ cumulative abnormal stock returns for the seven-day event window computed from the
one-factor model. The key independent variables are the two measures of CEO mobility, that is,
CEO predicted mobility and CEO PCA mobility. In addition, our research design controls for
manager, firm, and deal characteristics, with CEO duality, CEO age, CEO tenure, CEO
compensation, firm size, firm leverage, firm market-to-book, firm return on assets, public target,
industry (international) diversifications, 100% cash, 100% stock, and relative deal value. The
baseline regression model of our study is
𝑘

𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑚𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 + ∑

𝑗=1

𝛾𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖

(1)

According to our main conjecture, M&As consummated by CEOs with higher (lower)
mobility are expected to be associated with higher (lower) shareholder gains. Therefore, the
coefficient of CEO potential mobility (i.e., β1) in equation (1) is expected to be positive and
statistically significant. Table 3.3 reports the OLS regression results. Across the two regression
specifications, the coefficients of CEO mobility measures are positive and statistically significant
32

The sum of $18.05 million approximates the product of the median market capitalization ($1.687 billion) and the
difference in CAR[-3,+3] between CEOs of high and low mobility (0.0107).
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at conventional levels. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in
CEO predicted mobility (CEO PCA mobility) is associated with an increase of around 52 basis
points (63 basis points) in acquirer CAR[-3,+3].33 Consistent with the univariate results, the
multivariate analysis lends additional support to our hypothesis that M&A decisions made by more
mobile CEO are associated with better equity market reactions.34
[Insert Table 3.3 about here]
With respect to the effects of other control variables, our multivariate regressions yield
consistent coefficient estimates with those documented in previous studies (e.g., Doukas and
Travlos 1988; Berger, Ofek, and Yermack 1997; Dong et al. 2006; Masulis et al. 2007; Phan 2014).
Specifically, M&As initiated by CEOs awarded greater cash compensation (i.e., CEOs who are
more entrenched) are associated with lower CARs. In addition, we find that bigger acquiring firms
are associated with lower announcement abnormal returns. Deals paid 100% in stock are
associated with negative and significant announcement returns. In terms of diversification effects,
the coefficient of industry diversification across all different specifications is negative and
statistically significant at 1%, suggesting that such M&A decisions destroy value. Although the
coefficient of international diversification is also negative, it is statistically insignificant in all
regression specifications.
Acquirer post M&A long-term performance and CEO mobility
The evidence so far suggests that, in the context of M&As, more mobile CEOs outperform
less mobile CEOs in terms of delivering short-term shareholder gains, since more mobile CEOs

33

The values 52 basis points and 63 basis points are the product of the coefficients and the variable’s standard deviation
(i.e., 0.0057 * 0.9078 and 0.0065 * 0.9701).
34
In a separate untabulated analysis, we also check the moderation effects of payment methods (100% cash vs. 100%
stock vs. mixed) and industry diversification on the relation between CEO mobility and shareholder reactions to
M&As. However, the coefficients of the moderation terms are statistically insignificant. These results are available
upon request.
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tend to undertake M&A decisions in line with shareholder preferences. Accordingly, it is
reasonable to expect acquisitions by more mobile CEOs to continue to have better post-M&A longterm performance than less mobile CEOs. To examine this conjecture, we conduct a set of
multivariate regressions of acquirer post-M&A long-term performance on CEO mobility measures
and other controls. We estimate acquirer post-M&A long-term performance using buy-and-hold
abnormal returns (BHARs), as follows.
𝑇

𝑇

𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅[+1, +𝑇]𝑖 = ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ) − ∏(1 + 𝑅𝑏𝑒𝑛𝑐ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘,𝑡 )
𝑡=1

𝑡=1

where BHAR[+1, +T]i is the BHAR of acquirer i over the next T trading days after the
announcement date. We examine acquirers’ long-term performance for the 24 months (T = 500
trading days) after the acquisition announcement. Furthermore, Ri,t is the actual daily stock return
of firm i and Rbenchmark,t is the daily benchmark return predicted by the one-factor model. Table 3.4
reports the multivariate results for acquirer BHARs.
[Insert Table 3.4 about here]
As shown in Table 3.4, the coefficients of CEO mobility measures are consistently positive
and statistically significant at conventional levels across all models. For instance, a one standard
deviation increase in CEO predicted mobility (reported in regression (1) of Table 3.4) translates
into an increase of around 10.66% in acquirers’ BHARs realized over a two-year period.35 That is,
acquirers led by more mobile CEOs seem to perform better in the long run than those managed by
less mobile CEOs. Overall, consistent with our main conjecture, the empirical results based on
short- and long-term market performance imply that corporate decisions made by CEOs with
higher potential mobility are more aligned with shareholder interests.

35

The amount 10.66% is the product of the coefficient and the variable’s standard deviation (i.e., 0.1174 * 0.9078).
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Acquirer M&A decisions and CEO mobility
Prior studies (e.g., Furfine and Rosen 2011) suggest that M&A decisions largely depend
on managers’ discretion and, on average, tend to increase acquirers’ default risk. This empirical
pattern is further highlighted by Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2015) who find that CEOs have a
tendency to preserve the power of making decisions with respect to M&As, as opposed to other
corporate policies. The survey-based research conducted by Graham, Harvey, and Puri (2013) also
reveals that CEO characteristics, or, more specifically, CEO risk preferences, play important roles
in corporate takeover activities. Utilizing CEOs’ ownership of private pilot licenses to capture their
personal risk-taking preferences, Cain and McKeon (2016) find that risk-seeking CEOs are more
likely to engage in M&A activities than risk-averse CEOs. Similarly, Croci and Petmezas (2015)
report that CEOs with risk-inducing (convex) compensation (i.e., more risk seeking) are more
likely to engage in acquisitions. Using CEO pension and deferred compensation to capture CEO
risk aversion, Phan (2014) also documents that CEOs with lower relative leverage (i.e., more risk
seeking) are more likely to pursue M&A activities. Therefore, we can infer that more mobile
CEOs, who are expected to be more risk seeking, should exhibit a higher propensity to initiate
acquisitions than immobile or less mobile CEOs, ceteris paribus.
[Insert Table 3.5 about here]
To test this conjecture, we adhere to the literature and implement the following procedures
(e.g., Malmendier and Tate 2008; Yim 2013; Phan 2014). Specifically, we cross-check all firms in
the ExecuComp database from 1994 to 2016 with the sample of M&A announcements to construct
the dependent variable, a dummy that equals one if a firm has engaged in M&A activities in a
certain year, and zero otherwise. We then perform logistic regressions of acquisition propensity
on the two proxies of CEO mobility and other control variables, plus industry and year fixed
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effects. Based on the above discussion, we expect a positive coefficient estimate for CEO mobility.
Table 3.5 documents the empirical results. Across the models in Table 3.5, as expected, the two
coefficients of CEO mobility are found to be positive, implying that the more mobile a CEO is,
the more likely the CEO is to engage in acquisitions. The evidence is statistically significant at 5%
and 1%, as shown in columns (1) and (2) respectively. That is, more (less) mobile CEOs who
exhibit risk-taking (risk-averse) behavior are more (less) likely to engage in corporate takeovers.
Acquirer payment decisions and CEO mobility
According to Furfine and Rosen (2011), financing M&A transactions with cash tends to
increase bidder risk because this sort of acquisition payment method indirectly substitutes bidders’
safer and more liquid assets (i.e., cash) with the target’s assets. Alternatively, financing M&As
with stock provides bidders insurance in the sense that the potential gains and losses are co-shared
with the targets. For these reasons, acquirers led by managers exhibiting risk-taking behavior
should be more likely to facilitate takeover bids with cash, whereas acquirers controlled by riskaverse and/or conservative CEOs should opt for other forms of payment (e.g., stocks). Consistent
with this view, Phan (2014) reports that CEOs with higher levels of inside debt (i.e., more risk
averse) tend to use less cash in their acquisition decisions than those with higher levels of inside
debt (i.e., more risk seeking). In addition, according to Malmendier and Tate (2008), the use of
cash implicitly suggests that managers tend to be more confident and have stronger belief in the
synergy gains of a merger and its post-M&A performance. Therefore, we argue that more mobile
CEOs, who have accumulated experience based on their past corporate decisions, are more likely
to close a deal with cash than less mobile CEOs.
[Insert Table 3.6 about here]
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Accordingly, we expect a positive relation between CEO mobility measures and the
proportion of cash used in financing M&A transactions. To perform this test, following previous
studies (e.g., Faccio and Masulis 2005; Fu and Tang 2016), we run a Tobit regression of the cash
proportion used by the acquirers (bounded between 0% and 100%) on CEO mobility and other
control variables. The dependent variable, cash proportion, is the percentage of deal value
acquirers financed with cash. The findings are reported in Table 3.6. Consistent with our
prediction, as shown in Table 3.6, the coefficients of the CEO mobility proxies are strongly
positive (statistically significant at 5% and 1%) implying that CEOs with higher mobility tend to
use more cash instead of stock to finance M&A transactions. In summary, CEO mobility is
significantly related to acquirer payment decisions (cash vs. stock).
Acquirer diversification decisions and CEO mobility
On one hand, the M&A literature documents that diversification can help lower bidders’
overall risk and uncertainty via the coinsurance effect with the target whose cash flows are
imperfectly correlated (e.g., Levy and Sarnat 1970; Lewellen 1971). According to Amihud and
Lev (1981), diversifying M&A activities even help elevate managers’ undiversifiable employment
risk (i.e., their career concern). Prior theoretical work also suggests that entrenched managers
concerned about losing their jobs, without outside alternatives (i.e., with lower job mobility), have
an incentive to engage in diversification because such a strategy makes it costly for the firm to fire
them (Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Aggarwal and Samwick 2003). Consistent with this view, Phan
(2014) reports a significant and positive relation between CEO risk aversion (measured by inside
debt compensation) and acquirers’ propensity to engage in industry diversification. In line with
this tranche of research, less mobile or immobile CEOs, given their limited outside career options,
are also expected to engage more in industry and/or international diversifications.
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On the other hand, due to the nature of job hopping, more mobile CEOs are likely to gain
diverse skills and accumulate experience from different industries after each transition, which
could be beneficial to the current firm (Hambrick and Mason 1984; Hambrick 2007; Ryan and
Wang 2012; Custódio and Metzger 2013). Accordingly, more mobile CEOs could also engage
more in diversified M&A deals, especially across industries, since these M&As are thought to add
value to the acquiring companies (Song 1982; Barbopoulos and Doukas 2018). Given these
opposing effects, the potential relation between CEO mobility and the propensity to engage in
diversifying acquisitions needs to be justified empirically.
[Insert Table 3.7 about here]
In this part of the analysis, we investigate how CEO mobility affects acquirers’ likelihood
to acquire a target in a different two-digit SIC industry (i.e., industry diversification), as well as a
target in a different country (i.e., international diversification). Therefore, we run two logistic
regressions using industry diversification and international diversification as dependent variables,
respectively. The empirical evidence is reported in Table 3.7. Regarding industry diversification,
although the first two regression models show that the coefficients of CEO mobility measures are
positive, suggesting more mobile CEOs are more likely to engage in diversifying M&A deals
across different industries, the estimates are not statistically significant. Similarly, as shown in the
last two columns of Table 3.6, the empirical results for international diversification are not
statistically significant either. Therefore, we refrain from drawing any definitive conclusions for
the effect of CEO mobility on acquirers’ propensity to engage in industry and international
diversification. The results seem to suggest that both industrially and internationally diversifying
acquisitions are not strongly related to CEO mobility.
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ROBUSTNESS TESTS
Potential effects of managerial ability and CEO risk seeking inducing compensation
The reported correlations in the research methodology section suggest that the two CEO
mobility measures capture a considerable quantity of managers’ unobservable diverse skills and
accumulated experience as well as their risk preferences. Therefore, one could argue that the
overall results of CEO mobility in our study could be confounded by the managers’ unobservable
skills and risk preferences. To address this concern, in this section, we reexamine the
aforementioned analyses by including the industry-year adjusted managerial ability index
(Demerjian et al. 2012; Demerjian, Lev, Lewis, and McVay 2012) and CEO vega-to-delta (Core
and Guay 1999, 2002).
[Insert Table 3.8 about here]
If CEO predicted mobility and CEO PCA mobility are simply mirages of the CEO’s innate
skills and risk preferences, the effects of the two mobility measures on M&A outcomes should
dissipate when we include the proxies of skills and risk preferences (i.e., the managerial ability
index and CEO vega-to-delta). Nonetheless, if our mobility measures convey more meaningful
information than just the underlying skills and risk preferences (e.g., limited outside career
options), the coefficients of CEO mobility will remain statistically significant. The empirical
results are reported in Table 3.8. Across all model specifications, the effects of the CEO mobility
measures remain positive and statistically significant at conventional levels, whereas the effects of
the CEO vega-to-delta ratio and managerial ability are either marginally significant or
insignificant. Hence, our overall results are robust to the inclusion of managerial ability and CEO
risk seeking inducing compensation.
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Self-selection bias
Following recent M&A studies (e.g., Phan 2014; Masulis and Simsir 2018), we utilize
Heckman’s (1979) selection model to control for self-selection bias in our empirical analyses,
because the decision to engage in M&As is not random and we can only observe shareholder
reactions, acquirers’ post-M&A long-term performance, and payment considerations only for
firms that decided to do so. First, we run a probit regression of a firm’s propensity to engage in an
M&A in a given year, similar with the model specification reported in Table 3.5, and calculate the
inverse Mills ratio (IMR), inverse Mills ratio. Second, we rerun the multivariate regressions of
CAR[-3,+3], BHAR[+1,+500], and cash proportion used to finance M&A transactions on CEO
mobility measures together with the augmented IMRs.
[Insert Table 3.9 about here]
If the IMR’s coefficient is statistically significant, inclusion of the IMR is necessary to
control for self-selection bias. On the other hand, this would imply that our results are not sensitive
to self-selection bias. More importantly, we expect the effects of CEO potential mobility to remain
significant given the inclusion of the IMR. The results of the Heckman’s test, as reported in Table
3.9, suggest our overall results are robust to self-selection bias, since the coefficients of CEO
mobility measures remain statistically significant at conventional levels across all regression
specifications. Specifically, we continue to observe that M&A decisions consummated by more
mobile CEOs elicit higher CARs, lead to higher post-M&A long-term performance, and are
financed with a higher percentage of cash than those made by less mobile CEOs. In sum,
investment decisions pursued by more (less) mobile CEOs seem to be more (less) aligned with
shareholder interests.
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CONCLUSION
This paper explores the impact of acquirer CEOs’ mobility on the incidence and outcomes
of takeover decisions. Our results provide strong support for the CEO mobility effect in
acquisitions. Specifically, we find M&As consummated by more (less) mobile CEOs to be
associated with higher (lower) short-term shareholder gains. In addition, we find acquiring
companies led by CEOs with greater (lower) mobility to realize better (worse) post-M&A longterm performance, exhibit a higher (lower) propensity to engage in value-increasing M&A
activities, and tend to use cash (stock) to finance M&A transactions. Our findings are robust to
omitted variable bias (e.g., managerial ability and risk seeking inducing compensation), and selfselection bias. In summary, among different managerial characteristics, the findings of this study
demonstrate that CEO mobility plays an important role in explaining the nature of M&A decisions
and the variation of acquisition returns. More importantly, consistent with recent anecdotal
evidence, this study also suggests that increased managerial mobility can lead to the undertaking
of risky M&A decisions that ultimately improve firm performance.
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Table 3.1 M&A distribution by year and sample descriptive statistics
Panel A of this table reports successful M&A announcements made by U.S. publicly listed firms annually during the
1994 – 2016 period. The final sample comprises of 2,906 announcements. The four columns show the annual number
of M&A announcement for the full sample as well as the three subsamples based on the method of payment. Panel B
shows the descriptive statistics of the independent variables used in the main analysis. Column (5) to (7) report the
number of observations, mean and standard deviation while the last three columns show the 25 th, 50th and 75th
percentiles. Appendix 3.1 provides the variables’ definitions.

Year
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
Total

Full sample
(1)
28
87
137
120
136
139
120
93
103
118
138
149
131
149
120
98
156
178
165
130
146
154
111
2,906

Variable
Public target
Industry diversification
International diversification
100% cash
100% stock
Relative deal value
Firm size
Firm leverage
Firm market-to-book
Firm return on assets
CEO predicted mobility
CEO PCA mobility
CEO duality
CEO age
CEO tenure
CEO cash compensation

Panel A: M&A distribution by year
100% Stock
100% Cash
(2)
(3)
5
14
19
42
34
48
21
45
29
45
25
47
16
50
11
33
7
36
5
55
8
59
4
75
2
72
2
83
0
65
4
38
1
81
3
96
0
89
4
77
2
79
1
69
2
44
205
1,342
Panel B: Descriptive statistics
N
Mean
STD
25%
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
2,906
0.4542
0.4980
0.0000
2,906
0.3235
0.4679
0.0000
2,906
0.2017
0.4013
0.0000
2,906
0.4618
0.4986
0.0000
2,906
0.0705
0.2561
0.0000
2,906
0.0974
0.1555
0.0226
2,906
7.9375
1.5192
6.8446
2,906
0.1511
0.1451
0.0051
2,906
3.5811
5.8819
1.7325
2,906
0.0627
0.0766
0.0332
2,906
0.0333
0.9078
-0.4866
2,906
-0.0089
0.9701
-0.7212
2,906
0.5502
0.4976
0.0000
2,906
54.6493
7.7882
50.0000
2,906
7.3111
7.6535
2.0000
2,906
1.1241
1.2881
0.3076

Mixed
(4)
9
26
55
54
62
67
54
49
60
58
71
70
57
64
55
56
74
79
76
49
65
84
65
1,359
50%
(9)
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0451
7.7786
0.1300
2.6073
0.0622
-0.2274
0.0466
1.0000
55.0000
5.0000
0.7050

75%
(10)
1.0000
1.0000
0.0000
1.0000
0.0000
0.1012
8.8754
0.2459
3.9354
0.0963
0.2005
0.6760
1.0000
60.0000
10.0000
1.4686
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Table 3.2 Univariate results of acquirer abnormal stock returns
This table reports the univariate analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[-3,+3]) for different M&A
samples from 1994 to 2016. The cumulative abnormal returns (CAR[-3,+3]) are estimated using the one-factor model.
The estimation period is from t = -211 to t = -11. Panel A reports the average CAR, its standard deviation, and the
number of observations for the full sample, 100% cash, mixed, and 100% stock subsamples respectively. The first
three columns in panel B shows similar statistics for the three different terciles of CEOs based on CEO predicted
mobility, which is defined as the predicted value estimated from the logistic regression of switching position on 6
related mobility determinants. The last column of panel B reports the difference-in-means test between the high and
low mobility groups. Panel C shows similar statistics for the three different terciles of CEOs based on CEO PCA
mobility, which is defined as the weighted average of the five factors based on their eigenvalues estimated from the
PCA of all 14 related mobility determinants. ***, **, and * are used to indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10%
respectively. Appendix 3.1 provides the other variables’ definitions.
Panel A: Acquirer CARs for the full sample and the three subsamples based on method of payments
Variable
Full sample
100% Cash
Mixed
100% Stock
Mean
0.0041***
0.0087***
0.0026
-0.0163**
Standard error
0.0015
0.0020
0.0023
0.0064
Observations
2,906
1,342
1,359
205
Panel B: Acquirer CARs for the three terciles based on CEO predicted mobility
Bottom tercile
Middle tercile
Top tercile
Top - Bottom
(Less mobile
(More mobile
Variable
CEOs)
CEOs)
Mean
0.0007
0.0002
0.0113***
0.0107***
Standard error
0.0025
0.0025
0.0026
0.0036
Observations
968
969
969
N/A
Panel C: Acquirer CARs for the three terciles based on CEO PCA mobility
Bottom tercile
Middle tercile
Top tercile
Top - Bottom
(Less mobile
(More mobile
Variable
CEOs)
CEOs)
Mean
-0.0015
0.0068***
0.0068***
0.0083**
Standard error
0.0029
0.0025
0.0022
0.0036
Observations
968
969
969
N/A
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Table 3.3 Acquirer cumulative abnormal returns and CEO mobility
This table reports the OLS results of regressing seven-day acquirer cumulative abnormal returns, CAR[-3,+3], on
different measures of CEO mobility. CAR[-3,+3] is estimated using the one-factor model with the estimation period
from t = -211 to t = -11 days to the announcement date. CEO predicted mobility is the predicted value estimated from
the logistic regression of switching position on 6 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO PCA mobility is the
weighted average of the 5 factors based on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all 14 related determinants of
CEO mobility. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * are used to indicate
significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Appendix 3.1 provides the other variables’ definitions.
Variable
CEO predicted mobility

CAR[-3,+3]
(1)
0.0057***
(0.0017)

CEO PCA mobility
CEO duality
CEO age
CEO tenure
CEO cash compensation
Firm size
Firm leverage
Firm market-to-book
Firm return on assets
Public target
Industry diversification
International diversification
100% cash
100% stock
Relative deal value
Intercept
R2
Observations

0.0013
(0.0032)
0.0004*
(0.0002)
0.0002
(0.0002)
-0.0039*
(0.0023)
-0.0056***
(0.0015)
0.0193*
(0.0113)
-0.0004
(0.0003)
0.0415*
(0.0250)
-0.0007
(0.0037)
-0.0099***
(0.0031)
-0.0023
(0.0034)
0.0044
(0.0031)
-0.0155**
(0.0068)
-0.0157
(0.0172)
0.0306*
(0.0177)
2.28%
2,906

(2)
0.0065***
(0.0022)
-0.0027
(0.0034)
0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.0047**
(0.0023)
-0.0070***
(0.0016)
0.0106
(0.0114)
-0.0003
(0.0003)
0.0353
(0.0248)
-0.0012
(0.0037)
-0.0109***
(0.0031)
-0.0025
(0.0035)
0.0051
(0.0031)
-0.0136**
(0.0069)
-0.0161
(0.0172)
0.0654***
(0.0188)
2.28%
2,906
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Table 3.4 Acquirer post M&A long-term performance and CEO mobility
This table reports the OLS results of regressing two-year acquirer buy-and-hold abnormal returns, BHAR[+1,+500],
on different measures of CEO mobility. BHAR[+1,+500] is estimated using the one-factor model with the estimation
period from t = -211 to t = -11 days to the announcement date. CEO predicted mobility is the predicted value estimated
from the logistic regression of switching position on 6 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO PCA mobility is
the weighted average of the 5 factors based on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all 14 related determinants
of CEO mobility. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * are used to
indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Appendix 3.1 provides the other variables’ definitions.
Variable
CEO predicted mobility

BHAR[+1,+500]
(1)
0.1174***
(0.0421)

CEO PCA mobility
CEO duality
CEO age
CEO tenure
CEO cash compensation
Firm size
Firm leverage
Firm market-to-book
Firm return on assets
Public target
Industry diversification
International diversification
100% cash
100% stock
Relative deal value
Intercept
R2
Observations

-0.0716
(0.1707)
0.0117
(0.0147)
-0.0033
(0.0083)
-0.2819***
(0.0915)
-0.1430
(0.1354)
0.6174
(0.5772)
-0.1467
(0.1060)
6.5690**
(2.5956)
0.3037
(0.2806)
-0.1941
(0.2244)
-0.0246
(0.1514)
0.1762
(0.1556)
-1.4791
(0.9770)
-0.3220
(0.4345)
0.1283
(1.5798)
5.43%
2,906

(2)

0.3160**
(0.1363)
-0.2621
(0.2028)
0.0005
(0.0163)
-0.0100
(0.0089)
-0.3141***
(0.0974)
-0.2159
(0.1593)
0.1720
(0.5283)
-0.1410
(0.1055)
6.2468**
(2.5639)
0.2775
(0.2727)
-0.2429
(0.2350)
-0.0223
(0.1517)
0.1973
(0.1548)
-1.3788
(0.9475)
-0.3422
(0.4360)
1.5897
(1.9811)
5.61%
2,906
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Table 3.5 Acquirer M&A decisions and CEO mobility
This table reports the logistic regressions of acquirer M&A decisions on the measures of CEO mobility. The dependent
variable (i.e., the decision to engage in M&A activities) is a dummy that takes a value of one if a firm decides to
engage in M&As in a certain year, and zero otherwise. CEO predicted mobility is the predicted value estimated from
the logistic regression of switching position on 6 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO PCA mobility is the
weighted average of the 5 factors based on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all 14 related determinants of
CEO mobility. All models also include year and industry fixed effects; the latter is defined using two-digit SIC codes.
All independent variables are lagged by one period. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in
parentheses. ***, **, and * are used to indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Appendix 3.1
provides the other variables’ definitions.
Variable
CEO predicted mobility

M&A decisions
(1)
0.0683**
(0.0343)

CEO PCA mobility
CEO duality
CEO age
CEO tenure
CEO cash compensation
Firm size
Firm leverage
Firm market-to-book
Firm return on assets
Intercept
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Pseudo R2
Observations

-0.0253
(0.0468)
-0.0079***
(0.0029)
0.0000
(0.0032)
-0.0545***
(0.0199)
0.0684***
(0.0190)
-1.0573***
(0.1600)
-0.0017
(0.0029)
1.9461***
(0.2682)
-2.2995***
(0.2373)
Yes
Yes
6.78%
22,038

(2)
0.1014***
(0.0370)
-0.0854*
(0.0515)
-0.0119***
(0.0029)
-0.0029
(0.0030)
-0.0667***
(0.0203)
0.0469**
(0.0213)
-1.1314***
(0.1616)
-0.0017
(0.0030)
1.9594***
(0.2669)
-1.8298***
(0.2552)
Yes
Yes
7.13%
22,038
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Table 3.6 Acquirer payment decisions and CEO mobility
This table reports the Tobit regressions of acquirers’ use of cash in financing M&As (bounded between 0% and 100%)
on the measures of CEO mobility. The dependent variable is the percentage of cash acquirers use to finance the
takeover deals. CEO predicted mobility is the predicted value estimated from the logistic regression of switching
position on 6 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO PCA mobility is the weighted average of the 5 factors based
on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all 14 related determinants of CEO mobility. All models also include
year and industry fixed effects; the latter is defined using two-digit SIC codes. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * are used to indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Appendix 3.1 provides the other variables’ definitions.
Variable
CEO predicted mobility

Cash proportion
(1)
0.1345**
(0.0641)

CEO PCA mobility
CEO duality
CEO age
CEO tenure
CEO cash compensation
Firm size
Firm leverage
Firm market-to-book
Firm return on assets
Public target
Industry diversification
International diversification
Relative deal value
Intercept
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
AIC
Observations

0.0873
(0.0758)
0.0118**
(0.0049)
-0.0018
(0.0049)
-0.1332***
(0.0361)
-0.1458***
(0.0326)
0.1132
(0.2696)
-0.0163**
(0.0066)
1.6261***
(0.4745)
0.0554
(0.0790)
-0.3892***
(0.0761)
0.6662***
(0.1034)
-2.2540***
(0.2327)
3.9246***
(0.7746)
Yes
Yes
3,217.52
2,906

(2)
0.1830***
(0.0588)
-0.0203
(0.0824)
0.0043
(0.0048)
-0.0084*
(0.0045)
-0.1492***
(0.0364)
-0.1831***
(0.0355)
-0.0294
(0.2719)
-0.0147**
(0.0065)
1.5160***
(0.4713)
0.0423
(0.0788)
-0.3923***
(0.0758)
0.6628***
(0.1028)
-2.2743***
(0.2315)
4.9314***
(0.8125)
Yes
Yes
3,212.01
2,906
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Table 3.7 Acquirer diversification decisions and CEO mobility
This table reports the logistic regressions of acquirer diversification decisions (i.e., either across industries or country
borders) on the measures of CEO mobility. In the first (last) two columns, the dependent variable is a dummy that
take a value of one if the target firm belongs to a different two-digit SIC group (country) from that of the acquirer,
and zero otherwise. CEO predicted mobility is the predicted value estimated from the logistic regression of switching
position on 6 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO PCA mobility is the weighted average of the 5 factors based
on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all 14 related determinants of CEO mobility. All models also include
year and industry fixed effects; the latter is defined using two-digit SIC codes. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors are shown in parentheses. ***, **, and * are used to indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
Appendix 3.1 provides the other variables’ definitions.
Variable
CEO predicted mobility
CEO PCA mobility
CEO duality
CEO age
CEO tenure
CEO cash compensation
Firm size
Firm leverage
Firm market-to-book
Firm return on assets
Public target
100% cash
100% stock
Relative deal value
Intercept
Industry fixed effects
Year fixed effects
Pseudo R2
Observations

Industry diversification
(1)
(2)
0.0559
(0.0869)
0.0808
(0.0853)
0.0411
-0.0072
(0.0990)
(0.1104)
0.0005
-0.0031
(0.0069)
(0.0067)
-0.0056
-0.0080
(0.0069)
(0.0065)
-0.0161
-0.0245
(0.0496)
(0.0505)
0.0592
0.0395
(0.0457)
(0.0519)
-0.0615
-0.1260
(0.3754)
(0.3801)
-0.0069
-0.0058
(0.0085)
(0.0084)
-0.4416
-0.4736
(0.6055)
(0.6022)
-0.9758***
-0.9780***
(0.1095)
(0.1092)
-0.3583***
-0.3536***
(0.1012)
(0.1011)
0.4303**
0.4371**
(0.1870)
(0.1869)
0.1775
0.1662
(0.3084)
(0.3085)
-2.1933***
-1.7833***
(0.5445)
(0.6084)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
21.86%
21.88%
2,906
2,906

International diversification
(3)
(4)
-0.0739
(0.1067)
0.0632
(0.0896)
-0.0167
-0.0496
(0.1098)
(0.1208)
-0.0019
-0.0016
(0.0083)
(0.0083)
0.0032
0.0049
(0.0078)
(0.0073)
-0.0993*
-0.1043*
(0.0576)
(0.0577)
-0.0128
-0.0326
(0.0465)
(0.0500)
0.0178
-0.0069
(0.4134)
(0.4142)
-0.0105
-0.0097
(0.0075)
(0.0073)
0.6351
0.6255
(0.6608)
(0.6642)
-0.2123*
-0.2142*
(0.1254)
(0.1253)
-0.4070***
-0.4072***
(0.1126)
(0.1125)
-1.4537***
-1.4385***
(0.3431)
(0.3433)
-2.6416***
-2.6557***
(0.7149)
(0.7177)
-3.2576***
-3.1788***
(0.6028)
(0.6442)
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
12.84%
12.84%
2,906
2,906
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Table 3.8 Potential effects of managerial ability and CEO risk-seeking inducing compensation
This table reports the multivariate analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns, post-M&A long-term
performance, M&A decisions, and method of payments on the measures of CEO mobility controlling for managerial
ability and CEO risk preferences. In column (1) and (2), the dependent variable is CAR[-3,+3] estimated using the
one-factor model with the estimation period from t = -211 to t = -11 days to the announcement date. In column (3)
and (4), the dependent variable is BHAR[+1,+500] estimated using the one-factor model with the estimation period
from t = -211 to t = -11 days to the announcement date. In column (5) and (6), the dependent variable is a dummy that
takes a value of one if a firm decides to engage in M&As in a certain year, and zero otherwise. In column (7) and (8),
the dependent variable is the percentage of cash acquirers use to finance the takeover deals. CEO predicted mobility
is the predicted value from the logistic regression of switching position on 6 related determinants of CEO mobility.
CEO PCA mobility is the weighted average of the 5 factors based on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all
14 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO vega-to-delta is the ratio of CEO vega to CEO delta. Managerial
ability is the decile rank (by industry and year) of managerial efficiency estimated from Demerjian et al. (2012). Other
control variables are suppressed for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***,
**, and * are used to indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Appendix 3.1 provides the other
variables’ definitions.
Variable
CEO predicted mobility
CEO PCA mobility
CEO vega-to-delta
Managerial ability
Other controls
R2/Pseudo R2/AIC
Observations
Variable
CEO predicted mobility
CEO PCA mobility
CEO vega-to-delta
Managerial ability
Other controls
R2/Pseudo R2/AIC
Observations

CAR[-3,+3]
(1)
(2)
0.0057***
(0.0017)
0.0063***
(0.0022)
-0.0013
-0.0014
(0.0013)
(0.0013)
-0.0069
-0.0051
(0.0051)
(0.0051)
Yes
Yes
2.38%
2.36%
2,906
2,906
M&A decisions
(5)
(6)
0.0663*
(0.0343)
0.0944**
(0.0374)
0.0452*
0.0425*
(0.0232)
(0.0231)
0.0454
0.0648
(0.0792)
(0.0794)
Yes
Yes
6.83%
6.85%
22,038
22,038

BHAR[+1,+500]
(3)
(4)
0.1189***
(0.0421)
0.3127**
(0.1310)
0.0778
0.0734
(0.0615)
(0.0605)
-0.1394
-0.0427
(0.2264)
(0.2021)
Yes
Yes
5.47%
5.65%
2,906
2,906
Cash proportion
(7)
(8)
0.1287**
(0.0640)
0.1711***
(0.0599)
0.0690*
0.0650
(0.0407)
(0.0402)
-0.1720
-0.1186
(0.1260)
(0.1276)
Yes
Yes
3,217.16
3,212.84
2,906
2,906

Table 3.9 Heckman tests for self-selection bias
This table reports the multivariate analysis of acquirer cumulative abnormal returns, post-M&A long-term performance, and method of payments on the measures
of CEO mobility controlling for Heckman self-selection bias. In column (1) and (2), the dependent variable is CAR[-3,+3] estimated using the one-factor model
with the estimation period from t = -211 to t = -11 days to the announcement date. In column (3) and (4), the dependent variable is BHAR[+1,+500] estimated using
the one-factor model with the estimation period from t = -211 to t = -11 days to the announcement date. In column (5) and (6), the dependent variable is the
percentage of cash acquirers use to finance the takeover deals. CEO predicted mobility is the predicted value from the logistic regression of switching position on
6 related determinants of CEO mobility. CEO PCA mobility is the weighted average of the 5 factors based on their eigenvalues estimated from the PCA of all 14
related determinants of CEO mobility. Other control variables are suppressed for brevity. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. ***,
**, and * are used to indicate significant levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Appendix 3.1 provides the other variables’ definitions.
Variable
CEO predicted mobility
CEO PCA mobility
Inverse Mills ratio
Other controls
R2/Pseudo R2/AIC
Observations

CAR[-3,+3]
(1)
(2)
0.0062***
(0.0017)
0.0063***
(0.0022)
0.0042**
0.0029
(0.0018)
(0.0018)
Yes
Yes
2.45%
2.36%
2,906
2,906

BHAR[+1.+500]
(3)
(4)
0.0926**
(0.0438)
0.3413**
(0.1398)
-0.2018***
-0.2792***
(0.0746)
(0.0844)
Yes
Yes
5.53%
5.81%
2,906
2,906

Cash proportion
(5)
(6)
0.1817***
(0.0687)
0.2359***
(0.0649)
0.4077**
0.3781*
(0.2034)
(0.1982)
Yes
Yes
3,215.14
3,210.24
2,906
2,906
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APPENDICES
APPENDIX 1.1 ESSAY 1 VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
Variable
Firm Size
Firm Financial Leverage
Firm Market to Book Ratio
Relative Deal Value
Friendly Deal
Public Target
Private Target
Pre-crisis
During-crisis
Post-crisis
Stock Deal
International Diversification
Industrial Diversification
CEO Age
CEO Compensation
CEO Relative Leverage
CEO Relative Leverage (SERP)
CEO Relative Incentive
CEO Relative Incentive (SERP)

Description
Firm Characteristics
Log of (1 + Total Assets)
(Current Debt + Long-term Debt)/(Total Equity)
(Total Assets - Book Equity + Market Capitalization)/ (Total Assets)
Deal Characteristics
Deal value scaled by the acquirer’s total assets
Equals 1 if the acquisition was a friendly attempt, and 0 otherwise
Equals 1 if a public target was acquired, and 0 otherwise
Equals 1 if a private target was acquired, and 0 otherwise
Equals 1 if the announcement was made before 12/31/ 2007, and 0 otherwise
Equals 1 if the announcement was made after 12/31/2007 and before 06/30/2009, and 0 otherwise
Equals 1 if the announcement was made after 06/30/2009, and 0 otherwise
Equals 1 if at least 30% of the transaction was paid with the acquirers' stock, and 0 otherwise
Equals 1 if the target was a non-US company, and 0 otherwise
Equals 1 if the target was not in the same industry as the acquirer based on 2-digit SIC, and 0 otherwise
CEO Characteristics
Log of (CEO Age)
Log of (1 + Total Compensation)
(CEO Debt to Equity)/(Firm Debt to Equity)
(CEO Pension to Equity)/(Firm Debt to Equity)
(CEO Inside Debt/Change in CEO Equity)/(Firm Debt/Change in Firm Equity)
(CEO Pension/Change in CEO Equity)/(Firm Debt/Change in Firm Equity)
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APPENDIX 2.1 ESSAY 2 VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
Variable

Description

CEO relative leverage

CEO vega-to-delta ratio

CEO inside debt to CEO inside equity scaled by firm market leverage
after logarithm transformation
Equals one if CEO relative leverage is greater than or equal to one, and
zero otherwise
CEO inside debt to change in CEO inside equity scaled by the ratio of
firm debt to change in firm equity after logarithm transformation
Equals one if CEO relative incentive is greater than or equal to one, and
zero otherwise
CEO vega to CEO delta scaled by CEO debt-to-equity

CEO age

Natural logarithm of CEO age

CEO tenure

Natural logarithm of one plus the number of years the CEO has held the
CEO position
Natural logarithm of CEO salary plus bonus

CEO relative leverage ≥ 1
CEO relative incentive
CEO relative incentive ≥ 1

CEO cash compensation
CEO duality

Firm size

Equals one if the CEO is also the chair of the company's board of
directors, and zero otherwise
Equals one if the CEO's stock ownership is above the industry median,
and zero otherwise
Equals one if the ratio of the CEO's total compensation to the top five
executives' is greater than the industry median, and zero otherwise
Equals one if the CEO's tenure is above the industry median, and zero
otherwise
Natural logarithm of firm market capitalization

Firm leverage

Long-term debt to total equity

Firm market-to-book ratio

Market value of assets to book value of assets

Firm sales growth

Percentage change in sales from the previous period to the current
period
Firm R&D expense to firm total assets after logarithm transformation

CEO relative ownership
CEO pay slice
CEO relative tenure

Firm R&D
Firm free cash flows
Multiple announcements
CSR financial commitment
CSR environmental concern
CSR corporate philanthropy
CSR socially responsible investment

Ratio of earnings before depreciation and amortization minus the
change in working capital and capital expenditures to firm total assets
Equals one if the firm announces more than one CSR event in a year,
and zero otherwise
Equals one if the firm explicitly discloses the invested amount of money
is greater than $200,000, and zero otherwise
Equals one if the announcement is an environmental - related event, and
zero otherwise
Equals one if the announcement is a corporate philanthropy event, and
zero otherwise
Equals one if the announcement is a socially responsible investment,
and zero otherwise
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APPENDIX 3.1 ESSAY 3 VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS
Variable

Description
Deal & Firm Characteristics

Public status

Equals 1 if a public target was acquired, and 0 otherwise

Industry diversification
International diversification

Equals 1 if the target was not in the same industry as the acquirer based on
two-digit SIC, and 0 otherwise
Equals 1 if the target was a non-US company, and 0 otherwise

100% cash

Equals 1 if the whole transaction was paid with cash, and 0 otherwise

100% stock

Equals 1 if the whole transaction was paid with stock, and 0 otherwise

Relative deal value

Deal value scaled by the acquirer’s market value of assets

Firm size

Natural logarithm of market value of assets

Firm leverage

Ratio of long-term debt to total assets

Firm market-to-book-ratio

Ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity

Firm return on assets

Ratio of net income before extraordinary items to total assets
CEO Characteristics

CEO predicted mobility

CEO duality

The predicted value estimated from the logistic regression of switching
position on 6 related mobility determinants
The weighted average of the five factors based on their eigenvalues estimated
from the PCA of all 14 related mobility determinants
Equals 1 if the CEO is also the chair of the board, and 0 otherwise

CEO age

Age of the CEO in years

CEO tenure

Tenure of the CEO in years

CEO compensation

Sum of salary and bonus scaled by total assets

CEO PCA mobility
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